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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three chapters on the topic of intrahousehold resource 
allocation models. The first chapter tests the unitary and general collective models of 
intrahousehold resource allocation for various household compositions. I find that, for the quasi-
quadratic Engel curve specification, the overall results support the previous findings in the 
literature that the unitary model fails to explain how resources are allocated for all household 
types. However, when using the QUAIDS specification, the results can reject the unitary model 
only for smaller-sized households. The general collective model, on the other hand, cannot be 
rejected in either quasi-quadratic or QUAIDS and not in any of the household compositions. 
Overall, the results support the general collective model of household behavior rather than the 
unitary model. 
The second chapter derives and tests restrictions imposed by the collective model for 
households with more than two decision-makers in the absence of price variation. It extends the 
two-decision-maker model in chapter one to derive the testable restrictions for households with 
multiple decision makers using unconditional demand systems. Moreover, for comparison, a 
particular type of demand system that is conditional on distribution factors is also estimated as an 
alternative way to test the collective model. The results show that neither unconditional nor 
conditional demand systems can reject Pareto efficiency. Therefore, both approaches provide 
consistent outcomes supporting the hypothesis that the multiple-decision-maker households in 
Thailand behave in the Pareto efficient manner predicted by the collective model. 
Finally, my third chapter attempts to examine how one can exploit household-level 
consumption data to recover information about individual household members for situations with 
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no price variation. By combining consumption data from single and couple households, I am able 
to estimate the resource shares and indifference scales (a variation of the standard equivalence 
scales in the collective settings) for each household member via a system of Engel curves. The 
results show that, in Thailand, wives are likely to have higher resource shares than husbands in 
the married-couple households, while wives with higher education have the ability to extract 
more household resources. However, resource shares for wives are smaller for older-married 
compared to younger-married couples. Moreover, if a female were to live alone, she would need 
approximately three-quarters of the couple‟s income to reach the same indifference curve, and 
hence the same standard of living, that she would attain as a wife in the married-couple 
household. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Conventional economic analysis of consumption and welfare treats members of 
households as if they behaved as a single individual. This unitary perspective has been 
challenged by the collective approach, which emphasizes how the consumption and welfare of 
individuals partly depends on economic and social interactions within households. The unitary 
and collective models have different implications for the welfare effects of public policy and for 
the assessment of inequality in society, and for this reason many researchers have tested these 
models. A body of evidence has accumulated that rejects key implications of the unitary model, 
and a smaller body of evidence exists supporting predictions of the collective model.  
Previous tests of the unitary and collective models, however, suffer from at least four 
shortcomings. First, in most prior work, models are tested only for one particular type of 
household composition, usually a married couple with no children. But household composition, 
as measured by the number, ages, and genders of household members, is known to influence 
consumption decisions. The presence of children has a particularly strong influence on 
household behavior. It is not clear whether test results obtained for one type of household apply 
more broadly to other types. Second, prior tests of unitary and collective models without price 
variation have relied almost exclusively on one functional form for describing household 
consumption behavior, the quasi-quadratic Engel curve. This functional form is not consistent 
with preference maximization and is not typically employed in analysis of household 
expenditures using the unitary model. It is not clear whether rejection of the unitary model in this 
setting, or support for the collective model, is an artifact of the peculiar choice of functional 
form. Third, the testable implications of the collective model have not been derived for all 
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applications. Specifically, testable restrictions for households with more than two decision-
makers have not been derived for situations with no price variation. Many households may 
include more than two persons with a voice in decisions, and cross-sectional analyses of 
consumption almost always must be conducted in the absence of price variation. Fourth, prior 
studies have given relatively little attention to whether a statistically significant difference 
between unitary and collective models translates into a substantive difference in conclusions 
about economic welfare.  
This dissertation addresses these four issues using cross-sectional consumption data from 
Thailand. The dissertation is organized as follows. The first chapter tests the unitary and general 
collective models of intrahousehold resource allocation for various household compositions, 
using both the quasi-quadratic functional form and the utility-theoretic Quadratic Almost Ideal 
Demand System (QUAIDS) commonly employed in the analysis of household budgets in the 
unitary framework. The second chapter derives and tests restrictions imposed by the collective 
model for households with more than two decision-makers in the absence of price variation. It 
extends the two-decision-maker model in chapter one to derive the testable restrictions for 
households with multiple decision makers using unconditional demand systems. Finally, since 
measuring consumption inequality is a major application of the analysis of household 
expenditures, the third chapter attempts to estimate measures of consumption inequality that are 
based on the collective model.  
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CHAPTER ONE: TESTING THE UNITARY VS. COLLECTIVE MODELS 
OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR USING THAI CONSUMPTION DATA 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 Economic policy analyses often focus on individual welfare based on such outcomes as 
level of income, consumption, literacy, employment, or health condition. However, it is widely 
recognized that the welfare of an individual is based not only on own decisions, but also on the 
economic and social interactions within the household. These interactions can be affected by the 
process of allocating resources among household members, and the outcomes of this process can 
be referred to as intrahousehold resource allocation. Several models of intrahousehold resource 
allocation exist in the literature to examine household behavior: unitary model (Samuelson 1956; 
Becker 1981), general collective model (Chiappori 1988, 1992), cooperative bargaining model 
with cooperative outcome (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981), and 
cooperative bargaining model with noncooperative outcome (Lundberg and Pollak 1993).  
If we assume that households make consumption decisions as if they maximize a single 
utility function given a budget constraint, then we must predict that only total household income 
should matter in their consumption decisions and the various sources of income should be 
irrelevant. However, the unitary model has been challenged by a number of empirical studies that 
have rejected this income pooling hypothesis using different data sets from different countries 
(Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990; Bourguignon et al. 1993; Thomas and Chen 1994; Lundberg et al. 
1997; Ward-Batts 2008). Thus, collective models of household behavior which do not predict 
income pooling have attracted increasing attention from economists during recent years. This 
chapter will attempt to test these two models of intrahousehold resource allocations using 
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consumption expenditure data from Thailand: the unitary model which assumes that each 
household maximizes a single utility function subject to its pooled budget constraint; and the 
general collective model which assumes that each household member has separate utility 
functions, and that the household reaches a Pareto efficient outcome. 
However, neither the unitary nor the collective models have taken into consideration the 
possibilities that different household types may have different allocation methods. By different 
household types, I refer to households with a different number of people living in the same 
house. Different regions and countries are likely to have different household compositions. 
According to Bongaarts (2001), average household size in the developing world during 1990 to 
1998 ranges from 4.8 in Latin America to 5.6 in the Near East/North Africa; with 5.1 in Asia and 
5.2 in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, the average household size in the developed 
countries during late 1990s is much lower ranging from 2.1 in Sweden to 3.1 in Ireland; with 2.6 
in United States and Canada, 2.5 in France, and 2.4 in United Kingdom (Economic Commission 
for Europe Statistical Division, 2001). 
Moreover, households consisting of spouses only are likely to behave differently from 
households consisting of spouses with children on how to allocate resources among household 
members. As noted by Browning (1992), every aspect of household economic behavior is 
significantly correlated with the presence of children in the household. For example, young 
children are correlated with lower labor supply by the mothers while older children are correlated 
with higher consumption by the household as a whole. Even when comparing among nuclear 
families, smaller-size and bigger-size families may behave differently when some decisions need 
to be made within the family.  
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Apart from children, it is fairly common in many developing countries to have other 
types of dependents living in the same house. This may partly contribute to the fact that most 
developing countries have larger average household size than that of developed countries. This is 
also common in Thai society where the average household size is 4.4 in year 1990 and 4.0 in 
year 2000 (National Statistical Office Thailand, 2000). These dependents may include household 
head‟s and spouse‟s grandchildren, parents, grandparents, cousins and other blood relatives who 
have no income. Consequently, their consumption allocations depend only on incomes of 
household head, spouse, or other income earners of the family. All of these differences in 
household types imply that, in some cases, when we reject the income pooling hypothesis on one 
particular household type in one particular region, it does not necessarily mean that we will have 
to reject the same hypothesis when considering other household types in other regions. This is 
also true in the case of other alternative models. 
There are two concerns that should be mentioned when we try to analyze the models of 
intrahousehold resource allocations. First, it is difficult to determine how resources are actually 
allocated within households since in most household surveys, consumption and expenditure data 
are collected at the household rather than individual level so individual consumption is not 
directly observed. Without individual level data, it is difficult to determine which individuals are 
consumers of goods purchased by the household. For example, housing expenditures have a 
public good component within the household. Expenditures on specific goods may be assignable 
such as expenditures on men‟s, women‟s, and children‟s clothing. Even for such assignable 
goods, however, there may be externalities within the household; for example, an individual 
within the household may care whether other household members are well dressed. Another 
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example is that, in most parts of the world, women are more responsible for purchasing food than 
men. This information, however, does not tell us how the food will be distributed among 
household members (Doss 1996). 
Second, endogeneity of the distribution of income within the household may create 
problems when testing these models. An example is earned income since its distribution and 
magnitude depend on hours worked by each member, which may be determined jointly with 
household expenditures. As noted by Browning and Meghir (1991), if hours of work affect 
preferences between individual goods then demand systems that take no account of this 
dependence may give biased estimates. However, testing these models based on unearned 
income instead of earned income may mitigate but does not completely avoid this problem. For 
example, as pointed out by Lundberg et al. (1997) and Ward-Batts (2008), income from assets 
may be correlated with past and current labor supplies, while public and private transfers may be 
responsive to household distress due to unemployment or bad health, and may be related to 
expenditures through the events that prompted them. Other sources of unexpected unearned 
income that are not subject to these concerns tend to be irregular, so they are not appropriate 
sources of income to test these models. 
In order to test these two models in a consistent framework, I follow the strategies 
adopted by Bourguignon et al. (1993) and Thomas and Chen (1994) who apply a theoretical 
model of collective decision making which nests both the income pooling and the Pareto 
efficient hypotheses within a general specification of consumption behavior. In this framework, 
the assumption of Pareto efficient allocation within the household generates testable restrictions 
on the parameters of the model. This may be done by observing only aggregate household 
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consumption of goods rather than individual consumption levels, so we need not to assume that 
goods are assignable. Moreover, instead of treating household income as endogenous, I will treat 
household income exogenously by using the data of couples in which both partners are full-time 
employees in the paid labor market as suggested by Bourguignon et al. (1993). Using exogenous 
income in testing these two models may reduce the endogeneity problem of income distribution 
by making household consumption decisions independent from household leisure choices. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 gives a brief review of the existing 
theoretical literature on models of household behavior. Section 1.3 provides details of the unitary 
and the general collective models together with their testable restrictions. Section 1.4 describes 
sample data. Section 1.5 outlines the empirical model of household expenditures estimated in 
this chapter and presents results. Finally, the conclusions are provided in Section 1.6. 
 
1.2. Models of household resource allocations 
 The early models of household behavior, not unexpectedly, were extensions of existing 
models of individual behavior and hence are termed unitary models. For example, Samuelson 
(1956) proposes modeling household as if they are maximizing a single household utility 
function reached by consensus among individual household members so that the household can 
be considered as an elementary decision unit. An alternative justification for this traditional 
model is that there is one household member (a dictator) who determines all allocations from the 
point of view of an altruist who cares about other household members (Becker 1981). The 
unitary approach has the advantages of simplicity and convenience because the results derived 
for individual can be directly extended to the household situation.  
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 One implication of the unitary model is that only total household income, and not the 
separate incomes of individual members, will affect household demands. Which household 
member receives income is irrelevant to the allocation of household resources. Rejection of the 
pooling hypothesis, and hence unitary model, has important implications for the effectiveness of 
policies aimed at improving welfare of particular household members. The unitary model implies 
that transfer policies that attempt to redistribute income to particular household members will be 
neutralized by reallocations of household resources. The welfare of the targeted member may be 
improved, but no more or less than if the transfer had been given to another household member. 
In other words, a dollar of the transfer income has the same effect on household demands 
whether the transfer is made to the husband or to the wife.  
 While treating the household as a single homogeneous unit has the advantages of 
simplicity and convenience, aggregating a group of individuals into a household in this way 
involves invoking assumptions that are not theoretically attractive. i.e., all household resources 
are pooled. The unitary model also has been challenged by a number of empirical studies that 
have rejected the income pooling hypothesis (Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990; Bourguignon et al. 
1993; Thomas and Chen 1994; Lundberg et al. 1997; Ward-Batts 2008). On the other hand, a 
variety of collective models of household behavior have been developed to allow for the 
possibility that each household member has distinct preferences. These models do not impose the 
income pooling hypothesis. They include general collective model (Chiappori 1988, 1992), 
cooperative bargaining model with cooperative outcome (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and 
Horney 1981), and cooperative bargaining model with noncooperative outcome (Lundberg and 
Pollak 1993).  
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The general collective model proposed by Chiappori (1988; 1992) allows the husband 
and wife to have separate utility functions. This model assumes only that husband and wife 
somehow choose an allocation of resources which is Pareto efficient such that neither could be 
made better off by a redistribution of consumption goods without making the other worse off. 
This model does not specify the process used by the household to reach Pareto efficiency, so it is 
not a bargaining model. This is equivalent to the assumption that couples first share non-labor 
income; then, given individual shares, each spouse chooses labor supply and consumption to 
maximize his or her well-being. Sources of income can matter from this perspective if 
contributions to total income influence the share one is allocated. This framework was designed 
to let the data describe intrahousehold resource allocations and to use a minimum number of 
assumptions to gain as much information from the data as possible.  
 The cooperative bargaining model of household behavior was initially developed by 
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981). They propose a bargaining 
framework in which household decisions are made through a cooperative Nash-bargaining game. 
In McElroy and Horney‟s model, it is again assumed that husband and wife have separate utility 
functions, and each spouse receives utility from a pure public good. In addition, each spouse 
values leisure and consumption of private goods. They solve a Nash-bargaining problem in 
which each individual‟s threat point depends on options outside of the marriage; it is the utility 
that each spouse would obtain if divorced. In addition to Pareto efficiency, the Nash bargaining 
solution assumes three more axioms: symmetry, independence of utility origins and units, and 
contraction independence (see Vermeulen 2002). To the extent that current income is a predictor 
of income options in the event of divorce, each spouse‟s individual income will affect relative 
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bargaining power and hence the allocation of resources. In addition to income, the cooperative 
bargaining model suggests that factors such as divorce laws, child support laws, tax laws and 
transfer programs will affect relative bargaining power. McElroy (1990) refers to such factors as 
“extrahousehold environmental parameters.” Browning et al. (1994) refer to them as 
“distribution factors.” 
 Since it may be too extreme to suppose that spouses threaten divorce over every marital 
disagreement, alternative threat points should be considered. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) 
propose what they call “the separate spheres bargaining model” in which threat points are 
noncooperative outcomes within the marriage which reflect traditional gender roles. If an 
agreement cannot be reached through negotiation, gender roles determine each individual‟s 
contribution to household public goods within their respective spheres of influence; for example, 
men may be responsible for expenditures on housing, while women are responsible for 
expenditures on child care. The implication of this model is that it generates corner solutions in 
the provision of public goods. Because public goods are provided voluntarily, they may be 
underprovided within the household, as is typical in models with voluntarily provided public 
goods. So, both Pareto efficient and non-Pareto efficient outcomes are consistent with this 
model. 
 
1.3. Testing unitary versus collective models 
 Each model described in previous section has a different set of assumptions and makes 
different predictions about how resources will be allocated within households. To examine a 
model, it is important to test the validity of the predictions against the data to see whether 
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outcomes are consistent with the model. In this chapter, I will focus on testing the unitary model 
and the general collective model of Chiappori (1988, 1992) using consumption expenditure data 
from Thailand. The unitary model can be tested based on the income pooling hypothesis that 
only total household income affects household demands for consumption of goods, while the 
general collective model can be tested based on implications of the Pareto efficiency hypothesis.  
I have chosen to focus on testing these two models for two main reasons. First, testing the 
unitary model seems to be a sensible first step to study the household behavior. If we cannot 
reject the income pooling hypothesis, then modeling the household as an individual may be 
advantageous because the approach is simple and convenient. Second, testing the general 
collective model does not require the estimation of threat points as required by the bargaining 
models. This is important for an empirical purpose because estimating threat points requires a 
cardinal representation of preferences. 
During the past two decades, several empirical studies have rejected the unitary model 
focusing on either labor supply or on consumption demand. Schultz (1990) tests for the 
determination of husband and wife labor supply and fertility using unearned income based on the 
1981 Socioeconomic Survey of Thailand. He rejects the prediction of the unitary model that 
variables measuring the unearned income of the husband and the wife have equal coefficients in 
the wife‟s labor supply equation. He finds that women prefer to consume more leisure time when 
their unearned income increases but the effect for men‟s labor supply is not statistically 
significant. Moreover, unearned income owned by the wife is significantly related to higher 
fertility, and this effect is not evident for husband‟s unearned income. 
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Thomas (1990) uses survey data on family health and nutrition in Brazil for 1974-1975 to 
reject the unitary model prediction of the equality of parental income effects. He shows that 
unearned income received by a mother has a much larger positive effect on the health of family 
members than does unearned income received by a father. Moreover, the unitary model is also 
rejected for gender preference when considering household resource allocations on child 
anthropometric indicators. He finds that mothers prefer to devote resources to improve the 
heights and weights of their daughters, while fathers prefer to do the same for their sons. 
Bourguignon et al. (1993) use French household survey data in 1984-1985 to study 
models of intrahousehold allocation focusing on household consumption expenditures. Initially, 
they plan to analyze the behavior of couples without children because children and expenditure 
on them may be considered as public goods by both parents, while the model analyzed in their 
paper only allows for private goods. However, it turns out that considering only childless couples 
leads to too small of a sample size. For this reason, they also include couples with one child in 
the sample which still provides only 843 households. Complying with the fixed labor supply 
model by analyzing the effects of exogenous incomes on consumption expenditures, they are 
able to reject the unitary model that individual incomes have no effect on how household 
resources are allocated. Conversely, they are unable to reject the collective model which suggests 
that actual behavior may prove not to be inconsistent with the cooperative hypothesis. 
Thomas and Chen (1994) use individual and household incomes from household budget 
survey data in Taiwan in year 1980 to test the unitary and collective models focusing on ten 
expenditure groups. They examine three samples separately; the first sample contains a full 
sample of all 14,697 households; the second sub-sample includes only those households with 
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both male and female head present; and the third sub-sample restricts the sample to include only 
those who live in urban areas. They also examine a series of empirical Engel curves; each 
includes only non-labor income which is treated as exogenous, or total income (labor and non-
labor) which is treated as endogenous. Overall, the evidence indicates that the unitary model is 
not consistent with Taiwanese data while the collective model performs very well with the data 
for each pair of goods. However, these results rely critically on the assumption that total income 
is not exogenous. When total income is not instrumented, the collective model is rejected for 19 
of 45 pairs of goods. The difference in results illustrates that the assumptions used when 
specifying and estimating Engel curves can influence inferences about intrahousehold resource 
allocation. 
Lundberg et al. (1997) use U.K. Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data for the period of 
1973-90 to test the income pooling hypothesis based on a policy change in the U.K. that 
transferred a substantial child allowance from husbands to wives in the late 1970s. They consider 
expenditure patterns for families consisting of one child; two children; and three children. 
Childless couples are excluded because the wide age range of families (which include the 
elderly) is likely to result in expenditure patterns incomparable to those of households containing 
children. They use clothing expenditure as a prime category to examine the effect of a policy 
change because clothing expenditures are assignable to individual household members. The 
results clearly reject the income pooling hypothesis since there are significant changes in 
clothing expenditure patterns. For families with two or three children, there is a substantial 
increase in spending on women‟s and children‟s clothing relative to men‟s clothing following the 
transfer of resources from men to women. There is no significant change in the one-child 
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families, while for families with two and three children the differences are significant. The 
difference in results illustrates that conclusions about intrahousehold resource allocation may 
depend on household composition. 
Ward-Batts (2008) uses micro level data to analyze how budget shares change before and 
after the same child benefit reform in the UK for the two-parent families with and without 
children as an extension of Lundberg et al. (1997). Her overall results support the findings by 
Lundberg et al. (1997) which reject income pooling. In addition, she finds one interesting result 
that the estimates of budget shares among married-couple households with no children do not 
show a similar pattern of change to that in households with children. The sample without 
children shows no change in broad goods expenditures, or in narrowly defined goods with the 
exception of tobacco categories. Other tobacco is the only good for which similar changes are 
found in households with and without children.  
 Unlike previous studies that often test unitary or collective models using only one or a 
few household types, I will test both models using a broader range of household types, including 
non-nuclear families. This emphasis on household composition fits particularly well with the 
traditional Thai society in which not only children but also other blood relatives live together in 
the same household. One important assumption imposed for the models estimated in this chapter 
is that each family must have only two income earners who are spouses while the remaining 
family members are dependents with no income. This restriction allows us to compare the results 
from this chapter with the results from previous studies that consider only the two-earner 
households, with the emphasis on the differences in results that may have been affected by 
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household composition. This restriction will be relaxed in chapter two where I consider 
consumption allocation of multiple-earner households. 
Let us begin by considering a household consisting of an earning couple with D 
dependents in which one of the spouses is a dictator who has an altruistic preference. Thus, the 
dictator determines all allocations to household members as if solving the problem  
 );,,(
,,
axxxUMax dwh
xxx dwh
, d = 1,…, D      (1.1) 
subject to a budget constraint          
      yyyyxpxpxp
wh
D
d
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where ),,( dwhjx
j   denotes consumption of a vector of goods by individual j (husband, wife, 
and the thd  dependent), dx equals zero when the household has no dependents, a denotes a 
vector of individual and household characteristics, 
jp denotes a vector of prices faced by 
individual j, 
jy  denotes exogenous income (full-time wage and salary in the labor market) of 
individual j, and y
0
 represents exogenous joint household income (non-invested household 
income, e.g. assistance from other persons outside the household) .  
 Assuming that the utility function U(.) is continuous and quasiconcave, and the second 
order sufficient condition is satisfied, then by the implicit function theorem we can solve the 
first-order conditions of problem (1.1) for the demand for good i by individual j, 
j
ix . In general, 
j
ix will depend on all prices p
h
, p
w
, and 
dp denoted by p, and exogenous incomes y0, yh and yw as 
well as individual and household characteristics a:  
 );,,,( 0 ayyypxx whji
j
i  .        (1.2) 
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  When only household consumption is observed, the household demand for good i can be 
written as: 
 );,,,(
0
1
ayyypxxxxx whi
D
d
d
i
w
i
h
ii  

.     (1.3) 
 However, in the unitary model, whether income is received by husband or wife is 
irrelevant. The income pooling hypothesis predicts that household demand only depends on total 
household income, y = y
0
 + y
h
 + y
w
 as well as all prices and household characteristics. Then, the 
household demand for good i can also be written as: 
 );,( aypxx ii  .         (1.4) 
Equation (1.4) implies that it does not matter who controls income in the household so 
that redistribution of income within the household should not affect household resource 
allocations. This suggests a simple test of the income pooling hypothesis that in the household 
demand function for good i, the marginal effects of husband‟s and wife‟s incomes should be 
zero. If the income pooling is rejected, hence the unitary model, then we should determine what 
other household model might be consistent with the data. Thus, I continue to test if the data is 
consistent with the general collective model. 
 Continuing with the assumption that a household consists of two spouses and any number 
of dependents, and assume further that each spouse has altruistic preferences in the sense that 
each cares about every member‟s consumption of goods. I also assume that all dependents only 
play a passive role in this model such that all consumption decisions are made by the spouses. 
Thus, I will treat dependents‟ consumptions as household public goods. Let dependents‟ 
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consumptions and all other household public goods be represented by X, then any Pareto 
efficient allocations solves the problem: 
 );,,(
,,
aXxxUMax whh
Xxx wh
        (1.5) 
subject to            
     
wwhw uaXxxU );,,(      
    yyyyPXxpxp
whwwhh  0  
where wu is some required utility level for the wife and P denotes a price vector for public 
goods. Thus, the maximization problem (1.5) seeks an allocation that maximizes the husband‟s 
welfare subject to a given welfare level required for the wife and to the household budget 
constraint. By varying wu , all Pareto efficient allocations can be traced out. This set of Pareto 
efficient allocations forms the boundary of the utility possibility set, which captures all attainable 
vectors of utility levels for the household. 
 According to Chiappori (1992) and Vermeulen (2002), the household allocation problem 
(1.5) is equivalent to the following maximization problem: 
 );,,()1();,,(
,,
aXxxUaXxxUMax whwwhh
Xxx wh
      (1.6) 
subject to 
     yPXxpxp
wwhh   
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where 0 < µ < 1.
1
 In this social welfare context, welfare weights µ and (1- µ) are attached to both 
husband and wife. In general, the weighting function µ will depend on the exogenous variables 
which can be written as:
 
 ),,,,,,(
0 ayyyPpp whwh  .       (1.7) 
 These welfare weights play an important role in this model. An interpretation of these 
welfare weights is that they represent the bargaining power of the spouses in the intrahousehold 
allocation process. Changes in prices, exogenous incomes or household characteristics may shift 
bargaining power from one spouse to another. Solving maximization problem (1.6) yields the 
demand for any private good, xi, and the demand for any public good, Xm, as a function of prices, 
total household income and the household characteristics as well as the welfare weight, μ: 
 ),,,,,( ayPppxx whii          (1.8) 
 ),,,,,( ayPppXX whmm  .       (1.9) 
 Since we have the data on each spouse‟s individual income yh and yw, then we can 
differentiate the demand function (1.8) with respect to y
h
 and y
w
 to obtain: 
                                                 
1 To see this, note that the Lagrangian function of the maximization problem (1.5) equals:  
].[]);,,([);,,( 0 PXxpxpyyyuaXxxUaXxxU wwhhwhwwhwwhh  
  
Multiplying this Lagrangian function by 
1
1
, results in  
][);,,()1();,,( 0 PXxpxpyyyaXxxUaXxxU wwhhwhwhwwhh  
 
where 




1
1
 and 





1
 and where the unimportant constant 
wu for the maximization problem has been 
eliminated. See Vermeulen (2002). 
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 By dividing (1.10) by (1.11) holding total household income constant, the ratio of any 
two income effects can be written as  
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which is independent of i for private good. 
 Similarly, we can differentiate the demand function (1.9) with respect to y
h
 and y
w
 to 
obtain: 
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        (1.13) 
which is independent of m for public good. 
Thus, (1.12) and (1.13) provide a straightforward test for Pareto efficiency which is a 
simple way to test the validity of the general collective model. They imply that the ratio of 
husband income effects to wife income effects will be the same across all pairs of goods. 
 
1.4. Data   
 The data comes from the Socio-Economic Survey (SES) conducted by National 
Statistical Office of Thailand (NSO) on a sample of about 52,000 households in year 2006. The 
SES has been carried out every two years. The objective of the survey is to collect economic and 
social information about households such as income, expenditures, housing characteristics, 
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ownership of selected durable goods and changes in assets and liabilities, for measuring the 
variation in levels of living and disparities among households in different socioeconomic groups 
and geographic areas. All sample households were divided into 12 equally representative sub-
samples, and each sub-sample household group was interviewed about economic and social 
information for a one month period, from January to December 2006. The survey covered all 
private, non-institutional households residing permanently in municipal areas and non-municipal 
areas of all 76 provinces from five regions of Thailand. However, it excluded the population 
living in transient hotels and rooming houses, hostels, boarding schools, or living in institutions 
such as temples, military barracks, prisons, welfare institutes, hospitals and other such 
institutions. It also excluded households of foreign diplomats and other temporary residents. 
 Dependent variables are monthly consumption expenditures for each of 12 categories. 
This excludes expenditures on durable goods such as automobiles, televisions, refrigerators, 
household furniture.
2
 For each category, the survey records the consumption data in terms of last 
month expenditures on more frequently purchased goods, while recording monthly average of 
expenditures during the past 12 months for less frequently purchased goods. This data recording 
technique helps to avoid the problem of households recording zero consumption on some 
infrequently purchased goods that are not „true‟ zeros as pointed out by Phipps and Burton 
(1998). 
 The survey records three measurements of spouses‟ incomes depending on how the 
questions are written in the survey. The first question is a direct question asking how much each 
                                                 
2 I choose to exclude expenditures on durable goods from monthly consumption expenditures because total 
consumption expenditure may be higher in periods when households purchase durable goods so that it may not 
represent the usual household‟s consumption patterns. However, the overall results are similar when including 
durable goods to monthly consumption expenditures, and are available upon request from the author. 
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spouse typically earns from their jobs per month. The second question asks how much they 
actually received from their jobs last month. The third question asks how much they actually 
received from their jobs during the past 12 months. In order to obtain an average monthly 
income from the third question, I divide the income received during the past 12 months by the 
actual length of the working period. The data show that the correlations among these three 
measurements of monthly incomes are significantly high: 0.96 between direct and last month 
questions, 0.98 between direct and average monthly questions, and 0.95 between last month and 
average monthly questions. In this chapter, I choose to use incomes recorded from the direct 
question because that is normally the amount people deem to possess in Thai society. Moreover, 
workers in some occupations may have not yet received last month payments during the month 
of the interview. Using incomes from the direct question also has an advantage of reducing a 
number of workers reporting zero income compared to the case where the question of the actual 
incomes received last month had been chosen. 
 Level of education is recorded as the highest level of official educational attainment, so I 
convert each level of official education attainment into official years in school. Age is recorded 
up to subject‟s last birthday. Household size accounts for everyone excluding maids and 
servants, while children variables account for the number of younger children (aged less than 
five years) and older children (aged between 6 to 14 years) living in the same residence. 
Ownership dummies correspond to whether households own houses or vehicles. Regional 
dummies indicate residence in Bangkok or other regions of Thailand, and the urban dummy 
denotes residence in a municipal area.  
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 To be consistent with the model presented in the previous section, the sample is limited to 
households consisting of a married couple with one spouse recorded as head of the household, 
living with or without dependents of all ages. Both spouses are full-time employees who work 
for a minimum of 35 hours per week outside their home, and no one other than these spouses is 
reported to have any income. This results in a total sample size of 2933 households. Table 1 
provides overall descriptive statistics for this sample. 
 
1.5. Empirical model of household expenditures and results 
 Before testing the validity of the predictions of the unitary against the collective models, 
let us first assume that households behave according to the unitary model. This implies that only 
total household income, and not the separate incomes of individual members, will affect 
household demands.  
Following Bourguignon et al. (1993), without price variation, the individual Engel curves 
for all 12 categories for the unitary household model are assumed to have the following quasi-
quadratic form: 
 
g
gg
t
tt
t
t uayyC 
2)(
     
 (1.14) 
where C represents the 12 categories of consumption expenditures on private and public goods, a 
includes g demographic variables including household size, number of young and older children, 
ownership of houses and vehicles, age and level of education of both spouses, urban and regional 
dummies, and where u is a disturbance. Notice that parameters in Equation (1.14) vary over 
goods whereas variables and the disturbances vary over goods and across households. The 
household and good subscripts are suppressed to simplify notation. Table 2 provides the 
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estimates from the system of equations using the seemingly unrelated regression estimation 
(SURE) for the full sample size of 2933 households.  
 The results in Table 2 show that consumption expenditure data from Thailand fits well 
with the quasi-quadratic form by looking at the R-squared values. Ten of 12 categories have R-
squared values exceeding 0.22 and the only two categories that have low R-squared values are 
health, and alcohol and tobacco. The coefficient on household size is positive and significant at 
the 1% on seven categories, while it is insignificant on four, and negatively significant at 5% 
only on the alcohol and tobacco category. The results are sensible because larger households are 
expected to spend more on goods like housing, household operations, and food, requiring them 
to cut back on some of non-essentials like alcohol and tobacco.  
The presence of children has a significant impact (mostly negative) on all but one 
consumption categories at the 10% level of significance or lower, after removing effects of 
household size. It provides additional supports to Browning (1992)‟s argument that household 
economic behavior is significantly correlated with the presence of children, especially when we 
look at the effects of children on household food consumption both at home and outside of home. 
Results indicate that couples without children and those with varying numbers of children differ 
in how they allocate their resources. For example, the results show that couples with more 
children spend more on food at home and less on food outside of home than do couples with 
fewer or no children. Moreover, younger children tend to increase the expenditure on personal 
and services category, possibly because mothers who work full time may require more help (day 
care), while older children tend to increase the expenditures on clothing and footwear, and 
cosmetic products.  
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When looking at the demographic influences, higher-educated spouses tend to spend 
more on almost all categories, while ages of spouses have no significant impact on their 
consumption patterns. People living Bangkok clearly spend more on most categories than people 
living in other regions, except for cosmetic and alcohol and tobacco products. Foods are more 
expensive in the municipal than rural areas.  
The coefficient on total income is significant at 1% on all categories, while the 
coefficient on total income square is significant on nine categories. Using these highly significant 
income coefficients, we can calculate income elasticities, EY, to determine which categories can 
be considered inferior or normal goods.
3
 When evaluated at the mean total household income 
(23,059 baht), 11 out of 12 categories can be considered normal goods, while the only inferior 
good is cosmetic. When evaluated over the income distribution, only six categories can be 
considered normal goods at all income levels because both t  and tt  are positive. These 
categories are housing, household operation, clothing and footwear, transportation and 
communication, education, and recreation and religion. Personal and services, and cosmetic are 
considered inferior goods up to where household income levels reach 22,058 baht and 34,960 
baht, respectively, and then become normal goods. Health, food at home, food outside, and 
alcohol and tobacco are considered normal goods up to where household income levels reach 
                                                 
3 The income elasticities YE  is equal to  
C
y
y ttttt  2 . The critical income level that switch goods from 
normal to inferior goods (when 0t  and 0tt ) , or from inferior to normal goods (when 0t  and 
0tt )  is 
tt
t
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

2

 .   
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152,440 baht, 249,919 baht, 1,436,950 baht, and 140,483 baht, respectively, and then become 
inferior goods.
4
  
 Next, I will estimate the unitary model using another specification of the Engel curve 
developed by Banks et al. (1997) to see whether the results are similar to those obtained using 
the quasi-quadratic form. They propose what they call the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand 
System (QUAIDS) which generalizes the Almost Ideal (AI) model of Deaton and Muellbauer 
(1980) for more flexibility by having both linear and quadratic log total expenditure as the 
leading terms. The reasons why I choose to consider another specification of the Engel curve is 
to address three problems resulting from relying solely on the quasi-quadratic form. First, the 
quasi-quadratic is not consistent with utility maximizing behavior, whereas the QUAIDS is. 
Second, the quasi-quadratic form, while frequently used to test the unitary model, is rarely used 
by researchers who apply the unitary model to study household expenditures. Third, income 
effects often vary as income levels change, and thus inferences may differ according to the 
functional form used to represent nonlinear effects of income on demand (Banks et al. 1997). 
Without price variation, the QUAIDS for unitary model takes the following form of the 
expenditure share equation system:  
 
g
ggEEE vaEEw 
2)(lnln      (1.15) 
where w represents shares of consumption expenditures on each good, E represents total 
household consumption expenditure, a includes g demographic variables as described earlier, 
and where v is a disturbance. For simplification, notice again that parameters in Equation (1.15) 
vary over goods whereas variables and the disturbances vary over goods and across households. 
                                                 
4 However, these income levels are way at the top end (0.001%) of the sample distribution.  
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Since the shares of consumption expenditures from the Engel curve (1.15) sum up to one, 
we have to omit one of the consumption categories in order to perform SURE. In this case, I 
choose to omit the health category from the systems of equations to accommodate the adding up 
restriction of the underlying model of utility maximization subject to a linear budget constraint.
5
 
Table 3 provides the estimates from the systems of equations corresponding to the Engel curve 
(1.15) for 11 consumption categories for the full sample size of 2933 households.  
In general, the results in Table 3 show that Thai data do not fit as well with the Engel 
curve (1.15) as with the Engel curve (1.14) specifications. Of course, the two equation systems 
consider different dependent variables, so comparisons of R-squared are of limited value. 
However, the coefficients on most household characteristics including children variables have 
similar signs in both specifications. This is helpful for our analysis since the results do not show 
a lot of variation due to the difference in model specifications. However, when looking at the 
demographic influences, having higher education does not have much impact on consumption 
behavior compared to results in Table 2, while ages of spouses still have little significant impact, 
except for food outside of home. Another interesting finding is that people living outside 
Bangkok tend to spend higher expenditure shares on food at home and on alcohol and tobacco 
consumption.  
The coefficients on log total expenditure and its squared term are significant in almost all 
categories. When estimating total expenditure elasticities, EE, evaluated at the means of log total 
household expenditure and expenditure shares for each category, all categories can be considered 
                                                 
5 Theoretically, the results should be invariant to which share of consumption omitted. However, Barten (1969) 
proves that the results are invariant only if the model is estimated by maximum likelihood estimation. Thus, I 
reestimate the system of equations using the iterated SURE which converges to the maximum likelihood results and 
find the coefficients from iterated SURE are very similar to those obtained from SURE.  
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as normal goods (all EE are positive).
6
 This implies that households increase expenditure shares 
on each good when total household expenditure increases, holding other expenditure shares 
constant. 
However, there is a reason to suspect that total consumption expenditure may be 
endogenous with respect to shares of household consumption expenditure, especially for 
infrequently purchased goods. Consequently, total consumption expenditure may be higher in 
periods when infrequently purchased goods are purchased than in periods when they are not. 
This may not be as problematic in our case because the SES does record the infrequently 
purchased goods as average monthly expenditures during the past 12 months. When testing for 
exogeneity of log total expenditure and its square in each category, I find that it is rejected for six 
categories. Thus, I proceed to perform the 3SLS using log total income and its square to 
instrument for log of total expenditure and its square. In addition to log total income and its 
square, I also include all the explanatory variables, financial assets, debt dummy, and household 
nonconsumption expenditure in the instrument set. The minimum eigenvalue statistic of 198.267 
rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments at 5% level of significance. Moreover, we cannot 
reject the overidentifying restrictions in almost all consumption categories. This should provide 
us with at least some confidence that our choices of instruments are valid. Table 4 provides the 
3SLS estimates corresponding to the Engel curve (1.15) for 11 consumption categories for the 
full sample size of 2933 households. 
                                                 
6 The expenditure elasticities EE  is equal to  )(ln2
1
1 E
w
EEE   . Since there are two variables, w and lnE , 
in the formula, then we cannot exactly determine the critical expenditure level that switch goods from normal to 
inferior goods and vice versa. 
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In general, the 3SLS estimates show some variations in the significance levels of the 
coefficients compared to those reported in Table 3. However, there is no switch in signs between 
coefficients except for only the northeast coefficient in the transportation and communication 
category. Thus, there is little qualitative difference whether or not we instrument for total 
consumption expenditure and its square terms.  
Now, I proceed to test the validity of the predictions of the unitary against the collective 
models by adding individual income terms to the Engel curves (1.14) to get  
 
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where C represents the 12 categories of consumption expenditures on private and public goods, a 
includes g demographic variables including household size, number of young and older children, 
ownership of houses and vehicles, age and level of education of both spouses, urban and regional 
dummies, and where u is a disturbance. Notice again that parameters in Equation (1.16) vary 
over goods whereas variables and the disturbances vary over goods and across households. The 
household subscript is suppressed to simplify notation.
7
 Table 5 provides the estimates from the 
system of equations using SURE for all 12 consumption categories for the full sample size of 
2933 households. 
 After adding more income variables to the quasi-quadratic Engel curves, the results in 
Table 5 are very similar to those from Table 2, especially by looking at the R-squared values. 
Moreover, most demographic coefficients have not only the same significance levels but also the 
signs and magnitudes. The coefficients on household total income and its square are less 
significant in Table 5, which may be caused by adding more income variables to the model. 
                                                 
7 Equation (1.16) has the exact same functional form estimated by Bourguignon et al. (1993). 
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 In equation (1.16), 
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hy  and 
wy  constant and 
corresponds to the effect of a one-unit (100 baht) increase in 
0y  (because 
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2  is estimated holding 0 wt dydy  and corresponds to the 
effect of 
0dydyh  , that is, to a one-unit increase in the husband‟s income that is exactly offset 
by a one-unit decrease in non-labor income. Similarly, 
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2  is estimated 
holding 0 ht dydy  and corresponds to the effect of 0dydyw  . The income pooling 
hypothesis states that a change in the relative income of the husband and wife has no effect on 
demand if total household income is constant. For this to be true at arbitrary levels of y
h
 and y
w
, it 
must be true that 0 hwwwhhwh  . Imposing these five restrictions on 12 
expenditure categories gives a total of 60 restrictions. Rejection of these restrictions implies that 
income is not pooled and the unitary model may not be appropriate in explaining household 
resource allocation behavior.  
 When imposing a total of 60 restrictions to the systems of Engel curves (1.16) that 
husband‟s and wife‟s individual incomes are irrelevant, a chi-square value of 498.99 clearly 
rejects the income pooling hypothesis at the 1% significance level. This finding supports the 
results found from previous studies described in Section 1.3 which also reject income pooling. 
However, the rejection of income pooling in Table 5 may be due to the fact that almost 38% of 
our sample is households consisting of spouses only, which is similar to what most previous 
studies have considered using data from developed countries. None of the previous studies has 
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considered households with more than two generations living in the same residence which is 
fairly common in Thailand. Thus, I continue to test income pooling for each household type 
separately to see if the results still hold for each household type. 
Before proceeding to examine the behaviors of different household types, I will also test 
the validity of the predictions of the unitary against the collective models using QUAIDS 
specification by adding log individual income terms to the Engel curves (1.15) to get  
 
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where w represents shares of consumption expenditures on each good, E represents total 
household consumption expenditure, a includes g demographic variables as described earlier, 
and where v is a disturbance. Notice again that parameters in Equation (1.17) vary over goods 
whereas variables and the disturbances vary over goods and across households.  
From the Engel curve (1.17), we can test the income pooling hypothesis that only total 
expenditure has an effect on household consumption behavior while individual sources of 
income are irrelevant. For each consumption category, this is the same as testing the restrictions 
that 0 wh  . I choose to omit the health category from the systems of equations to 
accommodate the adding up restriction of the QUAIDS. Table 6 provides the estimates from the 
systems of equations corresponding to the Engel curve (1.17) for 11 consumption categories for 
the full sample size of 2933 households.  
 The estimates in Table 6 are extremely similar to the estimates found in Table 3, 
including the signs, magnitudes and level of significance. When considering the coefficients on 
spouses‟ incomes, the coefficients on log husband and wife incomes are significant in seven 
categories under this specification, while the coefficients on log total expenditure and its squared 
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term are significant in almost all categories. When imposing a total of 22 restrictions that 
individual sources of income are irrelevant in the QUAIDS, i.e., 0 wh   for 11 categories, 
a chi-square value of 157.75 clearly rejects income pooling for Thai data at 1% level of 
significance.  
When testing for exogeneity of log total expenditure and its square in each category, I 
find that it is convincingly rejected in all categories. Thus, I proceed to perform the 3SLS using 
log total income and its square to instrument for log of total expenditure and its square. In 
addition to log total income and its square, I also include all the explanatory variables, financial 
assets, debt dummy, and household nonconsumption expenditure in the instrument set. The 
minimum eigenvalue statistic of 19.51 rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments at 5% level of 
significance. Moreover, we cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions in almost all 
consumption categories. This should provide us with at least some confidence that our choices of 
instruments are valid. Table 7 provides the 3SLS estimates corresponding to the Engel curve 
(1.17) for 11 consumption categories for the full sample size of 2933 households. 
In general, the 3SLS estimates in Table 7 show some variations in the significance levels 
of the coefficients compared to those reported in Table 6. There is no switch in signs between 
coefficients except for only the log husband wage in food at home category, and the log total 
consumption squared term in the housing category. Thus, there is little qualitative difference 
whether or not we instrument for total consumption expenditure and its square terms. Moreover, 
a chi-square value of 59.70 also rejects income pooling at the 1% level of significance. Thus, the 
results from both Engel curve specifications (1.16) and (1.17) clearly reject the unitary model for 
household consumption expenditures in the two wage-earner households in Thailand.  
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Next, in order to compare the differences between the results in this chapter to those from 
previous studies, I continue to estimate the Engel curves for each subsample for various 
household compositions separately. Seven subsamples are estimated by equations (1.16) and 
(1.17) which include households consisting of spouses with various types of dependents. Since 
we rejected the exogeneity of log total expenditure and its square, I only report the testing results 
using the 3SLS estimates for the QUAIDS specification. Table 8 provides the results for the test 
of the income pooling hypotheses for all subsamples.
8
  
The results in Table 8 show that the income pooling can be rejected for all seven 
subsamples with the specification (1.16), but can be rejected for only four subsamples with 
(1.17). This is an interesting finding because our specification (1.16) is more parallel to what has 
been done by most previous studies that consider household consumption in terms of money 
expenditures rather than shares of total expenditures. In such case, the results in this chapter are 
consistent with results from previous studies for all types of households with or without any 
dependents. These confirm that the unitary model is still not very attractive to explain household 
consumption behaviors in Thailand.  
On the other hand, the QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) only rejects the income pooling for 
households consisting of fewer than four members. These findings clearly suggest that the 
number of dependents makes the difference on how households allocate their shares of 
consumption expenditures. Thus, households with different compositions should be examined 
separately on how their household resources are allocated. Considering all types of households 
together may lead to various results depending on the proportions of each household type in the 
                                                 
8 See Appendix A and Appendix B for estimates of each subsample for Engel curves (1.16) and (1.17). 
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sample. When considering each household type separately, households with more dependents 
seem to behave consistently with the prediction of the unitary model. A possible explanation is 
that once there are dependent individuals living in the household, these dependents can be 
considered as household public goods as described earlier in the model. Both spouses would be 
likely to spend higher shares of their individual incomes on these dependents‟ consumptions and 
have less money to spend freely for their own interests; thus, making it harder to reject the 
income pooling hypothesis.  
For example, the share of food consumed at home increases with the number of 
dependents while the share of food consumed outside declines. Couples with no dependents can 
very well behave just like two separate individuals sharing rents and utility bills. Once the 
household size gets larger, the shares of household public goods also get larger because there are 
only two income earners. Couples with dependents may consult each other more on how to 
allocate their resources and thus pool their incomes as opposed to couples without any 
dependent. Thus, it is possible that the unitary model may apply when there are many household 
public goods to be considered in the households which are the number of dependents in this case.  
Having rejected the unitary model for the full sample and most subsamples, I now test the 
general collective model of Chiappori (1988; 1992) that husband and wife choose a Pareto 
efficient allocation of resources. Testing the Pareto efficiency is the same as testing the non-
linear restrictions that the ratios of husband and wife income effects are the same across all pairs 
of consumption categories.
9
 Table 9 provides the results of testing the Pareto efficiency using the 
systems of equations regression for all subsamples.  
                                                 
9 See Eqs. (1.12) and (1.13). 
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 Table 9 shows that Pareto efficiency is not rejected at the 5% level in any subsample 
using either Engel curve specification. These results suggest that all household types in Thailand 
behave consistently with the Pareto efficient hypothesis as suggested by Bourguignon et al. 
(1993) using French and by Thomas and Chen (1994) using Taiwanese data. Therefore, we may 
conclude that the general collective model is more attractive than the unitary model in explaining 
intrahousehold resource allocation behaviors regardless of the specification of the Engel curve. 
 
1.6. Conclusions 
 This chapter tests the unitary and general collective models of intrahousehold resource 
allocations using consumption expenditure data from Thailand. The main difference of this 
chapter from previous studies is that it looks at the application of these models for various 
household compositions since most studies in the literature have rejected the unitary model using 
data from nuclear families.   
However, most previous studies using consumption expenditure data have used data from 
developed countries. Prior research indicates that household composition has a substantial effect 
of consumption expenditures and suggests that the outcome of tests of the unitary model may 
differ according to household composition. Household composition differs between developed 
and developing countries. Households tend to be larger and non-nuclear families are more 
common in developing countries. Thus, I test the unitary and collective models separately for 
different types of households. 
I find that, for the quasi-quadratic Engel curve specification, the overall results support 
the previous findings in the literature that the unitary model fails to explain how the resources are 
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allocated for all household types. However, when using the QUAIDS, the unitary model is 
rejected only for smaller-sized households. These are households consisting of fewer than four 
members. These findings bring up two interesting concerns from testing the unitary model. First, 
different Engel curve specifications affect the results. Second, the presence of dependents in the 
households, such as children, appears to affect how resources are allocated within the 
households. 
The general collective model, on the other hand, cannot be rejected in any subsample for 
either quasi-quadratic or QUAIDS functional forms. This finding supports the perspective of the 
general collective model that household members may have different preferences but allocate 
their resources efficiently. The results in this chapter indicate that the general collective model of 
household behavior is more attractive than the unitary model. 
Finally, even though the general collective model appears to be more theoretically and 
empirically attractive, all results in this chapter are restricted to only two wage-earner households 
with two distribution factors which are spouses‟ individual incomes. Since the idea of extended 
families is fairly common in most developing countries, there are opportunities for future 
research to examine households consisting of multiple earners with more distribution factors to 
see if the general collective model still performs well under such circumstances. 
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CHAPTER TWO: DO THAI HOUSEHOLDS WITH MULTIPLE 
DECISION MAKERS BEHAVE PARETO EFFICIENTLY? 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 The standard economic model to explain how a household chooses to allocate resources 
among its members is the unitary model. The unitary model generally considers the household as 
a single decision-making unit in which all household members reach consensus and thus can be 
represented by one common preference (Samuelson 1956). Another justification for this model is 
that there is a dictator who determines all allocations from the point of view of an altruist who 
cares about other household members (Becker 1981). Because of its simplicity and convenience 
the unitary model had been applied in many studies both theoretically and empirically. 
 The unitary model has been seriously challenged during the past two decades, however, 
based on its weak theoretical foundation that we can analyze households as a single decision-
making unit. Using this assumption, we can apply Neo-classical utility theory to the household 
setting and ignore the possibility that each individual in the household has unique preferences. 
The unitary model also has been challenged by many empirical studies that reject restrictions on 
the Slutsky matrix (Browning and Chiappori 1998) or reject the income pooling hypothesis 
(Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990; Bourguignon et al. 1993; Thomas and Chen 1994; Lundberg et al. 
1997; Phipps and Burton 1998). For example, Browning and Chiappori (1998) reject the 
symmetry property of the Slutsky matrix for Canadian couples but not for single men and 
women. This result suggests that the rejection of the symmetry property is due to having the 
incorrect model for couples and is not attributable to the specification of the model. However, 
the results from chapter one show that, without price variation, the rejection of the income 
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pooling depends on the specification of the estimated Engel curves for households with two 
decision makers in Thailand. These findings suggest that the rejections of the unitary model may 
be due to having either the incorrect model or inadequate functional forms or both. 
 On the other hand, the general collective model developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992), 
which is the main alternative to the unitary model, works well empirically in explaining 
household decision behaviors for various model specifications using consumption survey data 
from different countries. More importantly, the general collective model is very theoretically 
attractive because it allows each household member to have distinct preferences and only 
assumes that the final outcomes are Pareto efficient. 
 Up to now, only a small number of studies have used consumption expenditure data to 
test the validity of the general collective model (Bourguignon et al. 1993; Thomas and Chen 
1994). However, these previous studies only test the Pareto efficiency hypothesis for households 
consisting of two decision makers. None has tested the Pareto efficiency for households with 
multiple decision makers. The latter case is important because it is very common in many 
developing countries that households consist of at least two or three generations of blood 
relatives living together as extended families. Thus, it may be worthwhile to determine whether 
the general collective model applies to households in which decisions may be more complex than 
in households with only two decision makers.  
This chapter generalizes tests for Pareto efficiency for application to households with 
more than two decision makers, by applying the concept of distribution factors. Distribution 
factors are variables that affect the household decision process but do not affect either individual 
preferences or the household budget constraint. Some examples of distribution factors have been 
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suggested in prior studies (e.g. McElroy 1990; Lundberg and Pollak 1993; Browning et al. 1994; 
Lundberg et al. 1997; Chiappori et al. 2002; Dauphin et al. 2003; Bourguignon et al. 2009) are 
individual incomes, relative incomes of household members, the regional sex ratio, personal 
attractiveness, marriage and divorce laws, child support law where individual incomes are the 
most common distribution factor used in the literature. According to Bourguignon et al. (2009), 
these distribution factors will play a major role in the following three reasons. First, the existence 
of such variables is inconsistent with the unitary model. Second, without price variation, the 
influence of distribution factors provides the only testable restrictions for the collective model. 
Third, distribution factors are helpful in recovering some features of the intra-household decision 
process; this point will be discussed in the next chapter. This chapter extends the model used in 
chapter one to derive the testable restrictions on the collective model for households with any 
number of decision makers using the unconditional demand systems approach. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 develops the theoretical framework and 
provides testable restrictions on the collective model for households with more than two decision 
makers using the unconditional demand systems. Section 2.3 introduces the concept of 
conditional demand systems and its application. Section 2.4 describes the sample. Section 2.5 
outlines the empirical model of household expenditures estimated in the chapter and presents 
empirical results. Finally, conclusions are provided in Section 2.6. 
 
2.2. The theoretical framework 
Let us begin by considering a household consisting of H+1 members (with H ≥ 1) with no 
household production. Each member h, with h = 1, …, H+1, chooses his or her consumption of N 
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market goods that can either be consumed privately or publicly. To minimize the assumptions on 
individual preferences and to allow externalities within the household, assume that all H+1 
members have altruistic preferences represented by );,,...,( aQqq1 1HhU , where qh denotes a 
vector of private consumption by the h
th
 member and Q denotes a vector of public consumption, 
and a denotes a vector of individual and household characteristics.  The total household 
consumption can be written as qQqh 


1
1
H
h
. Since there is no price variation, we can 
normalize all prices to one so that the household budget constraint is given by 
x
H
h
 


qeQqe h )(
1
1
, where e is a unit vector of dimension N and x can be considered either 
as total household income or, as in the standard analysis of demand, total household expenditure.  
Since we allow individual preferences to be different, we need to specify how households 
decide to consume q given the household budget constraint. In general, the household‟s 
decisions do not depend only on individual preferences but also on each member‟s decision-
making power. Moreover, apart from the individual and household characteristics, these 
decision-making powers may also depend on distribution factors mentioned earlier. According to 
Chiappori et al. (2002), Dauphin et al. (2003) and Bourguignon et al. (2009), a variable zk is a 
distribution factor if it affects the choices of qh and Q directly through the weighting factors but 
does not have any effect through preferences or the household budget constraint. More 
importantly, the effects of distribution factors on consumption decisions provide the only testable 
restrictions for the collective model of household behavior where there is no price variation. 
Therefore, for all Pareto efficient allocations the household maximizes the problem: 
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aQqqaQqqaQqqzaμ 1H11H11H1  

HH UUUxMax 
Qqq 1H1
  (2.1) 
subject to a budget constraint          
x
H
h
 


)(
1
1
Qqe h  
where )],,(),...,,,([),,( 1 zazazaμ xxx H  and 


H
h
h x
1
),,(1 za  represent each household 
member‟s welfare weights, and z is a K-vector of distribution factors. The distribution factors 
influence the weight of each member‟s preferences in household decisions. If individual income 
is a distribution factor, for example, members who have lower incomes may be more willing to 
compromise than those who have higher incomes. In that event, the outcomes of household 
decision process are likely to favor those with higher incomes and thus decision-making powers, 
as reflected in larger values of the welfare weights. 
Assuming that each the utility function Uh(.) is continuous and quasiconcave, and the 
second order sufficient condition is satisfied, then by the implicit function theorem we can solve 
the first-order conditions of problem (2.1) for the demand function for good j by the h
th
 member 
as a function of individual and household characteristics a as well as distribution factors z:   
 )),,(),...,,,(,,( 1 zazaa xxxqq H
j
h
j
h   , h = 1, …, H+1.   (2.2) 
 When only household consumption is observed, the household demand for good j can be 
written as: 
 )),,(),...,,,(,,( 1
1
1
zazaa xxxqqq H
j
H
h
j
h
j  


.     (2.3) 
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 The expression of Eq. (2.3) is very useful for our analysis because it can be used to 
represent both private and public consumption through index j.  
 To consider the influence of distribution factors on consumption behavior, let us 
differentiate (2.3) with respect to zk to obtain 
 
 





 H
h k
h
h
j
k
j
z
q
z
q
1


,         (2.4) 
for all k = 1, …, K.  
We can rewrite (2.4) into the matrix forms to get 
 
jj
μz Mqq            (2.5) 
where 
j
zq  is a Kx1 vector of partial derivatives of q
j
 with respect to zk; M is  a KxH matrix of 
partial derivatives of h with respect to zk; and 
j
μq  is an Hx1 vector of partial derivatives of q
j
 
with respect to h . 
Assuming that not every element of the vector jμq  is identical, then in order to solve for a 
solution of jμq  in system (2.5), we also need to assume that rank [M] ≥ H which implies that K ≥ 
H. If K = H, and M has full rank such that rank [M] = H, we can obtain a unique solution for jμq  
which is 
jj
zμ qMq
1 .          (2.6) 
However, this unique solution of jμq  from system (2.6) imposes no testable restrictions 
on the collective model because only 
j
zq is observable, while 
j
μq  and M
-1
 are not. Thus, to be 
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able to derive any testable restrictions, we must have K > H or, in other words, we must have at 
least as many distribution factors as the number of decision makers in the household.  
When K > H, we then have an over-identified system. This over-identified system is 
crucial for us because it allows us to manipulate system (2.5) so that there are CK,H which equals 
to 
)!(!
!
HKH
K

ways to solve for ,jμq  but all solutions must be identical. These manipulations 
imply restrictions among 
j
zq  which also involve the unobservable M matrix. Thus, to solve for 
j
μq , I first delete any arbitrary (K-H) rows from 
j
zq and M in system (2.5) to form new CK,H just-
identified systems: 
j
HH
j
μz qMq ][dim][dim           (2.7) 
where 
][dim H
j
zq  is an Hx1 vector of partial derivatives of q
j
 with respect to the remaining zk; 
M[dimH] is a square matrix of dimension H of partial derivatives of h with respect to the 
remaining zk; where 
j
μq  remains the same. Let us further assume that M[dimH] has a full column 
rank H, so it is invertible. Then, we can solve for jμq  by 
][dim
1
][dim H
j
H
j
zμ qMq
 .        (2.8) 
Systems (2.7) and (2.8) show how we have CK,H ways to solve for 
j
μq . However, there 
are some redundancies among these CK,H systems which allow us to eliminate some systems with 
common constraints. As a result, we need to consider only (K/H) systems if (K/H) is an integer; 
or otherwise, the closest integer higher than (K/H). Since the expressions for the general case are 
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cumbersome in terms of notations at this point, I use an example to illustrate how systems (2.7) 
and (2.8) operate so that later on we can easily extend to the case of any number of K and H.   
Let us consider households consisting of three income earners living with or without 
dependents. Any dependents are assumed to play only a passive role and have no decision-
making power. Also assume that the distribution factors are the three earners‟ exogenous labor 
incomes. Thus, we have H = 2 and K = 3 which is the simplest case to test the collective model 
for households with more than two decision makers. In this case, there are C3,2 = 3 systems that 
can solve for jμq , but all solutions must be identical. From (2.7), these three systems are 
jj
μz qMq ]12[]12[           (2.7.1) 
jj
μz qMq ]13[]13[           (2.7.2) 
jj
μz qMq ]23[]23[           (2.7.3) 
where the superscripts in the brackets represent the remaining k
th
 rows from the original system 
(2.7).  
Then, we can solve for jμq  by 
]12[
1
]12[
jj
zμ qMq
          (2.8.1) 
]13[
1
]13[
jj
zμ qMq
          (2.8.2) 
 
]23[
1
]23[
jj
zμ qMq
 .         (2.8.3) 
Since we have (K/H) = 1.5, then we need to consider only two out of the three systems 
(2.8.1), (2.8.2) and (2.8.3). It can easily be shown that once the constraints of the selected two 
systems are met, the constraints in the remaining system will be automatically satisfied. The 
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criterion for which systems to be selected is straightforward. We need to select the smallest 
number of systems such that they cover constraints for all K rows in the original M matrix. With 
3 rows to be covered, we can select any of the following 3 pairs of systems; (2.8.1) and (2.8.2); 
(2.8.1) and (2.8.3); or (2.8.2) and (2.8.3). The choice of pairs will not alter the final result. For 
example, I select systems (2.8.1) and (2.8.2) to illustrate the main concept of this approach.  
From (2.8.1) and (2.8.2), we know that 
]13[
1
]13[]12[
1
]12[
jjj
zzμ qMqMq
  . 
 Then, we can get rid of jμq  to obtain 
 
]13[}]13][12{[]12[ 1
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where 1 ]13[]12[}]13][12{[ 1
  MM .   
 It is useful to our analysis to expand system (2.9) to get 
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where rc
}]13][12{[ 1
 , r = 1, 2; c = 1, 2 represents the elements corresponding to the rth row and cth in 
}]13][12{[ 1
 .  
When fully calculated, system (2.9) becomes 
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which is equivalent to 
  jz
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j
z qqq 31112
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  .       (2.9.1) 
45 
 
Eq (2.9.1) consists of all three influences from distribution factors jz
j
z
j
z qqq 321 ,,  and two 
unknowns 21
}]13][12{[ 1
 and 22
}]13][12{[ 1
 which are functions of the partial derivatives of μ  with respect 
to z. However, having only one good j does not provide us with sufficient information to solve 
for the two unknowns, so one or more additional goods is required to derive testable restrictions 
in this case.  
One important thing to be noticed here is that the first row of 
}]13][12{[ 1
 contains only 
zero and one elements which are constant across all goods. This implies that the first row of 
}]13][12{[ 1
  does not provide any restriction that can be tested. Thus, the only row that can be used 
to derive the restrictions is the second row which I will call the “non-zero-and-one” row. The 
concept of the “non-zero-and-one” row will be crucial in determining the total number of 
restrictions when we consider more general cases later on in this section.  
 Next, I will show how many goods are required in order for us to impose testable 
restrictions on the collective model. Consider the second good, i, that the household chooses to 
consume. From (2.3), we have 
)),,(),...,,,(,,( 1
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Follow the same procedure earlier to obtain 
]13[}]13][12{[]12[ 1
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Then, 
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From (2.9.1) and (2.10.1), we now have two equations with two unknowns. Then, we can 
solve for 21
}]13][12{[ 1
 and 22
}]13][12{[ 1
  to get 
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However, these results still cannot provide us with any testable restrictions because we 
can only observe the values of ),,,,,(
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right hand sides, while the values of 21
}]13][12{[ 1
  and 22
}]13][12{[ 1
 on the left hand sides are still 
unobservable. It means that we need to consider more goods in order to eliminate the 
unobservable ω terms.  
Let consider the third good, l, and follow the same procedure to get 
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Eqs. (2.9.1), (2.10.1) and (2.11.1) represent a system of three equations that contain all 
the required information to derive the restrictions with two unobservable ω terms. The testable 
restrictions can be obtained through multiple steps as follows: 
Step 1: From (2.9.1), we can solve for 21
}]13][12{[ 1
 in terms of a base good, j, to obtain 
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Step 2: Substitute (2.9.1.1) into (2.10.1) and (2.11.1), then solve for 22
}]13][12{[ 1
  to obtain 
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 Step 3: Setting (2.10.1.1) equals (2.11.1.1) to eliminate the unobservable 22
}]13][12{[ 1
  to 
obtain a unique testable restriction for the collective model which is 
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Thus, in the case of H = 2 and K = 3, we need at least three goods to achieve one testable 
restriction. This finding gives us another requirement for testing the collective model that we 
need at least as many goods as the decision makers in the household or N ≥ H+1. Another 
interesting finding from these steps is that the choice of whether we first choose to solve for 
either 21
}]13][12{[ 1
 or 22
}]13][12{[ 1
  in step 1 does not affect the number of restrictions to be obtained. It 
means that after achieving restriction (2.12), we do not need to repeat steps 1, 2 and 3 again to 
first solve for 22
}]13][12{[ 1
 to derive another restriction that 
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The reason behind this is straightforward. Even though (2.13) provides us with a 
legitimate testing restriction, it does not provide any new information that has not already been 
contained in (2.12). The testing expressions may look different between (2.12) and (2.13), but 
only one restriction is sufficient to test the collective model. This shows that only one restriction 
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is required for each “non-zero-and-one” row in
}]13][12{[ 1
 . Therefore, we only need one 
restriction in this particular example.  
Next, let us see how the values of N and K affect the number of restrictions for 
households with H+1 members in general. If we follow the same procedure above with 
additional information on extra goods (now N > 3) while H and K remain the same at two and 
three, then we will obtain more than one restriction. The additional restrictions come from the 
fact that now we have extra information on N which is greater than the minimum requirement of 
H+1 by (N – H – 1) goods. This shows that having additional goods implies additional 
restrictions. Consequently, we will have extra equations that can solve for 22
}]13][12{[ 1
 ; as a result, 
having extra (N – H – 1) restrictions to test the collective model. Thus, in case of N > H+1, we 
have a total of (N – H) restrictions for each “non-zero-and-one” row in 
}]13][12{[ 1
 . 
To determine the number of the “non-zero-and-one” rows for the general case is quite 
straightforward. It can be determined by the difference between the values of K and H. For 
example, from (2.7), if we consider the case where K = 4 and H = 2 and follow the same 
procedure we would get 
]34[
1
]34[]12[
1
]12[
jjj
zzμ qMqMq
  . 
Thus, we can get rid of jμq  to obtain 
 
]34[}]34][12{[]12[ 1
jj
zz qq          (2.14) 
where 1 ]34[]12[}]34][12{[ 1
  MM .         
 Expand system (2.14) to get 
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where rc
}]34][12{[ 1
 , r = 1, 2; c = 1, 2 represents the elements corresponding to the rth row and cth 
column of 
}]34][12{[ 1
 . The main difference between systems (2.14) and (2.9) is that when 
}]34][12{[ 1
  in (2.14) is fully calculated, it does not contain any “non-zero-and-one” row as in 
}]13][12{[ 1
 from (2.9). Thus, system (2.14) provides us with 2 constraints:  
  jz
j
z
j
z qqq 41311
12
}]34][12{[
11
}]34][12{[ 
        (2.14.1) 
j
z
j
z
j
z qqq 41312
22
}]34][12{[
21
}]34][12{[ 
  .      (2.14.2) 
As we have seen earlier that when N = H+1, each “non-zero-and-one” row corresponds to 
having one restriction. Then, with N = H+1, system (2.14) will provide two restrictions. This 
additional restriction comes from the fact that as the number of K increases, each of them will 
impact decision powers within the household. In the case of N = H+1, the number of “non-zero-
and-one” rows can be easily determined by K – H.  
Therefore, in general, the total number of restrictions will be equaled to (N – H)(K – H). 
Even though this approach seems rather complicated, to my knowledge, this is the first approach 
that allows us to derive the precise testable restrictions to test the collective model of household 
behaviors with multiple decision makers. The only drawback from this approach is that, due to 
the flexibilities of this model in general, there is no immediate formula to determine the exact 
expressions of each testable restriction. The restrictions are different for each possible value of 
N, K and H. 
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2.3. The concept of conditional demand systems 
 The theoretical framework in the previous section shows that the testable restrictions 
derived from unconditional demand systems can be very complicated and cumbersome, 
especially when the numbers of N, H and K increase. This section, I will briefly describe an 
alternative approach which has recently been used in the literature, based on conditional demand 
systems.   
According to Browning and Meghir (1991), conditional demand systems originally were 
used in demand analysis where the demand for one set of goods (goods of interest) are 
conditioned on prices of these goods, total expenditures on these goods, and the quantities of 
another set of goods (conditioning goods). However, in considering the restrictions implied by 
the collective model, Bourguignon et al. (1995; 2009) extend the original concept of conditional 
demand systems to define what they call “z-conditional demands” in which the demand for one 
good can be expressed as a function of the demand for another good, total expenditure, 
preferences and distribution factors. Several studies have applied the concept of z-conditional 
demand systems to examine properties of collective models; in particular, Dauphin and Fortin 
(2001, hereafter DF), Dauphin et al. (2003), Donni (2006), and Donni and Moreau (2007).  
In this chapter, I will consider a particular type of z-conditional demand systems used in 
DF to derive different sets of testable restrictions as alternative ways to test the collective model. 
To make this a self-contained chapter, I will also outline the theoretical discussion presented by 
DF. Let us follow DF by first using the demand functions (2.3) obtained in the previous section, 
so we can rewrite (2.3) as: 
)),,(,,(ˆ),,(~ zaμaqzaq xxx         (2.15) 
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where ),,(~ zaq x  and )),,(,,(ˆ zaμaq xx  are the observable and unobservable Nx1 vectors of the 
demands for all N goods, respectively. The key issue here is to first find a way to test whether the 
demands systems can actually be written as )),,(,,(ˆ zaμaq xx since this form contains the 
unobservable welfare weights, ),,( zaμ x .  
 To make it less cumbersome, let us drop x and a from all demand functions such that 
(2.15) becomes 
 ))((ˆ)(~ zμqzq  .         (2.16) 
 Next, based on a particular type of z-conditional demand systems developed by 
Bourguignon et al. (1995) and generalized by DF, they are able to derive a local test for the 
collective model. First, they consider partitions ],[ 21  qqq  of the demand systems and 
],[ 21  zzz  of the distribution factors, with 1q  and 1z  having the same dimension k. Given such 
a partition, (2.16) can be written as: 
 )),((ˆ),(~ 2112111 zzμqzzqq  ,       (2.17) 
)),((ˆ),(~ 2122122 zzμqzzqq  .       (2.18) 
 Apply Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 from DF and adjust names of variables and equations 
corresponding to the notation used in this paper, we have 
Lemma 1. Let N ≥ H + 1 and K ≥ H + 1 and consider a K*z  
at which )(~ zq  is differentiable. Next, assume that *)(~11 zqzD  is 
non-singular and let *)*,(~* 2111 zzqq  . Then, conditional on *,1q
there exist a unique and continuously differentiable function 
)*,(~ 211 zqz  that solves that solves (2.17) for 1z  on some 
neighborhood of *)*,( 21 zq  and such that: 
 
))),*,(~((ˆ)),*,(~(~* 22111221111 zzqzμqzzqzqq  .   (2.19) 
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Proof. Use the implicit function theorem.  
Under the conditions of Lemma 1, one can define the 
function 
kNK :2q  by: 
 
))),*,(~((ˆ)*,( 22112212 zzqzμqzqq  .     (2.20) 
 The right hand side of (2.20) yields a (local) demand sub-
system for 2q  conditional on the k-vector *1q . 
 
Theorem 1. Let the conditions of Lemma 1 hold and suppose that, 
in addition, )(zμ  and ))((ˆ zμq  are differentiable at, respectively, 
*z  and *)(zμ . Then, for k = H the demand system for q  satisfies: 
 
 0zqq *)*,( 2122zD ,       (2.21) 
where 0  is a null matrix of dimension )()( HKHN  . 
Proof. See p. 214 in DF. 
 Eq. (2.21) shows that once household demands for the N – H goods, *)*,( 212 zqq , are 
conditioned on as many goods as there are the welfare weights (H in this case) in the household 
maximization problem (2.1), the adjustment in 1z  will compensate for any changes in 2z  as to 
keep 1q  constant in a way that will leave )(zμ  unchanged. Moreover, if )(zμ  stays constant 
when 2z  changes, then 2q  must also stay constant, and therefore 0zqq *)*,( 2122zD . 
Bourguignon et al. (2009) also gives an intuitive explanation that is, for given values of x and a, 
whenever distribution factors ),( 21 zz  contain some information that is relevant for intra-
household allocation, this information is fully summarized by the values of 1q . Once we 
condition on 1q , 2z  becomes irrelevant. 
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 As suggested by some of the earlier studies (Dauphin and Fortin 2001; Dauphin et al. 
2003; Bourguignon et al. 2009), there are both advantages and disadvantages to using the 
approach of z-conditional demand systems to test collective rationality. The key advantage is 
that, instead of testing for cross-equation restrictions like in the unconditional demand systems 
which is rather complicated and cumbersome, this approach is likely to be more powerful 
because testing on exclusion restrictions are more robust than testing restrictions on parameters 
across equations. On the other hand, one drawback of using this approach is that the estimation 
of the conditional sub-system may introduce an endogeneity problem since 1q  variables are 
endogenous. However, we can use instrumental variable technique to solve this problem by 
using the excluded exogenous variables in 1z  which has the same dimension as 1q , and the most 
common choices are individual exogenous incomes.  
Another drawback from this approach as noted by DF is that when N = H + 1, one has 
**)*,( 1212 qezqq  x  from the adding-up restriction. Thus, (2.21) is always satisfied in this 
case. This requires additional assumption that we must have N > H + 1 in order to derive any 
testable restrictions for the collective model. However, this should not create any major problem 
for the analysis for two possible reasons as long as we have N ≥ H + 1 and K ≥ H + 1. First, 
household survey data often contain a greater number of consumption categories than the 
number of household members, so N > H + 1 is usually satisfied. The second reason may be that 
some household surveys may observe the data for only )( NN
o   consumption categories such 
that the adding-up restriction will not always be satisfied.  
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2.4. Data   
As mentioned in the introduction, extended families are very common for the Thai family 
system, which is somewhat different from the norm of the married couple families in most 
western countries. This is because, through the hierarchical structure in Thailand, one of the key 
responsibilities placed on children is to take care of their parents when they are old. Thus, for 
this particular reason, many Thai households often consist of members of two or more 
generations living together, while the elderly are awarded the highest status such that they can 
give advice and consultation on household decisions (Limanonda 1995).  
Not only can the elders give advice to household members, but children can also give 
some thoughts to the elders in certain circumstances. For example, older children who earn 
incomes will have decision-making powers and may have their own thoughts about how 
resources should be allocated within the household. Having many income earners in the 
household will make it more difficult for all members to reach an agreement. Thus, individual 
incomes can be considered our distribution factors that affect the decision-making power through 
the welfare weights, ),,( zaμ x . 
The data comes from the same Socio-Economic Survey (SES) conducted by the National 
Statistical Office of Thailand (NSO) in year 2006 used in chapter one, but with different types of 
sample. The reader is referred to the data section in chapter one to see how the data are collected. 
Initially, I planned to consider the case where households have four income earners (two couples 
from two different generations) to see how this particular situation impacts household 
consumption choices. It turns out, however, that considering only such households lead to 
extremely small of a sample size (only six households). 
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Then, for easier demonstration of the model presented in the previous section, I choose to 
consider the case where there are three decision makers in the household; with two out of three 
decision makers are married couples. Since we are considering households with three decision 
makers, the number of female and male decision makers may be a determinant in the 
intrahousehold allocation process. This is because the introduction of the third decision maker in 
the household may shift the balance of the decision power between the married couple to favor 
the dominant gender of the household. Thus, in addition to individual incomes, I will consider a 
major gender of household decision makers as additional distribution factor to test the collective 
model in the next section.    
Thus, the sample is limited only to households consisting of three earners (two are 
married couples); each of them is wage and salary earner who work full-time for a minimum of 
35 hours per week outside their home. Moreover, the third decision maker is limited to be either 
1) a child of the married couples or 2) a parent of one of the married couples. This results in a 
total sample size of 443 households. Table 10 provides the main overall descriptive statistics of 
the sample. 
 
2.5. Empirical model of household expenditures and results 
For implementation, I continue to estimate the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System 
(QUAIDS). Without price variations, the QUAIDS model takes the following form of 
expenditure share equation system: 
vzaEEw
K
k
kk
G
g
ggEEE  
 11
2)(lnln           (2.22) 
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where w represents shares of consumption expenditure on each good, E represents total 
household consumption expenditure, a represents g preference factors, z represents k distribution 
factors, and where v is a residual term. Notice again that parameters in Equation (2.22) vary over 
goods whereas variables and the disturbances vary over goods and across households.    
Since the shares of consumption expenditure sum up to one, I choose to omit the health 
category from the systems of equations to accommodate the adding up restriction of the 
QUAIDS. Table 11 provides the SURE estimates from the system of equations corresponding to 
the Engel curve (2.22) for 11 consumption categories for the full sample size of 443 households. 
 The results show that the data fit a little better for seven categories in the case of three 
decision makers compared to the case where spouses are the only decision makers in the 
household. However, there are relatively few significant coefficients in the case of households 
with three decision makers. The coefficients on most household characteristics have similar signs 
to those in the case of two decision makers (results from chapter one). The coefficients on the 
third member‟s characteristics and income are insignificant in most categories. This implies that 
having additional decision maker does not necessary alter household consumption behaviors. 
However, the coefficient on major gender provides us with an interesting result. When the third 
member is male, households significantly spend lower share of consumption on cosmetic, while 
spend higher share on alcohol and tobacco products. This supports a common claim that 
cosmetics can be considered as female, while alcohol and tobacco as male products.  
Before testing whether households with three decision makers behave efficiently, let us 
first test whether they behave according to the unitary model since we did not consider 
households with three decision makers in chapter one. According to Bourguignon et al. (2009) 
57 
 
mention earlier, the existence of distribution factors is inconsistent with the unitary model. Thus, 
testing the unitary model is the same as testing that ,0k  for Kk ,...,1 , that is all coefficients 
on individual incomes and major gender are zero. Since we estimate the system of 11 
consumption categories in this case, this provides us with a total of 44 restrictions to test for the 
unitary model. The chi-square value of 85.66 rejects income pooling, hence the unitary model, at 
1% level of significance. 
Again, there is a reason for us to suspect that total consumption expenditure may be 
endogenous with respect to shares of household consumption expenditure, especially for 
infrequent purchased categories. When testing for exogeneity of log total expenditure and its 
square in each category, I find that it is rejected for only two categories that are transportation 
and communication, and food eaten at home. Nevertheless, I also perform the 3SLS using log 
total income, log total income square, monthly welfare benefits received from employers, and all 
explanatory variables to instrument for log of total expenditure and its square. The minimum 
eigenvalue statistic of 14.00 rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments at 5% level of 
significance. Moreover, the overidentifying restriction is rejected for only alcohol and tobacco 
category. This provides us with at least some confidence that the instruments are valid. Table 12 
provides the 3SLS estimates corresponding to the Engel curve (2.22) for 11 consumption 
categories for the full sample size of 443 households.  
In general, the 3SLS estimates show some variation in the significance levels of the 
overall coefficients compared to those reported in Table 11. However, the signs of most 
coefficients are very similar between the two methods of estimation. Thus, in the comparative 
statics perspective, there is not much of the difference whether or not we instrument for total 
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consumption expenditure and its square terms. Moreover, a chi-square value of 62.84 also rejects 
income pooling at the 5% level of significance. Thus, the results from both SURE and 3SLS 
clearly reject the unitary model for three wage-earner households in Thailand. 
Now, let us derive the testable restrictions on the collective rationality by first using the 
share of housing expenditure as a base good. Following the steps described in section 2.2, testing 
the Pareto efficient hypothesis for households with three decision makers, four distribution 
factors and 11 consumption categories provides us with a set of 1829))((  HKHN  
restrictions.
10
 We obtain a chi-square value of 4.51 which cannot reject the Pareto efficiency at 
any significant level. This implies that the three-decision-maker households in Thailand do 
behave efficiently which is consistent with the collective model. In addition, since the choice of 
choosing the base good should not alter the final result, I also estimate 10 more sets of 
restrictions where each set uses different base goods. Table 13 provides the chi-square values for 
all sets of testable restrictions using different base goods. 
The results in Table 13 show that there is not a single case in which we can reject Pareto 
efficiency. These findings are important because they demonstrate that the approach developed 
in this chapter is not sensitive or limited to some particular choices of the base good. Thus, using 
the unconditional demand systems gives us a robust way to test for the validity of the collective 
model.    
Next, I continue to test the collective rationality using the z-conditional demand systems 
used in DF. In order to apply Theorem 1 in DF for the case of three decision makers, the demand 
systems must be conditioned on two consumption goods which is equal to the number of the 
                                                 
10 I use 11N  because if all restrictions are satisfied for 11 goods, by adding up, the restriction for the 12th good 
is also satisfied. 
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welfare weights, ),,( zaμ x . Moreover, we also have to select 2 distribution factors such that 1z  
has the same dimension as 1q .  
Since the systems of equations contain a total of 11 goods, the z-conditional demand 
systems would consist of nine equations, and each equation is conditioned on two conditioning 
goods. Again, the choice of the two conditioning goods is arbitrary and it should not affect the 
final result. Thus, we have C11,2 = 55 different z-conditional demand systems that can test Pareto 
efficiency. In addition, we also have C4,2 = 6 ways to choose the two corresponding distribution 
factors in each of the 55 z-conditional demand systems. Therefore, for a particular case 
considered in this chapter, we have a total of 330 possible ways to test the collective model, each 
possibility contains 18 restrictions, and all possibilities should generate the same result.  
Under the maintained assumption that *)(~11 zqzD  is non-singular in every possibility, we 
can directly apply Theorem 1 in DF. The results show that only three out of 330 possibilities can 
reject the Pareto efficiency at 5% significance while other 327 possibilities cannot.
11
 However, 
none of these three possibilities can pass the non-singularity test of *)(~11 zqzD ; as a result, 
Theorem 1 in DF is not applicable for these three possibilities. Thus, we can say that using the 
available data, there is not a single possibility that can reject the Pareto efficiency hypothesis.  
Therefore, using the z-conditional demand systems provide the same conclusion that the 
three-decision-maker households in Thailand do behave efficiently which is consistent with the 
results obtained when using the unconditional demand systems. However, the results in this 
chapter show that even though the z-conditional demand approach may be more powerful and 
                                                 
11 The results are available upon request from the author. 
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more robust, it also generates many more testing possibilities than the unconditional demand 
approach. This may be considered as another disadvantage of using the z-conditional demand 
approach. Since each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses, the choice of whether it is 
best to use the unconditional demand or z-conditional demand systems cannot yet be resolved in 
general. 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
Up to now, there are a small number of studies that have proper consumption expenditure 
data to empirically test the validity of the collective model (Bourguignon et al. 1993; Thomas 
and Chen 1994). However, these previous studies only test the Pareto efficiency hypothesis for 
households consisting of only two decision makers. None of them has ever tested Pareto 
efficiency in the case of households with multiple decision makers.  
This chapter generalizes and tests whether larger households with more than two decision 
makers behave efficiently by applying the concept of distribution factors. Distribution factors are 
variables that only affect the household decision process, but not on individual preferences or the 
household budget constraint. This chapter extends the model used in chapter one to derive the 
testable restrictions on the collective model for households with any number of decision makers 
using the unconditional demand systems approach. This approach can also apply to broader cases 
where there are more distribution factors than the number of decision makers in the household. 
Moreover, I also consider a particular type of z-conditional demand systems used in 
Dauphin and Fortin (2001) to derive different sets of testable restrictions as alternative ways to 
test the collective model. The results show that both unconditional and z-conditional demand 
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systems provide similar outcomes that the three-decision-maker households in Thailand behave 
efficiently, which is consistent with the collective framework. 
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CHAPTER THREE: COLLECTIVE MODEL AND WITHIN-HOUSEHOLD 
CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
A major application of demand analysis for applied welfare economics is the 
measurement of consumption inequality between households using household equivalence 
scales. These scales may be used to determine how much income a household with a given 
composition would need to attain the same welfare level as a reference household. Equivalence 
scales are based on the unitary assumption that consumption decisions are made to maximize a 
single household welfare function. Results of chapters one and two, however, suggest that 
consumption decisions in Thai households are not consistent with the unitary model, but are 
consistent with the collective model. This chapter estimates indifference scales, alternatives to 
equivalence scales that are based on the collective model and that measure consumption 
inequality between individuals rather than between households. Using indifference scales, we 
may be able to examine welfare effects of public policy on inequality in society, such as effects 
of policies regarding poverty reduction. 
In Thailand, poverty reduction has played a significant role in country‟s development 
goals. These goals include improving the well-being of disadvantaged families, sharing the 
benefits of growth across communities, and connecting remote regions within the country and 
with the rest of the world. Over the past decades, commitment to poverty reduction by policy 
makers, businesses, and civil society has coincided with a remarkable record of poverty 
reduction. For example, the national poverty headcount, defined as the share of people living in 
households with income below the poverty line, fell from 32.6 percent in 1988 to 11.4 percent in 
63 
 
1996, then rose to 14.2 percent up to 2000 due to the consequences of the Asian crisis before it 
declined with the economic recovery and dropped below 10 percent for the first time (Jitsuchon 
and Richter 2006). Despite this record, there are some concerns about the effectiveness of 
economic policies in supporting continued growth in household income and providing 
communities with access to basic services.  
In 2001, Thai government adopted a number of poverty reduction policies such as the 
Village Fund, asset capitalization, and the BAHT 30 (about $1) health care system. However, 
many of the policies have limited coverage or significant benefit leakage to the nonpoor because 
they cover large populations. Improved targeting through better criteria for the allocation of 
resources is essential if the number of the poor is to be reduced. For example, the Village Fund 
was launched in 2001 as a revolving fund of BAHT 1 million that was to be distributed to about 
70,000 villages nationwide over a three-year period. A key characteristic of the program is that it 
covers every single village in the country, regardless of whether the village is poor or nonpoor. 
In fact, the bulk of the beneficiaries of the program are nonpoor households. The poverty impact 
of the Village Fund would be increased if the same resources were allocated in a more targeted 
fashion toward poor villages or if loans were provided at more favorable terms to low-income 
households or individuals within the households (Jitsuchon and Richter 2006). 
Although the success of the collective approach to household behavior has been 
recognized and there is growing interest in making inequality or welfare comparisons between 
individuals rather than households, survey data are generally collected at the household level. 
Welfare or inequality statements are usually measured at this level. For example, previous 
studies in the consumption literature use equivalence scales to measure consumption inequality. 
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Equivalence scales measure individual inequality rather than household inequality only if there is 
no within-household inequality. The interpretation of standard equivalence scales as measures of 
individual inequality implies a very restricted model of intrahousehold allocation by assuming 
that consumption is divided equally among household members regardless of individual 
preferences, sources of incomes, or decision-making powers. Findings from the previous two 
chapters, however, suggest that individual preferences, sources of incomes, and decision making 
powers influence consumption decisions. Then, ignoring the consumption inequality within 
households may give misleading estimates of the individual inequality.  
This chapter examines the use of household consumption data without price variation to 
recover information about individual household members and consumption inequality. The 
chapter focuses on single and married women, using collective household models developed in 
Lewel and Pendakur (2008), hereafter LP. The LP model is based on the structural model 
proposed by Browning et al. (2004), hereafter BCL. BCL assumed that households consumed a 
vector of goods ranging from purely private to very sharable, and showed how to recover 
individual resource shares and indifference scales via demand system estimation. However, the 
model used in BCL is highly nonlinear in prices, expenditures and other characteristics and is 
very difficult to estimate, both computationally and in terms of data requirements. On the other 
hand, the model used in LP provides a way to estimate the parameters of interest and obtain 
identification without price variation, so that the demand system reduces to a system of Engel 
curves.   
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the model used to estimate the 
resource shares and indifference scales. Section 3.3 outlines systems of Engel curves estimated 
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in this chapter. Section 3.4 describes sample data and presents results.  Finally, the conclusions 
are provided in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2. The model 
 Let us begin by considering the LP model of household demands where each household 
member is denoted by Jj ,...,1 . Let x denote log total household expenditure and 
],...,[ 1  Kppp  denote the K-vector of log market prices. The budget share of individual j on 
good k is denoted by ),( xwkj p , that is, if individual j were living alone, he/she would spend the 
fraction ),( xwkj p  of total expenditure exp(x) on good k. Assume that the household has a type of 
economies of scale from sharing consumption according to Barten (1964), that is, there exists a 
K-vector of constant ],...,[
1  Kα , called log Barten scales, such that the total log quantity of 
good k consumed by the members of the household equals the log quantity of the good purchased 
by the household minus k . Thus, k  can be interpreted as the degree of publicness or the 
economy of scale for good k within the household; a purely private good k would have 0k , 
while a good that is shared has 0k . 
 Let ),,( αp xwkj  denote the budget share for good k of a household which is comprised of 
individuals Jj ,...,1 , and has log Barten scale parameters, α . Individuals living alone are 
assumed to have no economies of scale to consumption, and so have log Barten scale parameters 
equal to zero. Thus, for each good k and individual j, ),( xwkj p  denotes the budget share demand 
function for a household consisting just of individual j living alone. 
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 With some technical restrictions, BCL proves that if the household behaves Pareto 
efficiently and shares consumption within the household according to the Barten technology 
above, then the household budget share for good k is given by 
)),,(ln,(),,(),,( αppααpαp xxwxxw j
k
j
j
j
k       (3.1) 
where ),,( αp xj  is the resource share of individual j in the household and 1),,(  αp x
j
j . 
Equation (3.1) illustrates how efficiency can be obtained by having each household member 
behave as if maximizing his/her own utility functions given a fraction j  of the household total 
expenditure, exp(x), and facing log shadow prices pα   which reflect the economies of scale 
from sharing. The two elements of household demand functions of most interest here are 
resource shares and indifference curves. BCL shows that resource shares can be 
nonparametrically identified by combining data on multiple person households with data on 
individuals living alone. Since we have already defined resource shares, we now define 
indifference scales.  
Let ),( xV j p  denote the indirect utility of individual j and suppose that the household has 
Barten scales α  and individual j in the household has resource share ),,( αp xj . BCL defines an 
indifference scale ),,( αp xI j  as the solution to 
)),,(ln,()),,(ln,( xxIVxxV jjjj  αppαppα  .    (3.2) 
Equation (3.2) shows that if we multiply the total household expenditure by the 
indifference scale ),,( αp xI j , and give that amount of income to individual j living alone (facing 
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log market price p ), then individual j would be able to purchase a bundle of goods that lies on 
the same indifference curve as if  he/she were to consume as a member of the household. 
Indifference scales differ from the standard adult equivalence scales in that equivalence 
scales equate the utility of an individual to the utility of a household, and then compare the utility 
of one household to the utility of another household. Equivalence scales thus face the 
fundamental problems associated with interpersonal comparisons of utility. On the other hand, 
indifference scales depend only on the indifference curves of individual j in two different 
situations, i.e., living alone facing market prices, versus living in a household consuming his/her 
share of the household‟s resources and facing shadow prices. As a result, indifference scales can 
potentially be identified just from revealed preference data. One assumption needs to be imposed 
here, that is, individual j‟s indifference curves over the goods themselves remain the same 
whether he/she living as a single or as a member of a household. Changes in consumption 
behaviors between living alone or with other persons are attributed merely to sharing of 
consumptions and resources rather than changes in preferences.  
Next, let us define the Independence of Base (IB) assumption to represent the scale 
economies. For each individual j living in a household, assume that there exists a scalar-valued 
function ),( αpjD  that satisfies the condition 
)),(ln,(),( αpppα jjj DxVxV         (3.3) 
Equation (3.3) is a joint restriction on the behavior of the individual and the household, 
because it involves the individual‟s utility function jV  and the household‟s scale economy 
parameters α . The function ),( αpjD  measures the cost savings experienced by individual j 
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resulting from scale economies of living in the household. These scale economies are assumed to 
be independent of the base expenditure (or utility) level. This assumption is similar to the IB 
restriction in the equivalence scale literature (Lewbel 1989; Blundell and Lewbel 1991; Blundell 
et al. 1998).  
When applying Roy‟s identity to Eq. (3.3), individual j‟s budget share functions on good 
k can be written as 
)),(ln,(),(),( αppαppα j
k
j
k
j
k
j Dxwdxw       (3.4) 
where 
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is the elasticity of jD  with respect to the 
thk  price. The consequence of the IB assumption in the 
present context is that the demands of individual j when living alone differ from her demands 
when living in a household only in that they are translated over log expenditure x by ),(ln αpjD  
and over each kjw  by ),( αp
k
jd . 
 Assume that resource shares j  do not depend on x, and so are given by 0),( αpj . By 
substituting Eq. (3.4) into (3.1), the household budget share demand functions can be written as 
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is person j‟s  indifference scale (deflator of total expenditure x) which combines the effect of cost 
savings jD  and resource shares j  of individual j when living in the household. Eq. (3.6) shows 
that household budget share equations are a simple function of individual budget share 
equations; in particular, they are weighted average of individual budget shares translated both in 
budget shares (weighted by scale economy price elasticities) and log expenditure (weighted by 
individual indifference scales). Eq. (3.7) shows that individual j‟s indifference scale is smaller 
when she receives a larger share of household resources j  or experiences smaller cost savings 
from sharing consumption. 
 We now suppose that data are only observed in one price regime, 0pp  , as typically 
occurred when considering cross-sectional data. Both 0p  and α  are vectors of constants and can 
now be taken out of Eq. (3.6). We can then rewrite Eq. (3.6) in Engel curve form as 
  
j
j
k
j
k
jj
k Ixwdxw )]ln([)(         (3.8) 
where )(xwk  and )(xwkj  are the household‟s and individual j‟s Engle curves for good k, 
respectively, and where the resource shares j  and indifference scales jI  are now constants for 
each individual j. Moreover, in addition to the fact that 1
j
j , we also need to assume that 
0j  for each household member j, so each household member j can be considered as a 
decision maker in the household.  
 Since we have assumed that individual‟s preferences over goods are the same whether 
living alone or in a household, observing the expenditure of households and of individuals on 
each good k in this one price regime allows the Engel curve functions )(xwk  and )(xwkj  to be 
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identified for each good k. However, we need to investigate whether the resource shares j  and 
indifference scales jI  can be identified from these Engel curves. Using Theorem 1 in LP, it can 
be shown that j  and jI  are nonparametrically identified, as long as some of the goods have 
budget shares that are nonlinear and are sufficiently different across individuals. Specifically, 
Theorem 1 says that in a household with J people, the resource shares and indifference scales are 
identified if there are J goods having nonlinear Engel curves that differ both across people and 
across goods. Also note that Theorem 1 is sufficient but not necessary for identification. One 
may also obtain identification under weaker conditions by the presence of assignable goods, or 
by functional form restrictions. 
 
3.3. Empirical implementation 
 For implementation, I follow LP by considering the households consisting of married 
couples, so 2J . I index the members of the household by fj   for female and mj   for 
male. Since resource shares j  sum to one, I define a single share function f   with 
m 1 . Moreover, to exploit data from a survey of many people, I also specify how 
jj
k
j DIxw ,,),(   and 
k
jd  vary by observable characteristics such as age and education.  
 Next, I introduce a vector of demographic characteristics for each individual, jz , and a 
vector of distribution factors, hz . Distribution factors as described in previous two chapters are 
variables that affect the decision making process but do not directly affect preferences. In the 
present context, distribution factors are variables that affect resource shares but not the demand 
71 
 
functions of individual household members. Thus, jz  can enter the budget share functions of the 
relevant singles, ),( j
k
j xw z  and the scale economies functions and elasticities of the singles 
)( jjD z  and )( j
k
jd z . Both hz  and the individual characteristics fz  and mz  enter the resource 
share function ),,( mfh zzz , and since the indifference scale is equal to the scale economies 
divided by the resource share, these arguments also enter the indifference scale ),,( mfhjI zzz . 
 Let ),,( mfh zzzz   denote the set of distribution factors and all demographic 
characteristics, so we can write the resource share and indifference scale functions as )(z  and 
)(zjI . Adding   error terms for each good 1,...,1  Kk , the model of estimation for single 
individuals can be written as 
k
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and for couples as 
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where  mfjwkj ,,   is individual j‟s actual budget share and mfjxw j
k
j ,),,( z  is the Engel 
curve function for these shares. Notice that the equation for the 
thK  good in each household type 
(f, m and couples) does not need to be estimated, because its parameters can be determined by 
budget shares summing to one for each household. 
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 Although the parameters of interest, )(z  and )(zjI , can be nonparametrically identified 
from Engel curve data according to Theorem 1 in LP, I will flexibly parameterize the model for 
empirical tractability. For parameterization, let us continue to estimate the budget share Engel 
curve models using the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) which was found to 
provide a good fit for Engle curves (Banks et al. 1997). Without price variation, the QUAIDS 
models for single females are given by 
 kfff
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2'0 )()(),( zezezaz //      (3.12) 
and for single males by 
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for each good Kk ,...,1 , where fz  and mz  are vectors of female‟s and male‟s demographic 
characteristics including ages and highest level of education. I also normalize fz  and mz  to zero 
for a reference set of characteristics, which in this chapter are an individual aged 35 with Junior 
High School as their highest level of education. 
 Substitute Eqs. (3.12) and (3.13) into (3.11) then gives the budget share Engel curve 
models for couples as 
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  To estimate the models, I also need to parameterize )(),( j
k
jjj dD zz  and )(z . The 
indifference scale is given by )(ln)(ln)(ln zzz jjjj DI  . Following LP, I parameterize 
)( ffD z  and )( mmD z  as 
fffff dD zdz
/ 0)(ln ,        (3.15) 
 mmmmm dD zdz
/ 0)(ln         (3.16) 
and for each Kk ,...,1 , the price elasticities of the IB scales are parameterized as 
 f
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0)(   ,         (3.17) 
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k
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k
mm
k
md zδz
'
0)(   .        (3.18) 
Moreover, the resource share function )(z  can be parameterized by 
 mmffhhr zrzrzrzrz
////  0)(        (3.19) 
where I take the distribution factor hz  to be the relative wage of the wife versus the husband as 
suggested by Browning and Chiappori (1998).  
 Using Eqs. (3.15) to (3.19), I can write the functional forms for indifference scales )(zfI  
and )(zmI  as 
 )ln()(ln 0 zrzdz
//  ffff dI        (3.20) 
 )1ln()(ln 0 zrzdz
//  mmmm dI .       (3.21) 
 The model I actually estimate is then obtained by substituting Eq. (3.12) into (3.9) and 
Eq. (3.13) into (3.10) for singles, and substituting Eqs. (3.17) to (3.21) into Eq. (3.14) for 
couples, for each 1,...,1  Kk  good. We then have a system of 1K  equations for each 
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household type. To estimate the functions of interest )(z  and )(zjI  requires a two-step process. 
First, I separately estimate each system of 1K  equations for the singles using NLSUR method 
to obtain kj
k
jj
k
j
k
j cba ,,,,
'0 /
ea  for mfj , . Then, I substitute these single parameters into the 
couple‟s budget share system (3.14) for each 1,...,1  Kk  good, and estimate a system of 
equations for couples by NLSUR using only just couples data. It is crucial for us to first estimate 
the systems of equations for singles because, without information on singles, the parameters of 
interest from the couple‟s model by itself are not all identified.  
 According to Theorem 1 in LP, the couple‟s model above is identified as long as the 
K2  matrices consisting of rows ],[ km
k
f bb  and ],[
k
m
k
f cc  each have rank two and )(z  is not 
equal to zero or one. However, the precision of estimation is likely to be improved by the 
presence of an assignable good. A good is considered assignable if it is consumed exclusively by 
only one individual in the collective household. Unfortunately, there are no records of any 
assignable good in our sample data from Thailand. I try to estimate the models by assuming that 
cosmetics can be considered as an assignable good for female, while alcohol and tobacco as an 
assignable good for male. However, the survey data show that approximately 13% of single 
males report positive expenditures on cosmetics, while 9% of single females report positive 
expenditures alcohol and tobacco. Since these numbers are relatively large, I choose not include 
any assignable good to the model.     
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3.4. Data and results 
 The sample data used to estimate the model in this chapter also comes from the same 
Socio-Economic Survey (SES) conducted by the National Statistical Office of Thailand (NSO) in 
year 2006 used in chapters one and two. The reader is referred to the data section in chapter one 
to see how the data are collected. The sample is only limited to three types of households (single 
female, single male and married couples with no child) with each individual being a full-time 
wage and salary earner. Thus, our sample consists of 810 single females, 825 single males, and 
1108 childless couples. The vectors fz  and mz  consist of two demographic variables, age and 
years of formal education. I normalize fz  and mz  to zero by subtracting 35 from age, and 9 from 
years of formal education for a reference set of characteristics. I also define distribution factors 
hz  to be the demeaned female‟s share of gross household income (the mean is 0.45). In addition, 
I decide to totally drop the budget share on education category out of the estimated models 
because there are only 1% of single female and 2% of single male reported to have positive 
expenditures on education. Thus, I estimate the system of budget shares using NLSUR for 
11K  non-durable categories, and the omitted category is healthcare. Table 14 provides the 
main overall descriptive statistics of the sample. 
 Table 15 reports the estimated parameters for the collective household that enter the scale 
economies fD and mD , and resource shares   functions.
12
 For an individual aged 35 with nine 
years of formal education, scale economies for female and male are given by )exp( ,0 fd  and 
                                                 
12 Estimates for the hundreds of parameters of the model comprising the singles‟ budget share equations for each 
model are available upon request from the author. Moreover, I also compute ranks of the K2  matrices consisting 
of rows ],[ km
k
j bb  and ],[
k
m
k
j cc  for identification purpose using Stata. The results show that each matrix has rank 
two; thus satisfying Theorem 1 in LP. 
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)exp( ,0 md , respectively. Notice that, in principle, one should expect the scale economy to lie 
between 0.5 (completely sharing of consumption) and 1 (purely private consumption). I first 
consider the estimated parameters from Model A. Model A estimates the couple models 
developed in section 3.3. The results for Model A give scale economies of 0.88 for female and 
1.86 for male of this type in the married-couple households. Even though the scale economy for 
female is reasonable in magnitude, the scale economy for male clearly is not. These point 
estimates imply that for a female aged 35 with 9 years of formal education, the cost of living as a 
member (wife) of the household equals 88% of the costs if she should live alone (single). On the 
other hand, a married male (husband) faces a much higher cost of living of 186% compared to 
when he lives alone.  
There may be two possible explanations that cause the scale economy for husband to lie 
outside the 0.5 – 1 range. The first possibility is that it is common in Thai society for husbands to 
provide housing and some personal expenses for their wives even when wives work full time. As 
a result, married males would require higher income to be as well off as they were living alone. 
The second possibility is that these scale economies are imprecisely estimated as we may see that 
they are not statistically significant at any level. As pointed out by Bargain et al. (2010), which 
uses the model similar to LP to estimate the measurement of child costs using data from Ireland, 
that the estimated parameters may be sensitive to model specifications. Thus, I estimate Model B 
where the resource shares   are now specified using the logistic form as 
)exp(1
)exp(
)(
zr
zr
z
/
/

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used by Bargain et al. (2010). The main difference of using the logistic form for the resource 
shares is that now the resource shares are bounded between zero and one, which was not the case 
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in Model A. However, the scale economies are still not statistically significant at any level in 
model B.
13
   
In addition, demographics affect the demand of single individuals, and so should also 
affect their scale economies when living in married couple households. The negative and 
significant coefficient on faged ,  suggests that older females in married couples have smaller scale 
economies (more negative fDln ) than younger females in married couples, while none of the 
remaining coefficients on the demographic variables are significant; hence, no discernible effect 
on scale economies.  
The resource shares   are more precisely estimated than the scale economies, and the 
estimates are more stable across Models A and B. In Model A, the parameter 0r  gives the 
resource share   of a female (wife) aged 35 with 9 years of formal education in a married-
couple household, while for Model B it equals exp )( 0r . The estimated resource shares for a wife 
equal 0.649 and 0.644 for Models A and B, and they are both significant at 1% and 5% 
respectively. These results are different than those found by LP and Lise and Seitz (2011) that 
females have resource shares less than 0.5. However, these results are more in line with BCL and 
Bargain et al. (2010) that female‟s resource shares are in the neighborhood of 0.6. Notice from 
Models A and B that the precisions of the estimates of the 0r  coefficient are very impressive 
even though I am not able to incorporate the use of assignable goods. This ability to identify and 
estimate the resource shares without the presence of assignable goods is an interesting finding 
because it implies that we may be able to use household-level data to recover some of the 
                                                 
13 I also estimate Models A and B using different initial values for r0 and find that the estimated results are relatively 
stable across the values with no evidence of multiple local minima. 
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individual decision-making process parameters, which rarely occurred in the earlier literature of 
collective household model. 
For the effect of demographic variables on the resource share, Models A and B show that 
the wife‟s share of gross household income and husband‟s education level have no significant 
effects on the resource shares, while wife‟s education and ages of both spouses do. The positive 
value of feducr ,  implies that the wives with higher education have larger resource shares 
compared to wives with only Junior High School qualification. This is somewhat expected since 
we should anticipate that wives‟ ability to extract resources within the household would be larger 
when they are more educated. The negative coefficients on fager ,  and mager ,  imply that, ceteris 
paribus, older wives tend to have smaller resource shares compared to younger wives, and also 
receive smaller resource shares when their husbands get older. These results are interesting 
because they simply demonstrate that older wives have less bargaining power within the 
household while older husbands possess more power, which is very common in Thai society.  
I estimate two more models using instrumental variables for log total household 
expenditure. First, I run a linear regression to predict log total expenditure for each type of 
household by regressing log total expenditure on log total income and all explanatory variables, 
their square and interaction terms, then substituting the predicted value of log total expenditure 
into singles‟ and couples‟ household models. After that, I estimate the couple‟s model using 
NLSUR. Models C and D provide the estimated parameters after controlling for the endogeneity 
of total household expenditures.
14
  
                                                 
14 I have estimated more specifications than Models C and D reported here, including different instruments. In 
particular, I experience that all models are very sensitive to the choice of instruments because the estimates are 
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 The estimated parameters from Models C and D are exceedingly different from each 
other and also different than the results obtained from Models A and B. These findings are 
similar to the results found by BCL which estimates the resource shares using GMM estimations 
and finds that the estimated models are sensitive to the choice of instruments. Bargain et al. 
(2010) also find that the share of children which is interpreted as the cost of children is relatively 
stable across specifications without endogeneity correction, but unstable when the endogeneity 
of total expenditure is controlled for. 
 Finally, indifference scales, which are used to adjust household income that puts a single 
individual on the same indifferent curve they would attain when they were married, can be 
obtained by dividing the scale economy with the resource share. Since the estimated parameters 
from Models C and D are relatively unstable, then I only interpret the results obtained from 
Models A and B. Therefore, given the estimates from Model A, a female aged 35 with 9 years of 
formal education has an estimated indifference scale of (0.88/0.649) = 1.36. This implies that this 
female when living alone would need approximately (1/1.36) = 74% of the couple‟s income to 
reach the same indifference curve that she would attain as a wife in the married-couple 
household. From Model B, the indifference scale of such female would equal to (0.85/0.644) = 
1.32. This implies that when living alone she would need (1/1.32) = 76% of the couple‟s income 
to attain the same indifference curve that she would attain as a wife in the married-couple 
household. Therefore, the estimates are relatively stable between Models A and B regardless of 
the functional form of the resource shares.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
relatively unstable across all specifications. The estimated parameters from models with different instruments are 
available upon request from the author. 
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3.5. Conclusions 
  The success of the collective approach to household behavior has been recognized and 
there is growing interest in using it to make inequality or welfare comparisons between 
individuals. Survey data are generally collected at the household level and welfare or inequality 
statements are usually measured at this level. This chapter estimates systems of Engel curves 
developed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) using household consumption data to recover many 
of the objects of interest, especially resource shares and indifference scales of the individuals 
who together make up the household in the collective framework.  
 Even though the estimates of scale economies are imprecise, I find relatively stable and 
more precise results for the resource shares. Using Thai consumption data, I find that wives aged 
35 with Junior High School diplomas have resource shares equal to nearly 65% of married-
couple‟s total incomes, while higher educated wives have larger resource shares. Resource shares 
for wives are smaller for older-married compared to younger-married couples. Moreover, if a 
female were to live alone, she would need approximately three-quarters of the couple‟s income 
to reach the same indifference curve, and hence the same standard of living, that she would attain 
as a wife in the married-couple household. 
Finally, the readers should be cautious that the estimated model in this chapter assumes 
that there is no change in preferences from being single to being married, so that differences 
between the consumption behaviors of singles versus couples are due to sharing of household 
goods and the allocation of household resources to husbands and wives. Therefore, there are 
opportunities for us to examine the situation where we allow individual‟s preferences to change 
after marriage. This may be done by acquiring additional data which include direct observations 
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of the resource allocation and separate consumption of some goods by individuals within the 
household. I will leave these opportunities for my future research.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for all 2933 households 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Household characteristics:
Household size 3.06 1.04 2 9
Number of young children (age 0-5) 0.23 0.48 0 3
Number of older children (age 6-14) 0.52 0.73 0 4
Husband age 39.06 9.50 18 75
Wife age 36.61 9.18 16 76
Husband education (year) 10.66 4.74 0 22
Wife education (year) 10.67 4.86 0 22
Central 0.43 0.50 0 1
North 0.16 0.37 0 1
Northeastern 0.17 0.37 0 1
South 0.12 0.32 0 1
Rural 0.25 0.43 0 1
Monthly income (in hundred):
Husband wages 127.02 110.54 10 2000
Wife wages 102.89 92.52 5 1200
Total household income 230.36 190.53 30 3000
Total household consumption 180.87 134.37 15.86 2077.95
Share of monthly consumption expenditure (%) on:
Housing 15.22 7.45 1.25 64.90
Household operations 7.02 3.55 0.00 43.34
Clothing & Footwear 3.89 4.66 0.00 30.62
Personal & Services 3.85 3.20 0.00 29.53
Cosmetic 0.72 1.30 0.00 21.60
Health 1.50 3.64 0.00 58.86
Transportation & Communication 18.83 9.36 0.00 60.46
Education 1.92 3.42 0.00 46.61
Recreation & Religion 1.86 2.36 0.00 25.03
Food eaten at home 28.91 11.52 2.76 78.56
Food eaten outside 11.99 8.41 0.00 73.97
Alcohol & Tobacco 4.29 5.86 0.00 48.40
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Table 2. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (unitary model) with all household compositions 
 
 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Health Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 3.372138 -3.544552*** -3.425716*** 1.040187 -0.179794 -3.260877** -6.88292*** -7.599359*** -1.683796** 4.619832** 11.28793*** 6.730615***
(2.771189) (1.161005) (1.262572) (1.102068) (0.419679) (1.530563) (2.558455) (1.134348) (0.754496) (2.161818) (1.792946) (1.376926)
Household size 2.447597*** 2.564208*** -0.0409 0.376319 -0.15319 1.234883*** 3.356849*** 3.888807*** 0.236848 4.347187*** 2.897741*** -0.703404** 3.06
(0.681573) (0.285549) (0.310529) (0.271054) (0.10322) (0.376442) (0.629252) (0.278993) (0.185568) (0.531699) (0.440975) (0.338655)
Young children -1.589591 -1.026734** 0.134926 3.445435*** -0.096855 -0.226032 -4.39009*** -3.673807*** -0.481955 4.625384*** -4.673697*** 0.186806 0.23
(1.092827) (0.457846) (0.497899) (0.434604) (0.165502) (0.603582) (1.008934) (0.447333) (0.297538) (0.852519) (0.707054) (0.542995)
Older children -3.625263*** -1.17483*** 1.032571*** -0.231981 0.296514** -1.3709*** -1.464415* -1.011194*** -0.193489 1.182416* -1.389984** 0.891497** 0.52
(0.84927) (0.355807) (0.386933) (0.337745) (0.128617) (0.469063) (0.784075) (0.347637) (0.231226) (0.66252) (0.549474) (0.421979)
Home owner 8.14947*** 0.84844** 0.348138 0.050001 0.266619* 0.339861 2.776233*** 0.158661 0.310584 0.195594 0.993778 -1.288352*** 0.52
(0.949202) (0.397674) (0.432463) (0.377486) (0.143751) (0.524256) (0.876335) (0.388543) (0.258434) (0.740477) (0.614129) (0.471632)
Vehicle owner 2.540932** 0.677995 0.197072 0.600068 0.075258 -0.249856 6.221644*** 0.598133 0.781221** 0.550239 -0.539082 1.021934* 0.84
(1.214085) (0.508648) (0.553145) (0.482827) (0.183865) (0.670555) (1.120884) (0.496969) (0.330552) (0.947114) (0.785507) (0.603245)
Husband age -0.006849 0.010381 -0.011194 0.019292 0.001016 -0.033626 -0.022414 -0.068897* -0.003161 0.004177 -0.081277 -0.05291 39.06
(0.090533) (0.037929) (0.041247) (0.036004) (0.013711) (0.050002) (0.083583) (0.037058) (0.024649) (0.070625) (0.058574) (0.044983)
Wife age 0.047777 0.036399 -0.008162 -0.004031 0.015171 0.060417 -0.024021 0.047264 0.008486 0.127181* -0.082988 0.017163 36.61
(0.094195) (0.039464) (0.042916) (0.03746) (0.014265) (0.052025) (0.086964) (0.038557) (0.025646) (0.073482) (0.060944) (0.046803)
Husband education (year) 0.479061*** 0.177061*** 0.191239*** 0.15934*** 0.077989*** -0.037529 0.830384*** 0.081944 0.06427 0.308441*** 0.039309 -0.057936 10.66
(0.151295) (0.063386) (0.068931) (0.060168) (0.022913) (0.083562) (0.139681) (0.06193) (0.041192) (0.118026) (0.097887) (0.075174)
Wife education (year) 0.267743* 0.165649*** 0.153866** 0.272587*** 0.150354*** 0.146969* 0.534765*** -0.04894 0.010332 0.416592*** 0.366237*** -0.103904 10.67
(0.14769) (0.061875) (0.067288) (0.058734) (0.022367) (0.081571) (0.136352) (0.060455) (0.040211) (0.115213) (0.095555) (0.073383)
HH total income 0.043892*** 0.008802*** 0.020388*** -0.014558*** -0.011187*** 0.015244*** 0.065756*** 0.013161*** 0.015308*** 0.039987*** 0.028739*** 0.016858*** 230.36
(0.005817) (0.002437) (0.00265) (0.002313) (0.000881) (0.003213) (0.00537) (0.002381) (0.001584) (0.004538) (0.003763) (0.00289)
HH total income square 0.000004 0.000013*** 0.000003** 0.000033*** 0.000016*** -0.000005*** 0.000042*** 0.000008*** 0.00000004 -0.000008*** -0.000001 -0.000006*** 89354.57
(0.000003) (0.000001) (0.000002) (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000002) (0.000003) (0.000001) (0.000001) (0.000003) (0.000002) (0.000002)
Central -9.965106*** -1.459253*** 2.396331*** -1.720148*** -0.149259 -1.529792** -4.549628*** -2.209069*** 0.127183 -0.20371 -2.86346*** 0.972466 0.43
(1.359943) (0.569756) (0.619599) (0.540833) (0.205955) (0.751114) (1.255545) (0.556674) (0.370264) (1.060898) (0.879876) (0.675717)
North -13.95853*** -2.419238*** 2.785889*** -2.662457*** -0.062684 -1.47304* -12.04932*** -2.537374*** -0.839094* -3.316868*** -8.284594*** 0.193504 0.16
(1.602706) (0.671463) (0.730204) (0.637377) (0.24272) (0.885195) (1.479672) (0.656045) (0.436359) (1.250278) (1.036943) (0.79634)
Northeast -17.47446*** -4.382593*** 1.074179 -2.603857*** -0.251059 -3.473658*** -12.57153*** -5.038213*** -1.628048*** -3.539661*** -10.18*** 0.985452 0.17
(1.616982) (0.677444) (0.736708) (0.643054) (0.244882) (0.89308) (1.492852) (0.661889) (0.440246) (1.261415) (1.046179) (0.803433)
South -11.78578*** -3.385955*** 2.519596*** -2.58823*** -0.290252 -1.747585* -9.459163*** -2.664688*** -1.223181*** -0.040938 -4.690447*** 0.466601 0.12
(1.715201) (0.718593) (0.781457) (0.682114) (0.259756) (0.947327) (1.583531) (0.702094) (0.466988) (1.338036) (1.109726) (0.852235)
Rural -0.767361 -0.803638* -0.469672 -0.278107 -0.143367 -0.472445 -0.26324 -0.342626 -0.467508* -1.325718* -1.86976*** 0.130535 0.25
(0.991641) (0.415454) (0.451798) (0.394364) (0.150178) (0.547696) (0.915517) (0.405915) (0.269988) (0.773584) (0.641587) (0.492719)
R-squared 0.3105 0.3400 0.2607 0.3965 0.4179 0.0597 0.6450 0.3051 0.2489 0.3299 0.2237 0.0263
Number of households 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Table 3. QUAIDS Engel curve (unitary model) with all household compositions (SURE) 
 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 47.95122*** 28.6071*** -11.72575** 14.9885*** -0.279357 -63.56146*** -0.661715 2.169561 122.5616*** -39.63972*** -14.4352***
(7.568327) (3.644231) (4.680457) (3.244211) (1.32222) (8.380295) (3.13245) (2.373891) (9.535993) (8.305295) (5.998765)
Household size -0.422973 0.647975*** -0.673187*** -0.271705*** -0.154844*** -0.756311*** 1.4795*** -0.231708*** 0.76068*** 0.502355** -0.897427** 3.06
(0.233604) (0.112483) (0.144467) (0.100136) (0.040812) (0.258667) (0.096686) (0.073273) (0.294338) (0.256352) (0.185158)
Young children -0.189286 0.196662 0.38417* 1.823501*** -0.101049 -1.846728*** -1.359492*** -0.163269 4.251885*** -3.332964*** 0.072893 0.23
(0.366663) (0.176552) (0.226754) (0.157173) (0.064058) (0.406001) (0.151758) (0.115008) (0.461991) (0.402367) (0.290623)
Older children -0.863702*** -0.299925** 0.663647*** 0.070154 0.035162 -0.5121 -0.110872 0.003563 1.535698*** -0.690937** 0.370314 0.52
(0.2851) (0.137279) (0.176314) (0.12221) (0.049808) (0.315687) (0.118) (0.089425) (0.359223) (0.312862) (0.225975)
Home owner 3.386533*** 0.232454 -0.227118 -0.2422* 0.027776 -0.014805 -0.08216 -0.087766 -0.839084** -0.835992** -1.156135*** 0.52
(0.320278) (0.154217) (0.198069) (0.137289) (0.055954) (0.354639) (0.13256) (0.100459) (0.403546) (0.351465) (0.253857)
Vehicle owner 0.038214 -0.065912 -0.162627 -0.085155 -0.008825 2.964907*** 0.159562 0.351926*** -0.630297 -2.435099*** -0.100494 0.84
(0.410944) (0.197874) (0.254139) (0.176154) (0.071794) (0.455032) (0.170085) (0.128897) (0.517784) (0.450959) (0.32572)
Husband age 0.075287** 0.015614 0.005437 -0.008224 -0.002294 0.060732* -0.006356 0.013818 0.021935 -0.121565*** -0.055555** 39.06
(0.030032) (0.014461) (0.018573) (0.012874) (0.005247) (0.033254) (0.01243) (0.00942) (0.03784) (0.032957) (0.023804)
Wife age -0.015054 0.025003* -0.012177 -0.018767 -0.008871 0.010027 0.033088** 0.002977 0.030416 -0.071633** 0.016777 36.61
(0.031297) (0.01507) (0.019355) (0.013416) (0.005468) (0.034655) (0.012954) (0.009817) (0.039434) (0.034345) (0.024807)
Husband education (year) 0.192609*** 0.017355 0.020657 -0.006757 0.002794 0.34288*** 0.020463 0.035466** -0.214644*** -0.157405*** -0.193043*** 10.66
(0.049827) (0.023992) (0.030814) (0.021359) (0.008705) (0.055173) (0.020623) (0.015629) (0.062782) (0.054679) (0.039494)
Wife education (year) 0.040917 0.038578 0.01635 0.040819* 0.025513*** 0.23447*** -0.014003 -0.001075 -0.20934*** -0.011567 -0.200145*** 10.67
(0.048954) (0.023572) (0.030274) (0.020984) (0.008552) (0.054206) (0.020261) (0.015355) (0.061681) (0.053721) (0.038801)
Log (household total consumption) -11.40674*** -8.609631*** 3.911027** -4.29764*** 0.111265 26.79339*** -1.925881 -1.432116 -29.80317*** 24.72721*** 8.343684*** 4.89
(3.032674) (1.460265) (1.875487) (1.299975) (0.529821) (3.358035) (1.255192) (0.951232) (3.82113) (3.327982) (2.403741)
Log (hh total consumption) square 0.871901*** 0.689185*** -0.157129 0.470327*** 0.040062 -2.304151*** 0.297368** 0.245216*** 2.026401*** -2.346334*** -0.606255** 24.25
(0.301982) (0.145408) (0.186754) (0.129447) (0.052758) (0.33438) (0.124987) (0.09472) (0.380494) (0.331388) (0.239356)
Central -2.561366*** -0.053644 1.760144*** -0.411262** 0.000633 -1.465686*** -0.532324*** 0.412813*** 2.00351*** -0.57566 1.462926*** 0.43
(0.457673) (0.220375) (0.283037) (0.196185) (0.079958) (0.506775) (0.189426) (0.143554) (0.576662) (0.502239) (0.362758)
North -4.093137*** -0.101006 3.044569*** -0.292014 0.176343* -2.132306*** -0.037834 0.37397** 3.021543*** -2.003164*** 1.683812*** 0.16
(0.554452) (0.266975) (0.342888) (0.237669) (0.096865) (0.613936) (0.229482) (0.17391) (0.698602) (0.608442) (0.439467)
Northeast -4.163578*** -0.40101 2.632196*** -0.021434 0.243642** -1.601606*** -1.023438*** 0.127592 3.817403*** -2.236195*** 2.597241*** 0.17
(0.561907) (0.270564) (0.347498) (0.240865) (0.098168) (0.622191) (0.232567) (0.176248) (0.707995) (0.616623) (0.445375)
South -2.247507*** -0.638355** 2.472685*** -0.582481** -0.006619 -2.594735*** -0.417596* -0.061485 3.638793*** -1.250661** 1.398328*** 0.12
(0.580158) (0.279352) (0.358785) (0.248688) (0.101356) (0.6424) (0.240121) (0.181973) (0.730991) (0.636651) (0.459841)
Rural -0.927423*** -0.190953 0.164484 -0.008971 -0.016366 1.320277*** -0.122081 -0.07543 0.212248 -0.60705* 0.315895 0.25
(0.334023) (0.160836) (0.206569) (0.143181) (0.058355) (0.369859) (0.138249) (0.10477) (0.420864) (0.366548) (0.264751)
R-squared 0.0868 0.0701 0.1089 0.0903 0.0916 0.2919 0.2605 0.1070 0.3945 0.1377 0.0742
Number of households 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Table 4. QUAIDS Engel curve (unitary model) with all household compositions (3SLS) 
 
 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 10.72154 28.43179*** 1.473448 23.32235*** 1.445582 -76.86008*** 2.074284 1.86969 151.4285*** -30.57731** -14.63786
(12.60288) (6.04125) (7.783365) (5.386769) (2.194414) (14.48936) (5.193334) (3.934851) (16.02402) (13.76865) (9.980853)
Household size -0.532857** 0.624349*** -0.56318*** -0.225477** -0.174205*** -1.619468*** 1.463474*** -0.223764*** 1.297742*** 0.518199* -0.71634*** 3.06
(0.246086) (0.117962) (0.151979) (0.105183) (0.042849) (0.282922) (0.101406) (0.076833) (0.312888) (0.268849) (0.194888)
Young children -0.130749 0.207885 0.329759 1.80015*** -0.092178 -1.43551*** -1.352377*** -0.16698 3.992437*** -3.342047*** -0.012858 0.23
(0.370093) (0.177406) (0.228564) (0.158187) (0.064441) (0.425491) (0.152506) (0.11555) (0.470557) (0.404327) (0.293095)
Older children -0.852595*** -0.290859*** 0.631994*** 0.05923 0.044185 -0.186742 -0.102287 0.000209 1.350824*** -0.689387** 0.299502 0.52
(0.287764) (0.137941) (0.177719) (0.122997) (0.050106) (0.330839) (0.118581) (0.089845) (0.36588) (0.314383) (0.227895)
Home owner 3.393007*** 0.213303 -0.170438 -0.225695 0.00718 -0.696379* -0.102641 -0.080385 -0.469036 -0.846619** -1.005292*** 0.52
(0.327226) (0.156858) (0.202091) (0.139864) (0.056977) (0.376208) (0.134842) (0.102166) (0.416054) (0.357495) (0.259147)
Vehicle owner -0.209365 -0.092296 0.002683 -0.006129 -0.024038 1.977352*** 0.151455 0.359568*** 0.054778 -2.386732*** 0.096429 0.84
(0.423987) (0.20324) (0.261848) (0.181222) (0.073825) (0.487452) (0.174714) (0.132377) (0.539081) (0.463206) (0.335776)
Husband age 0.070877** 0.014561 0.010175 -0.00627 -0.003182 0.02235 -0.007109 0.014176 0.045541 -0.120979*** -0.047463** 39.06
(0.030349) (0.014548) (0.018743) (0.012972) (0.005284) (0.034892) (0.012506) (0.009476) (0.038588) (0.033157) (0.024035)
Wife age -0.016779 0.023464 -0.006859 -0.016947 -0.010411* -0.04517 0.031618** 0.003548 0.061688 -0.071935** 0.028804 36.61
(0.031792) (0.01524) (0.019635) (0.013589) (0.005536) (0.036551) (0.013101) (0.009926) (0.040423) (0.034733) (0.025178)
Husband education (year) 0.151391*** 0.010044 0.057152* 0.009132 -0.002827 0.074408 0.016069 0.037854** -0.043519 -0.15073** -0.137311*** 10.66
(0.055276) (0.026497) (0.034138) (0.023626) (0.009625) (0.06355) (0.022778) (0.017258) (0.070281) (0.060389) (0.043776)
Wife education (year) -0.008237 0.031064 0.05617* 0.05864** 0.020084** -0.042763 -0.017987 0.001312 -0.028812 -0.003039 -0.14315*** 10.67
(0.055052) (0.02639) (0.034) (0.023531) (0.009586) (0.063293) (0.022686) (0.017188) (0.069997) (0.060145) (0.043599)
Log (household total consumption) 3.35555 -8.604784*** -1.123895 -7.541647*** -0.64113 29.761*** -3.078201 -1.288504 -39.98503*** 21.10328*** 8.932455** 4.89
(5.039183) (2.415557) (3.112131) (2.153867) (0.877423) (5.793484) (2.076523) (1.573326) (6.407107) (5.505312) (3.990784)
Log (hh total consumption) square -0.509783 0.707771*** 0.255578 0.75613*** 0.13063 -1.903072*** 0.425077** 0.2245 2.60708*** -1.998167*** -0.811055** 24.25
(0.493966) (0.236785) (0.305067) (0.211133) (0.086009) (0.567907) (0.203551) (0.154225) (0.628057) (0.539659) (0.391197)
Central -2.466828*** -0.015069 1.609393*** -0.468116** 0.036599 -0.072439 -0.499503** 0.399005*** 1.184621** -0.580681 1.163655*** 0.43
(0.474597) (0.2275) (0.293105) (0.202854) (0.082637) (0.545638) (0.19557) (0.148178) (0.60343) (0.518498) (0.375857)
North -3.601858*** -0.022107 2.634928*** -0.473673* 0.234616** 0.773703 0.005937 0.348666* 1.143099 -2.086615*** 1.084362** 0.16
(0.613558) (0.294112) (0.378925) (0.262249) (0.106833) (0.7054) (0.252832) (0.191564) (0.780113) (0.670313) (0.485908)
Northeast -3.852929*** -0.312825 2.255429*** -0.172148 0.321011*** 1.601284** -0.955821*** 0.096959 1.880809** -2.270894*** 1.917113*** 0.17
(0.626252) (0.300197) (0.386765) (0.267675) (0.109043) (0.719994) (0.258063) (0.195527) (0.796252) (0.68418) (0.49596)
South -2.112054*** -0.580407** 2.248458*** -0.666446*** 0.047747 -0.503042 -0.367779 -0.082292 2.413141*** -1.256592* 0.948483** 0.12
(0.609004) (0.291929) (0.376112) (0.260303) (0.10604) (0.700163) (0.250955) (0.190142) (0.774322) (0.665337) (0.482301)
Rural -0.804547** -0.178784 0.085283 -0.047326 -0.009795 1.777432*** -0.119022 -0.078869 -0.109677 -0.631491* 0.225432 0.25
(0.338702) (0.162358) (0.209178) (0.144769) (0.058975) (0.389401) (0.139571) (0.105749) (0.430645) (0.370032) (0.268235)
R-squared 0.0782 0.0698 0.1030 0.0870 0.0892 0.2295 0.2601 0.1069 0.3777 0.1373 0.0671
Number of households 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Table 5. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (monthly expenditures on monthly incomes) with all household compositions 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Health Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 3.963707 -3.589473*** -3.157096 1.074747 -0.07391 -3.093508** -6.756507*** -8.005282*** -1.512694** 4.863536** 11.16771*** 6.584779***
(2.760838) (1.16188) (1.263553) (1.080833) (0.413369) (1.531739) (2.532665) (1.128518) (0.754191) (2.165687) (1.798459) (1.37511)
Household size 2.235393*** 2.534827*** -0.042719 0.459701* -0.094958 1.232468*** 3.413266*** 3.804653*** 0.275645 4.315569*** 2.908493*** -0.789491** 3.06
(0.678869) (0.285698) (0.310698) (0.265769) (0.101644) (0.376643) (0.622764) (0.277494) (0.18545) (0.532526) (0.442228) (0.338129)
Young children -1.51615 -1.013693** 0.144808 3.391352*** -0.167245 -0.239971 -4.599473*** -3.656585*** -0.509749* 4.588048*** -4.68427*** 0.164081 0.23
(1.085796) (0.45695) (0.496937) (0.425075) (0.162572) (0.60241) (0.996059) (0.443829) (0.296612) (0.851733) (0.707307) (0.54081)
Older children -3.429768*** -1.202633*** 1.032985*** -0.383093 0.216187* -1.37688*** -1.770607** -0.998616*** -0.240296 1.116322* -1.433383*** 0.859421** 0.52
(0.844576) (0.355434) (0.386537) (0.330641) (0.126455) (0.468579) (0.774775) (0.345228) (0.230717) (0.662512) (0.550172) (0.420664)
Home owner 8.074346*** 0.889971** 0.370002 0.014664 0.239553* 0.287876 2.684924*** 0.158721 0.297086 0.211884 1.02406* -1.276497*** 0.52
(0.942782) (0.396763) (0.431483) (0.369087) (0.141159) (0.523064) (0.864864) (0.385371) (0.257544) (0.739547) (0.614145) (0.469578)
Vehicle owner 2.370711** 0.636507 0.160124 0.608288 0.092017 -0.267524 6.155476*** 0.573013 0.779263** 0.466741 -0.537502 0.9499 0.84
(1.205911) (0.5075) (0.551909) (0.472099) (0.180556) (0.669051) (1.106247) (0.492927) (0.329425) (0.945954) (0.785552) (0.600637)
Husband age -0.000098 -0.005168 -0.014023 0.017724 0.001766 -0.026006 -0.048381 -0.08237** -0.001134 -0.014618 -0.091326 -0.076409* 39.06
(0.090657) (0.038153) (0.041491) (0.035491) (0.013574) (0.050298) (0.083165) (0.037057) (0.024765) (0.071115) (0.059056) (0.045154)
Wife age 0.035708 0.056522 -0.008428 -0.012777 0.004638 0.045113 -0.023026 0.071377* -0.000746 0.14039* -0.069918 0.044719 36.61
(0.095039) (0.039996) (0.043496) (0.037206) (0.01423) (0.052728) (0.087184) (0.038848) (0.025962) (0.074551) (0.06191) (0.047337)
Husband education (year) 0.508616*** 0.138323** 0.181139*** 0.151066** 0.078805*** -0.017102 0.772128*** 0.056745 0.066644 0.263216** 0.013361 -0.108264 10.66
(0.152735) (0.064278) (0.069902) (0.059794) (0.022868) (0.084739) (0.140112) (0.062432) (0.041723) (0.11981) (0.099494) (0.076074)
Wife education (year) 0.275466* 0.221125*** 0.173751** 0.229168*** 0.10897*** 0.105204 0.472965*** -0.009231 -0.012693 0.454687*** 0.39377*** -0.048833 10.67
(0.153842) (0.064743) (0.070409) (0.060227) (0.023034) (0.085353) (0.141127) (0.062884) (0.042026) (0.120678) (0.100215) (0.076625)
Husband wage&salary -1.607835*** 0.204737 -0.151878 0.55228*** -0.152555** -0.256385 -0.354716 0.155228 -0.034647 -0.358682 0.267628 -0.249067 127.01
(0.542183) (0.228174) (0.248141) (0.212258) (0.081179) (0.300808) (0.497374) (0.221622) (0.148111) (0.425305) (0.353188) (0.270049)
Wife wage&salary -1.61341*** 0.181121 -0.168279 0.580529*** -0.134436* -0.234872 -0.309022 0.151387 -0.026346 -0.377565 0.256557 -0.265556 102.89
(0.542377) (0.228256) (0.24823) (0.212334) (0.081208) (0.300916) (0.497552) (0.221702) (0.148164) (0.425457) (0.353314) (0.270146)
HH total income 1.649388*** -0.186944 0.17684 -0.575369*** 0.136864* 0.263478 0.412664 -0.138702 0.047093 0.406965 -0.233641 0.274831 230.36
(0.542884) (0.228469) (0.248462) (0.212532) (0.081284) (0.301197) (0.498017) (0.221909) (0.148302) (0.425855) (0.353644) (0.270398)
Husband w&s square 0.000596 -0.000339* -0.000045 -0.001024*** 0.000155** -0.000107 -0.00042 -0.000175 -0.00013 -0.000033 -0.000163 0.000074 28347.76
(0.000483) (0.000203) (0.000221) (0.000189) (0.000072) (0.000268) (0.000443) (0.000198) (0.000132) (0.000379) (0.000315) (0.000241)
Wife w&s square 0.000652 -0.000329 -0.000028 -0.001086*** 0.00012* -0.000125 -0.000544 -0.000178 -0.000146 -0.000036 -0.000168 0.000071 19143.79
(0.000483) (0.000203) (0.000221) (0.000189) (0.000072) (0.000268) (0.000443) (0.000198) (0.000132) (0.000379) (0.000315) (0.000241)
HH total income square -0.000581 0.000339* 0.000011 0.00109*** -0.000126* 0.000126 0.000557 0.000232 0.000125 0.000012 0.000158 -0.000052 89354.57
(0.000484) (0.000204) (0.000222) (0.00019) (0.000073) (0.000269) (0.000444) (0.000198) (0.000132) (0.00038) (0.000315) (0.000241)
Husws * Wifews 0.001112 -0.000625 0.000067 -0.002154*** 0.000276* -0.000307 -0.001199 -0.000571 -0.000229 -0.000007 -0.000303 0.000022 20782.16
(0.000972) (0.000409) (0.000445) (0.00038) (0.000146) (0.000539) (0.000891) (0.000397) (0.000266) (0.000762) (0.000633) (0.000484)
Central -9.84346*** -1.343235** 2.466693*** -1.456942*** -0.148967 -1.448496* -4.19193*** -2.171126*** 0.19168 -0.037154 -2.83658*** 1.064201 0.43
(1.351739) (0.56887) (0.61865) (0.529189) (0.20239) (0.749958) (1.240023) (0.552536) (0.369261) (1.060346) (0.880547) (0.67327)
North -14.0746*** -2.328121*** 2.790796*** -2.396568*** -0.073682 -1.434989 -11.80316*** -2.467345*** -0.802013* -3.263758*** -8.238306*** 0.232886 0.16
(1.593465) (0.670599) (0.729281) (0.623822) (0.238583) (0.88407) (1.461772) (0.651344) (0.435295) (1.249964) (1.038012) (0.793668)
Northeast -17.39376*** -4.242463*** 1.073636 -2.185902*** -0.230548 -3.346346*** -11.90722*** -4.860208*** -1.563723*** -3.359367*** -10.13231*** 1.175689 0.17
(1.608406) (0.676887) (0.736119) (0.62967) (0.24082) (0.892359) (1.475477) (0.657451) (0.439376) (1.261684) (1.047744) (0.80111)
South -11.76045*** -3.25191*** 2.559185*** -2.238864*** -0.28292 -1.661* -8.989528*** -2.574189*** -1.156691** 0.119674 -4.642293*** 0.583259 0.12
(1.70486) (0.717479) (0.780263) (0.667431) (0.255262) (0.945873) (1.56396) (0.696877) (0.465725) (1.337345) (1.110576) (0.849151)
Rural -0.63585 -0.813243** -0.490091 -0.287725 -0.137682 -0.439161 -0.16428 -0.28987 -0.475797* -1.305195* -1.886805*** 0.188685 0.25
(0.984849) (0.414467) (0.450736) (0.385556) (0.147457) (0.546404) (0.903455) (0.402566) (0.269036) (0.772546) (0.641548) (0.490531)
R-squared 0.3208 0.3440 0.2651 0.4239 0.4395 0.0654 0.6547 0.3174 0.2552 0.3326 0.2249 0.0362
Number of households 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Table 6. QUAIDS Engel curve with all household compositions (SURE) 
 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 48.68685*** 28.63959*** -10.6582** 15.33509*** -0.460065 -75.48891*** -0.643023 1.973703 128.6835*** -40.73426*** -10.7644*
(7.650512) (3.68176) (4.730097) (3.276996) (1.336609) (8.307995) (3.164829) (2.399664) (9.60752) (8.389993) (6.04701)
Household size -0.433594* 0.646505*** -0.689461*** -0.276151*** -0.152001*** -0.576672** 1.478401*** -0.228412*** 0.667609** 0.521451** -0.954796*** 3.06
(0.234216) (0.112715) (0.144809) (0.100323) (0.04092) (0.254344) (0.096889) (0.073464) (0.294128) (0.256854) (0.185125)
Young children -0.196503 0.196854 0.374136* 1.819816*** -0.099396 -1.733499*** -1.359252*** -0.161587 4.194212*** -3.323906*** 0.039109 0.23
(0.366747) (0.176495) (0.22675) (0.157091) (0.064074) (0.398265) (0.151714) (0.115034) (0.460561) (0.402196) (0.289879)
Older children -0.866223*** -0.303086** 0.657368*** 0.070667 0.036494 -0.448604 -0.113462 0.005662 1.500461*** -0.677154** 0.344425 0.52
(0.285162) (0.137232) (0.176307) (0.122145) (0.04982) (0.309668) (0.117964) (0.089444) (0.358106) (0.312725) (0.225393)
Home owner 3.37835*** 0.244156 -0.228629 -0.252787* 0.026967 0.028402 -0.072376 -0.091234 -0.85079** -0.863503** -1.144321*** 0.52
(0.320437) (0.154208) (0.198117) (0.137255) (0.055983) (0.347976) (0.132557) (0.100509) (0.402406) (0.35141) (0.253276)
Vehicle owner 0.057498 -0.086213 -0.152815 -0.064266 -0.008619 2.809109*** 0.142532 0.356693*** -0.568693 -2.394205*** -0.096578 0.84
(0.411406) (0.197987) (0.254361) (0.17622) (0.071876) (0.446763) (0.170189) (0.129042) (0.516644) (0.451172) (0.325178)
Husband age 0.082011*** 0.009673 0.009836 -0.001575 -0.002488 -0.002027 -0.011352 0.014947 0.048732 -0.111047*** -0.049227** 39.06
(0.030772) (0.014809) (0.019026) (0.013181) (0.005376) (0.033417) (0.01273) (0.009652) (0.038644) (0.033747) (0.024323)
Wife age -0.014157 0.028431* -0.007963 -0.020235 -0.009883* -0.029655 0.035918*** 0.001151 0.053725 -0.084117** 0.036045 36.61
(0.031915) (0.015359) (0.019732) (0.01367) (0.005576) (0.034658) (0.013203) (0.010011) (0.040079) (0.035) (0.025226)
Husband education (year) 0.209899*** 0.003606 0.03328 0.009488 0.001938 0.17017*** 0.008882 0.037656** -0.138595** -0.135387** -0.170101*** 10.66
(0.052618) (0.025322) (0.032532) (0.022538) (0.009193) (0.05714) (0.021767) (0.016504) (0.066077) (0.057704) (0.041589)
Wife education (year) 0.048485 0.047217* 0.034467 0.039751* 0.021714** 0.050182 -0.006932 -0.006977 -0.107543 -0.050146 -0.126142*** 10.67
(0.053997) (0.025986) (0.033385) (0.023129) (0.009434) (0.058638) (0.022337) (0.016937) (0.06781) (0.059217) (0.04268)
Log (husband wages) -0.365298 0.357099* -0.209475 -0.380373** 0.002509 3.154966*** 0.299856* -0.077435 -1.295362*** -0.684314 -0.194034 4.57
(0.381077) (0.183391) (0.235609) (0.163229) (0.066577) (0.413826) (0.157642) (0.119529) (0.478556) (0.417911) (0.301205)
Log (wife wages) -0.032525 -0.213189 -0.22912 0.102834 0.057478 2.09775*** -0.176216 0.107772 -1.260507*** 0.745009* -1.086401*** 4.34
(0.361904) (0.174164) (0.223755) (0.155017) (0.063228) (0.393006) (0.149711) (0.113515) (0.45448) (0.396885) (0.286051)
Log (household total consumption) -11.40062*** -8.734673*** 3.812251** -4.224833*** 0.139048 27.62351*** -2.029519 -1.375092 -30.33801*** 25.13035*** 7.82735*** 4.89
(3.037675) (1.461861) (1.878109) (1.301148) (0.530707) (3.298732) (1.256611) (0.952799) (3.814714) (3.331289) (2.400996)
Log (hh total consumption) square 0.894458*** 0.690615*** -0.124022 0.480713*** 0.03442 -2.673096*** 0.2983** 0.239008** 2.216143*** -2.381323*** -0.491806** 24.25
(0.30396) (0.146279) (0.18793) (0.130197) (0.053104) (0.330082) (0.125741) (0.09534) (0.381713) (0.33334) (0.240252)
Central -2.611625*** -0.028242 1.710937*** -0.450354** 0.006524 -0.855629* -0.510723*** 0.413266*** 1.714366*** -0.591747 1.332674*** 0.43
(0.460537) (0.221631) (0.284737) (0.197265) (0.08046) (0.500116) (0.190513) (0.144452) (0.578343) (0.505052) (0.364011)
North -4.135648*** -0.094135 2.990392*** -0.316925 0.184741* -1.507907** -0.031668 0.381194** 2.708655*** -1.968692*** 1.509858*** 0.16
(0.557128) (0.268114) (0.344457) (0.238638) (0.097335) (0.605007) (0.23047) (0.174749) (0.699642) (0.610979) (0.440357)
Northeast -4.193927*** -0.393662 2.595618*** -0.040581 0.249067** -1.173964* -1.017013*** 0.131605 3.605452*** -2.219622*** 2.483716*** 0.17
(0.563042) (0.27096) (0.348113) (0.241171) (0.098368) (0.611429) (0.232917) (0.176604) (0.707068) (0.617464) (0.445031)
South -2.292077*** -0.624878** 2.421274*** -0.612098** 0.000721 -1.986621*** -0.405936* -0.056848 3.340077*** -1.235157** 1.243326*** 0.12
(0.582412) (0.280282) (0.360089) (0.249469) (0.101752) (0.632465) (0.24093) (0.18268) (0.731394) (0.638707) (0.460342)
Rural -0.928678*** -0.189643 0.163836 -0.010324 -0.016377 1.330499*** -0.120982 -0.075735 0.208186 -0.609675* 0.315592 0.25
(0.333966) (0.160719) (0.206482) (0.14305) (0.058347) (0.362667) (0.138153) (0.104752) (0.419394) (0.366246) (0.263969)
R-squared 0.0871 0.0715 0.1097 0.0920 0.0919 0.3192 0.2615 0.1074 0.3987 0.1391 0.0797
Number of households 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Table 7. QUAIDS Engel curve with all household compositions (3SLS) 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant -5.904374 30.73023*** 4.64221 21.02358*** 0.279501 -72.4363*** 4.153896 2.318658 161.6928*** -33.89027** -14.04128
(14.74367) (6.199335) (8.155155) (5.523851) (2.312591) (14.26579) (5.334122) (4.063312) (17.4495) (14.12065) (10.17546)
Household size -1.881935*** 0.692271*** -0.333993 -0.332179** -0.262738*** -1.162002*** 1.534429*** -0.134622 2.010354*** 0.567569 -0.955905*** 3.06
(0.387215) (0.162814) (0.21418) (0.145074) (0.060736) (0.374664) (0.140091) (0.106715) (0.458278) (0.370852) (0.267239)
Young children 0.253036 0.182524 0.263156 1.834543*** -0.066702 -1.560395*** -1.377559*** -0.189608 3.783456*** -3.339962*** 0.040557 0.23
(0.428455) (0.180155) (0.236991) (0.160525) (0.067205) (0.414568) (0.155011) (0.118081) (0.507087) (0.41035) (0.295702)
Older children -0.524118 -0.313639** 0.574743*** 0.089389 0.066107 -0.292678 -0.124807 -0.018736 1.170915*** -0.684455** 0.342411 0.52
(0.334239) (0.140539) (0.184877) (0.125226) (0.052426) (0.323405) (0.120925) (0.092115) (0.39558) (0.320115) (0.230678)
Home owner 2.47672*** 0.271767 -0.011918 -0.306435** -0.053793 -0.396413 -0.043958 -0.02517 0.027458 -0.847079** -1.137227*** 0.52
(0.414036) (0.174092) (0.229016) (0.155122) (0.064943) (0.400616) (0.149794) (0.114107) (0.490022) (0.39654) (0.28575)
Vehicle owner -1.297602** -0.0421 0.186498 -0.089089 -0.094842 2.350323*** 0.204453 0.433157*** 0.625332 -2.332991*** -0.109062*** 0.84
(0.529301) (0.222557) (0.292772) (0.198307) (0.083023) (0.512145) (0.191496) (0.145874) (0.62644) (0.506934) (0.365301)
Husband age 0.114032*** 0.00866 0.001975 -0.000345 -0.000045 0.010886 -0.012594 0.012877 0.019065 -0.112072*** -0.049199** 39.06
(0.035779) (0.015044) (0.019791) (0.013405) (0.005612) (0.03462) (0.012945) (0.009861) (0.042346) (0.034267) (0.024693)
Wife age -0.038992 0.029188* -0.002014 -0.021794 -0.012159** -0.041618 0.036673*** 0.003004 0.0781* -0.083718** 0.036274 36.61
(0.036944) (0.015534) (0.020435) (0.013842) (0.005795) (0.035747) (0.013366) (0.010182) (0.043725) (0.035383) (0.025498)
Husband education (year) 0.052115 0.008694 0.072538** 0.005568 -0.00875 0.113436* 0.015737 0.04698** 0.002756 -0.128933** -0.171127*** 10.66
(0.066766) (0.028073) (0.03693) (0.025014) (0.010472) (0.064602) (0.024155) (0.0184) (0.079019) (0.063944) (0.046079)
Wife education (year) -0.142905** 0.053505* 0.082693** 0.037487 0.010318 -0.010619 0.002241 0.003315 0.058295 -0.040688 -0.12842*** 10.67
(0.07027) (0.029547) (0.038868) (0.026327) (0.011022) (0.067993) (0.025423) (0.019366) (0.083166) (0.067301) (0.048498)
Log (husband wages) -4.745477*** 0.495586 0.865965* -0.548137 -0.331332** 1.390182 0.469878 0.205525 2.761673** -0.543741 -0.198086 4.57
(0.94936) (0.399182) (0.525119) (0.355687) (0.14891) (0.918589) (0.34347) (0.261641) (1.123591) (0.909243) (0.655208)
Log (wife wages) -2.421528*** -0.138958 0.350671 -0.01642 -0.142085 1.045857* -0.093037 0.273452 1.014876 0.803513 -1.077101** 4.34
(0.637922) (0.26823) (0.352853) (0.239003) (0.10006) (0.617245) (0.230794) (0.175809) (0.754996) (0.610965) (0.440267)
Log (household total consumption) 12.42565** -9.634495*** -2.799869 -6.438017*** -0.01394 27.1591*** -4.03034* -1.635891 -45.35316*** 22.31974*** 9.145747** 4.89
(6.007284) (2.525909) (3.322804) (2.250684) (0.942262) (5.812575) (2.173379) (1.65559) (7.109769) (5.753437) (4.145974)
Log (hh total consumption) square -0.118 0.73725*** 0.200644 0.753951*** 0.153796* -2.076409*** 0.445005** 0.176803 2.449832*** -2.1446*** -0.622146 24.25
(0.571954) (0.240492) (0.316365) (0.214288) (0.089713) (0.553416) (0.206928) (0.157629) (0.676922) (0.547785) (0.394739)
Central -1.54991*** -0.061156 1.453661*** -0.395743* 0.096229 -0.382956 -0.547133*** 0.338975** 0.699505 -0.616692 1.327872*** 0.43
(0.570377) (0.239829) (0.315492) (0.213697) (0.089465) (0.551889) (0.206357) (0.157194) (0.675055) (0.546274) (0.39365)
North -0.633629 -0.206395 2.122562*** -0.215602 0.430986*** -0.202566 -0.178896 0.168381 -0.460975 -2.102556** 1.526704** 0.16
(0.909479) (0.382413) (0.50306) (0.340745) (0.142655) (0.880001) (0.329041) (0.25065) (1.076391) (0.871048) (0.627684)
Northeast -0.335596 -0.514921 1.652094*** 0.122736 0.552923*** 0.430602 -1.161429*** -0.123999 -0.003302 -2.333275** 2.48084*** 0.17
(0.993742) (0.417843) (0.549668) (0.372315) (0.155872) (0.961533) (0.359527) (0.273873) (1.176119) (0.95175) (0.685839)
South -0.291882 -0.687042** 1.935777*** -0.512524* 0.167634 -1.106794 -0.47567* -0.195453 1.435621 -1.284317* 1.235652** 0.12
(0.780748) (0.328284) (0.431854) (0.292514) (0.122463) (0.755442) (0.282467) (0.215172) (0.924034) (0.747756) (0.538839)
Rural -0.202394 -0.21328 -0.017993 0.003104 0.029914 1.576791*** -0.154126 -0.116768 -0.432047 -0.642402* 0.322231 0.25
(0.403761) (0.169771) (0.223332) (0.151273) (0.063331) (0.390674) (0.146077) (0.111275) (0.477861) (0.3867) (0.278659)
R-squared -0.1975 0.0702 0.0653 0.0887 0.0398 0.2910 0.2591 0.0960 0.2995 0.1387 0.0796
Number of households 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933 2933
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Table 8. Test of income pooling for households consisting of spouses with various 
household types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household composition Engel curve (1.16)  
1 
Engel curve (1.17)  
2 
Number of Average 
(3SLS) households household size 
1. Full sample 498.99** 59.70** 2933 3.06 
2. Spouses only 338.74** 57.56** 1108 2.00 
3. Spouses with kids, no others 302.01** 36.12** 1112 3.48 
4. Spouses with others, no kids 116.32** 33.93** 314 3.40 
5. Spouses with kids and others 395.72** 30.64 399 4.56 
6. Spouses with one dependent 156.61** 57.40** 846 3.00 
7. Spouses with two dependents 465.72** 27.56 728 4.00 
8. Spouses with three or more dependents 261.70** 19.04 251 5.25 
1 
 Chi-square value with 60 restrictions 
2 
 Chi-square value with 22 restrictions 
3 
 ** Significant at 5% 
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Table 9. Test of Pareto efficiency for households consisting of spouses with various 
household types 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household composition Engel curve (1.16)  
1 
Engel curve (1.17)  
2 
Number of Average 
(3SLS) households household size 
1. Full sample 8.34 9.04 2933 3.06 
2. Spouses only 11.00 11.32 1108 2.00 
3. Spouses with kids, no others 1.97 5.63 1112 3.48 
4. Spouses with others, no kids 3.31 3.79 314 3.40 
5. Spouses with kids and others 6.14 4.20 399 4.56 
6. Spouses with one dependent 1.89 1.70 846 3.00 
7. Spouses with two dependents 3.55 4.82 728 4.00 
8. Spouses with three or more dependents 4.50 2.70 251 5.25 
1 
 Chi-square value with 11 restrictions  
2 
 Chi-square value with 10 restrictions  
3 
 ** Significant at 5% 
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics for all 443 households 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Household characteristics:
Household size 4.44 1.34 3 10
Number of young children (age 0-5) 0.35 0.59 0 3
Number of older children (age 6-14) 0.45 0.69 0 4
Number of adults (age 15 and up) 3.64 0.80 2 8
Husband age 38.86 10.94 19 69
Wife age 36.66 10.39 16 67
Third member's age 31.46 13.48 14 70
Husband education (year) 9.42 4.70 0 18
Wife education (year) 9.26 4.90 0 18
Third member's education (year) 9.87 4.69 0 18
Central 0.53 0.50 0 1
North 0.14 0.35 0 1
Northeastern 0.11 0.31 0 1
South 0.08 0.28 0 1
Rural 0.29 0.45 0 1
Monthly income (in hundred):
Husband wages 103.28 102.05 12.00 1200.00
Wife wages 83.96 80.07 15.00 684.36
Third member's wages 76.44 74.85 5.00 670.00
Total household income 264.71 210.54 54.61 1652.85
Total household consumption 178.68 110.01 30.62 984.47
Share of monthly consumption expenditure (%) on:
Housing 15.48 8.64 3.58 66.69
Household operations 8.71 4.87 1.85 42.04
Clothing & Footwear 3.45 4.04 0.00 35.87
Personal & Services 3.20 1.59 0.00 9.73
Cosmetic 0.69 1.14 0.00 10.25
Health 1.91 4.97 0.00 53.71
Transportation & Communication 31.48 31.55 0.00 281.27
Education 1.92 3.69 0.00 29.28
Recreation & Religion 2.86 3.48 0.00 20.91
Food eaten at home 29.80 11.74 5.94 68.01
Food eaten outside 13.05 8.32 0.00 47.74
Alcohol & Tobacco 4.16 5.38 0.00 26.82
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Table 11. QUAIDS Engel curve for households with three decision makers 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 7.107318 24.01806 -16.44577 -1.540109 -4.828334 -287.5581*** -2.825888 10.58926 165.4799*** -31.99983 -20.24162
(29.01154) (16.11496) (12.92354) (5.368634) (3.688389) (96.81153) (11.54919) (11.03114) (31.04871) (26.23873) (17.29697)
Household size -0.993192* 0.571185* -0.020902 0.159764 0.014943 -1.878914 1.155133*** -0.24902 0.117735 -0.678319 -0.107294 4.4424
(0.570376) (0.316825) (0.254081) (0.105549) (0.072515) (1.903344) (0.227061) (0.216876) (0.610427) (0.515862) (0.340064)
Young children 0.966968 -0.492015 -0.431992 -0.292026 -0.197184 3.736004 -1.305326*** 0.347102 3.114141*** -0.067498 -0.466171 0.3476
(1.001336) (0.55621) (0.446058) (0.185299) (0.127305) (3.34146) (0.398622) (0.380741) (1.071649) (0.905633) (0.597007)
Older children -0.008113 -0.308676 -0.364575 -0.201447 -0.068169 -1.696375 -0.046523 -0.048212 0.403591 1.031379 -0.201752 0.4515
(0.843308) (0.46843) (0.375662) (0.156056) (0.107214) (2.81412) (0.335712) (0.320654) (0.902525) (0.762708) (0.502789)
Home owner 1.50093 0.637254 -1.067636** 0.107257 0.19151 1.517246 -0.69682 0.028008 0.806161 -1.087926 -0.928379 0.6930
(1.075682) (0.597506) (0.479176) (0.199057) (0.136757) (3.589551) (0.428218) (0.40901) (1.151216) (0.972873) (0.641332)
Vehicle owner -1.069316 -0.068714 -0.243325 -0.110631 -0.083524 10.07252** 0.177617 0.824373 -1.193408 0.388856 -0.177711 0.8804
(1.359768) (0.755307) (0.605726) (0.251627) (0.172875) (4.537549) (0.54131) (0.517029) (1.455251) (1.229807) (0.810708)
Husband age 0.115839 0.036517 0.018025 0.002817 0.010644 0.060594 0.014372 -0.004282 0.028956 -0.100403 -0.120739** 38.8623
(0.080889) (0.044931) (0.036033) (0.014969) (0.010284) (0.269926) (0.032201) (0.030757) (0.086569) (0.073158) (0.048227)
Wife age -0.059563 -0.020455 0.018902 0.001211 -0.020123* -0.134569 -0.004982 0.01579 0.111898 -0.122174 0.083991 36.6569
(0.089371) (0.049643) (0.039811) (0.016538) (0.011362) (0.29823) (0.035578) (0.033982) (0.095646) (0.080829) (0.053284)
Third member's age -0.022592 -0.000656 0.005223 0.000219 -0.003513 0.038116 0.017369 -0.010581 0.088899* -0.087179** -0.016905 31.4582
(0.043288) (0.024045) (0.019283) (0.008011) (0.005503) (0.144451) (0.017232) (0.016459) (0.046327) (0.03915) (0.025809)
Husband education (year) 0.20384 0.069916 0.130746* -0.005172 -0.024627 0.492929 -0.006721 0.065364 -0.354475** -0.190344 -0.11378 9.4199
(0.16246) (0.090241) (0.07237) (0.030063) (0.020654) (0.542128) (0.064674) (0.061773) (0.173868) (0.146933) (0.09686)
Wife education (year) -0.034585 0.118611 -0.002373 0.048192 0.023706 -0.130761 -0.098033 0.145192** 0.135945** -0.036204 -0.182322* 9.2641
(0.167311) (0.092936) (0.074531) (0.030961) (0.021271) (0.558315) (0.066605) (0.063617) (0.179059) (0.15132) (0.099752)
Third member's education (year) -0.203308 -0.164359** -0.049796 0.014456 -0.003946 0.977063** 0.126298** 0.015983 0.006199 -0.016798 -0.100158 9.8668
(0.143415) (0.079662) (0.063886) (0.026539) (0.018233) (0.478574) (0.057092) (0.054531) (0.153485) (0.129708) (0.085505)
Log (husband wages) 0.404268 0.901467 -0.304353 -0.031188 -0.199823 12.95368*** 0.336913 -0.078099 -1.287166 -0.464349 -0.836176 4.3579
(1.009385) (0.560681) (0.449643) (0.186788) (0.128328) (3.368319) (0.401826) (0.383802) (1.080264) (0.912912) (0.601806)
Log (wife wages) -1.498235 -0.526745 0.014943 -0.110439 0.22737 -2.526553 0.248869 -0.270767 -2.245668* 0.738592 0.923198 4.1602
(1.222853) (0.679255) (0.544735) (0.226291) (0.155468) (4.08066) (0.486805) (0.464969) (1.308721) (1.105977) (0.729077)
Log (third member's wages) 1.685567* 0.368412 0.890306** -0.075352 0.168295 3.904929 -0.425372 -0.273623 -2.106907** 1.021816 -0.554749 4.1012
(0.947134) (0.526102) (0.421913) (0.175269) (0.120414) (3.160588) (0.377044) (0.360132) (1.013642) (0.856611) (0.564691)
Majorsex 0.339399 -0.056368 -0.757501** -0.040251 -0.355895*** 2.071026 -0.129887 -0.132226 0.059011 -0.334487 1.570238*** 0.5756
(0.854671) (0.474742) (0.380723) (0.158158) (0.108659) (2.852037) (0.340236) (0.324974) (0.914685) (0.772985) (0.509563)
Log (household total consumption) 2.012113 -7.613945 4.669607 2.495177 1.887472 99.29768*** -1.43607 -4.331198 -40.48845*** 23.97226** 9.980562 5.0462
(11.08602) (6.157924) (4.938404) (2.051487) (1.409424) (36.99407) (4.413231) (4.215271) (11.86448) (10.02647) (6.609598)
Log (hh total consumption) square -0.031303 0.628649 -0.330624 -0.302568 -0.158849 -10.1126*** 0.22602 0.552933 3.200307*** -2.363847** -0.736439 25.7241
(1.07983) (0.59981) (0.481023) (0.199824) (0.137284) (3.603393) (0.429869) (0.410587) (1.155655) (0.976624) (0.643805)
Central -1.248773 0.293282 1.734166*** -0.307417 -0.123473 -1.408814 -0.267469 1.087539** 2.894941* -3.48043*** 1.889284** 0.5282
(1.38704) (0.770455) (0.617874) (0.256674) (0.176342) (4.628552) (0.552166) (0.527398) (1.484437) (1.254472) (0.826967)
North -1.927392 -0.288833 3.374145*** -0.40182 0.04235 8.206729 0.946313 0.763997 3.198797* -5.427473*** 1.958591* 0.1422
(1.683038) (0.934873) (0.74973) (0.311449) (0.213974) (5.6163) (0.67) (0.639947) (1.80122) (1.52218) (1.003444)
Northeast -1.861888 0.981623 2.803702*** -0.440466 0.262064 4.44106 -0.397002 -0.03906 5.817903*** -4.849196*** 2.063846* 0.1106
(1.789635) (0.994084) (0.797215) (0.331175) (0.227526) (5.972015) (0.712435) (0.680478) (1.915302) (1.618589) (1.066998)
South 0.180871 2.565321** 2.123259** -0.819721** -0.07906 -1.203179 -0.777414 -0.198965 4.369966** -4.358759** 0.214936 0.0835
(1.923171) (1.068259) (0.8567) (0.355886) (0.244503) (6.417625) (0.765595) (0.731253) (2.058215) (1.739362) (1.146614)
Rural 1.020385 -0.361457 0.308346 -0.009949 0.042149 1.181881 0.285668 -0.103631 -1.470411 -0.860916 0.196181 0.2867
(1.001345) (0.556214) (0.446061) (0.185301) (0.127306) (3.341489) (0.398625) (0.380744) (1.071659) (0.90564) (0.597012)
R-squared 0.0519 0.0804 0.1381 0.0459 0.1152 0.2088 0.1784 0.1544 0.4124 0.1643 0.1302
Number of households 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Majorsex equals zero if HH has 2 female decision makers; Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Table 12. QUAIDS Engel curve for households with three decision makers (3SLS) 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& 
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco 
Constant 24.46465 67.7485* -6.441724 -10.31175 7.236299 -429.9641 25.23095 22.68928 323.8149*** -90.03241 -24.11504 
(73.03721) (40.94513) (33.23029) (13.55906) (9.420459) (265.9891) (29.82181) (27.95234) (84.08979) (66.31179) (43.48707) 
Household size -1.143744* 0.694353* -0.271353 0.190553 0.049508 -5.765154** 1.379494*** -0.36747 1.058989 -0.756266 -0.168315 
(0.685763) (0.384443) (0.312007) (0.127309) (0.088451) (2.497433) (0.280004) (0.262451) (0.789538) (0.622617) (0.40831) 
Young children 1.046486 -0.579179 -0.292508 -0.306296 -0.221566* 6.013984 -1.444409*** 0.410258 2.515144** -0.000749 -0.429777 
(1.028932) (0.576826) (0.468141) (0.191017) (0.132713) (3.747195) (0.420123) (0.393786) (1.184638) (0.934186) (0.612636) 
Older children 0.058768 -0.32473 -0.26591 -0.21861 -0.072813 -0.364028 -0.110205 0.00337 0.163546 1.021278 -0.181924 
(0.854968) (0.479301) (0.388991) (0.158721) (0.110275) (3.11365) (0.349092) (0.327208) (0.984349) (0.776241) (0.509057) 
Home owner 1.383509 0.694469 -1.250318** 0.134773 0.207705 -1.117826 -0.557993 -0.063333 1.361329 -1.103777 -0.968657 
(1.107285) (0.620751) (0.50379) (0.205563) (0.142819) (4.032545) (0.452115) (0.423773) (1.274848) (1.005324) (0.659288) 
Vehicle owner -1.015732 -0.070183 -0.167987 -0.125408 -0.084088 11.02385** 0.137202 0.865393* -1.333248 0.367583 -0.163971 
(1.366062) (0.765823) (0.621527) (0.253604) (0.176197) (4.974965) (0.557776) (0.52281) (1.572785) (1.240272) (0.813366) 
Husband age 0.109607 0.043951 0.006897 0.003881 0.012722 -0.124083 0.025834 -0.009248 0.078679 -0.106333 -0.123704** 
(0.083171) (0.046626) (0.037841) (0.01544) (0.010728) (0.302894) (0.03396) (0.031831) (0.095757) (0.075512) (0.049521) 
Wife age -0.060527 -0.028627 0.020217 0.002216 -0.022384* -0.068125 -0.011886 0.015273 0.07665 -0.112307 0.085287 
(0.090446) (0.050705) (0.041151) (0.016791) (0.011666) (0.32939) (0.03693) (0.034615) (0.104133) (0.082118) (0.053853) 
Third member's age -0.022467 0.003013 0.004202 -0.000147 -0.002497 0.002905 0.020693 -0.010584 0.10549** -0.091478** -0.017565 
(0.043765) (0.024535) (0.019912) (0.008125) (0.005645) (0.159385) (0.01787) (0.01675) (0.050388) (0.039735) (0.026058) 
Husband education (year) 0.184458 0.071589 0.103123 0.00007 -0.024107 0.13718 0.00896 0.050496 -0.298634 -0.18397 -0.118965 
(0.166624) (0.093411) (0.07581) (0.030933) (0.021492) (0.606817) (0.068034) (0.063769) (0.191839) (0.151281) (0.09921) 
Wife education (year) -0.046772 0.145825 -0.028263 0.04913 0.031281 -0.621107 -0.06382 0.13514** 0.291572 -0.062463 -0.190509* 
(0.176241) (0.098802) (0.080186) (0.032718) (0.022732) (0.64184) (0.071961) (0.06745) (0.202911) (0.160012) (0.104936) 
Third member's education (year) -0.211819 -0.121485 -0.075652 0.01296 0.007957 0.391349 0.172409*** 0.008322 0.224829 -0.062749 -0.11037 
(0.161928) (0.090778) (0.073674) (0.030061) (0.020886) (0.589714) (0.066117) (0.061972) (0.186432) (0.147017) (0.096414) 
Log (husband wages) 0.279515 0.969276* -0.500727 -0.002587 -0.180671 10.08253*** 0.490942 -0.17533 -0.664995 -0.489312 -0.88029 
(1.048504) (0.587798) (0.477046) (0.19465) (0.135238) (3.818473) (0.428114) (0.401277) (1.207172) (0.951955) (0.624289) 
Log (wife wages) -1.86566 -0.307408 -0.569818 -0.027971 0.289214 -11.1828** 0.72079 -0.557664 -0.322825 0.642367 0.789576 
(1.481926) (0.830777) (0.674243) (0.275113) (0.191141) (5.396923) (0.605085) (0.567153) (1.706183) (1.345467) (0.882353) 
Log (third member's wages) 1.460101 0.365404 0.576299 -0.012343 0.168122 -0.004359 -0.263868 -0.445978 -1.560833 1.121958 -0.610834 
(1.030135) (0.5775) (0.468688) (0.19124) (0.132869) (3.751577) (0.420614) (0.394247) (1.186023) (0.935278) (0.613352) 
Majorsex 0.357338 -0.204006 -0.684348* -0.031934 -0.39685*** 3.889298 -0.280387 -0.11454 -0.665625 -0.171376 1.602546*** 
(0.891566) (0.499818) (0.405643) (0.165516) (0.114996) (3.246934) (0.364035) (0.341215) (1.026485) (0.809469) (0.530847) 
Log (household total consumption) -4.788647 -24.47855 0.662183 5.907702 -2.764929 152.348 -12.17825 -9.079334 -101.2847*** 46.39831* 11.44747 
(28.15074) (15.78149) (12.80795) (5.226069) (3.630929) (102.5202) (11.49422) (10.77367) (32.41074) (25.55856) (16.76123) 
Log (hh total consumption) square 0.779657 2.147812 0.307466 -0.66516 0.259658 -11.42531 1.049132 1.132339 8.184243*** -4.46902* -0.818742 
(2.638681) (1.479262) (1.200541) (0.48986) (0.340341) (9.609629) (1.077399) (1.009859) (3.037987) (2.395706) (1.571096) 
Central -0.834184 0.248545 2.327942*** -0.418747 -0.137083 6.292008 -0.611237 1.405817** 1.659251 -3.606417** 2.001879** 
(1.586198) (0.889233) (0.721684) (0.294471) (0.20459) (5.776663) (0.64766) (0.60706) (1.826234) (1.440137) (0.944438) 
North -1.509964 -0.634799 4.070011*** -0.486788 -0.054723 19.02742*** 0.320082 1.092538 0.568466 -5.206189*** 2.128622* 
(1.98983) (1.115512) (0.905328) (0.369404) (0.256652) (7.246625) (0.812467) (0.761535) (2.290948) (1.806603) (1.184764) 
Northeast -1.317691 0.581819 3.69421*** -0.555856 0.149703 18.02577** -1.165729 0.387882 2.624745 -4.619977** 2.275868* 
(2.224964) (1.247329) (1.012309) (0.413056) (0.28698) (8.102944) (0.908475) (0.851524) (2.561664) (2.020085) (1.324766) 
South 0.651387 2.463837** 2.813652*** -0.941498** -0.108555 8.053331 -1.214759 0.16361 2.733987 -4.443074** 0.352269 
(2.128017) (1.19298) (0.9682) (0.395058) (0.274475) (7.749879) (0.868891) (0.814421) (2.450046) (1.932065) (1.267042) 
Rural 1.043096 -0.486622 0.380848 -0.004986 0.007405 2.854497 0.152609 -0.082899 -2.103377* -0.725852 0.225456 
(1.026453) (0.575436) (0.467013) (0.190557) (0.132394) (3.738167) (0.419111) (0.392837) (1.181784) (0.931935) (0.61116) 
R-squared 0.0478 0.0593 0.0971 0.0357 0.0854 0.0536 0.1320 0.1397 0.3170 0.1542 0.1289 
Number of households 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 443 
1 
 Standard error in parentheses 
2 
 *** Significant at 1% 
   **   Significant at 5% 
   *     Significant at 10% 
3 
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht 
4 
 Dummy variables - Majorsex equals zero if the household has two female decision makers; Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero 
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Table 13. Test of Pareto efficiency using different base categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category Engel curve (2.22) Engel curve (2.22) 
3SLS
1. Housing 4.51 5.14
2. Household operations 3.83 4.88
3. Clothing & Footwear 6.67 4.70
4. Personal & Services 4.13 0.90
5. Cosmetic 2.80 1.91
6. Transportation & Communication 3.25 0.00
7. Education 4.51 2.77
8. Recreation & Religion 4.28 6.00
9. Food eaten at home 6.08 5.30
10. Food eaten outside 5.89 7.14
11. Alcohol & Tobacco 1.66 1.61
1
 ** Critical chi-square (18) at 5% is 28.8693
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Table 14. Descriptive statistics for all subsamples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Log household total expenditure 9.013 0.529 8.913 0.532 9.317 0.486 
Female age (less 35) 2.289 11.753 -0.918 10.580 
Female years of education (less 9) 3.181 5.031 1.118 4.517 
Female's income share (less 0.45) 0.010 0.095 
Male age (less 35) 0.339 11.267 1.323 11.011 
Male years of education (less 9) 1.709 4.633 1.151 4.461 
Budget shares on: 
Housing 0.215 0.095 0.202 0.086 0.163 0.076 
Household operations 0.067 0.047 0.057 0.036 0.066 0.035 
Clothing & Footwear 0.064 0.070 0.040 0.053 0.038 0.046 
Personal & Services 0.045 0.032 0.029 0.020 0.035 0.021 
Cosmetic 0.018 0.032 0.003 0.010 0.008 0.015 
Transportation & Communication 0.162 0.094 0.161 0.102 0.191 0.096 
Recreation & Religion 0.024 0.032 0.017 0.024 0.019 0.025 
Food eaten at home 0.257 0.125 0.236 0.136 0.275 0.109 
Food eaten outside 0.122 0.098 0.154 0.121 0.139 0.096 
Alcohol & Tobacco 0.009 0.041 0.093 0.107 0.052 0.066 
Health 0.016 0.051 0.008 0.034 0.014 0.035 
Number of observations 
Single female Single male Married couple 
810 825 1108 
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Table 15. Estimation results 
 
Variable Model A Model B Model C Model D
d 0, f -0.133 -0.168 0.875 0.509
(0.333) (0.344) (0.932) (0.705)
d 0 ,m 0.618 0.569 82.44 104.116
(0.604) (0.599) (240.241) (383.430)
d age, f -0.074*** -0.071*** 0.004 -0.009
(0.021) (0.02) (0.019) (0.013)
d age, m -0.013 -0.011 0.207 0.162
(0.019) (0.018) (0.306) (0.445)
d educ, f 0.047 0.044 -0.022 0.019
(0.036) (0.036) (0.056) (0.039)
d educ, m 0.007 0.01 -0.038 0.237
(0.034) (0.034) (0.69) (0.919)
r 0 0.649*** 0.591** 0.355*** 0.263
(0.054) (0.259) (0.125) (0.575)
r f, inc share 0.012 0.053 0.006 0.592
(0.009) (0.042) (0.042) (1.076)
r age, f -0.005*** -0.013*** 0.001 -0.01
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021)
r age, m -0.003** -0.013*** -0.0003 0.004
(0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.013)
r educ, f 0.003* 0.012* -0.002 0.011
(0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.043)
r educ, m -0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.006
(0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.039)
Form of the sharing rule (η) Linear Logistic Linear Logistic
Instrument log expenditure (x ) No No Yes Yes
Number of observations 2743 2743 2743 2743
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
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APPENDIX A: ESTIMATES OF THE QUASI-QUADRATIC ENGEL 
CURVE 
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Appendix A 1. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for households with spouses only 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Health Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 4.62882 1.247133 -2.537561 2.160066*** 0.078832 -2.763209** -3.037111 0.135442 -0.574997 15.93033*** 19.18081*** 4.486884**
(4.088519) (0.913843) (1.487438) (0.699381) (0.450759) (1.379431) (3.043871) (0.501868) (0.906372) (2.485461) (2.474664) (1.873181)
Home owner 10.0788*** 2.142745*** 0.967383 0.481539 0.592589*** 0.250951 4.532964*** 0.206104 0.562016 1.932907* 1.269151 -2.257723*** 0.3096
(1.808474) (0.40422) (0.657938) (0.309357) (0.199384) (0.610163) (1.346395) (0.221991) (0.400915) (1.099394) (1.094618) (0.828564)
Vehicle owner 0.230099 0.614632 0.293274 -0.033724 -0.000328 0.011667 3.508602*** -0.032107 0.395226 -0.155497 -0.367166 1.409723* 0.7238
(1.697436) (0.379401) (0.617542) (0.290363) (0.187142) (0.5727) (1.263728) (0.208361) (0.3763) (1.031892) (1.027409) (0.777691)
Husband age -0.050962 0.005415 -0.005317 -0.015459 -0.017024 0.043476 -0.031043 0.006206 0.002006 0.082051 -0.122008 -0.03146 36.3231
(0.151079) (0.033768) (0.054964) (0.025844) (0.016657) (0.050973) (0.112477) (0.018545) (0.033492) (0.091843) (0.091444) (0.069218)
Wife age -0.046326 0.044293 -0.052078 -0.034487 -0.013123 0.0113 -0.156963 -0.011943 -0.030662 -0.032188 -0.16764* 0.014049 34.0821
(0.157754) (0.03526) (0.057392) (0.026985) (0.017392) (0.053225) (0.117447) (0.019364) (0.034972) (0.095901) (0.095484) (0.072276)
Husband education (year) 0.220267 -0.013079 0.108879 0.03837 0.032824 -0.060724 0.468239** 0.010033 0.025678 0.150667 -0.096899 -0.235446** 10.1507
(0.262564) (0.058687) (0.095523) (0.044914) (0.028948) (0.088587) (0.195477) (0.03223) (0.058207) (0.159616) (0.158923) (0.120295)
Wife education (year) 0.019666 0.262652*** 0.048434 0.055358 0.027181 0.104756 0.208639 -0.008886 0.07038 0.182743 0.20743 0.075192 10.1182
(0.275903) (0.061668) (0.100376) (0.047196) (0.030418) (0.093087) (0.205408) (0.033867) (0.061164) (0.167725) (0.166996) (0.126407)
Husband wage&salary -5.54442*** 1.034597*** 0.192031 0.72442*** 0.005832 -1.172225*** 0.847019 -0.203449 0.720248*** -0.523367 0.455812 0.056368 106.4901
(1.21678) (0.271968) (0.442675) (0.208142) (0.13415) (0.410531) (0.905884) (0.149361) (0.269745) (0.739696) (0.736482) (0.557476)
Wife wage&salary -5.483625*** 1.015906*** 0.253939 0.744399*** 0.014047 -1.091012*** 0.902168 -0.206046 0.718153*** -0.571215 0.526612 0.053456 91.2456
(1.218265) (0.2723) (0.443215) (0.208396) (0.134314) (0.411032) (0.906989) (0.149543) (0.270074) (0.740598) (0.737381) (0.558156)
HH total income 5.627628*** -1.012345*** -0.179889 -0.71272*** 0.000173 1.153366*** -0.700299 0.204182 -0.70312*** 0.603602 -0.427403 -0.034349 198.0402
(1.217237) (0.27207) (0.442841) (0.20822) (0.134201) (0.410685) (0.906224) (0.149417) (0.269846) (0.739974) (0.736759) (0.557685)
Husband w&s square 0.001994* -0.001517*** -0.000942** -0.000863*** 0.000039 0.000198 -0.001206 0.000191 -0.000892*** -0.000271 -0.0003 -0.000451 19347.2200
(0.001109) (0.000248) (0.000403) (0.00019) (0.000122) (0.000374) (0.000825) (0.000136) (0.000246) (0.000674) (0.000671) (0.000508)
Wife w&s square 0.00191* -0.001536*** -0.001164*** -0.000932*** 0.000011 -0.000011 -0.001433* 0.000194 -0.000909*** -0.000288 -0.00043 -0.000469 14730.5500
(0.001126) (0.000252) (0.00041) (0.000193) (0.000124) (0.00038) (0.000838) (0.000138) (0.00025) (0.000685) (0.000682) (0.000516)
HH total income square -0.002155* 0.001499*** 0.000902** 0.000854*** -0.000052 -0.000136 0.001085 -0.000202 0.000882*** 0.000122 0.000377 0.000566 65380.3400
(0.00111) (0.000248) (0.000404) (0.00019) (0.000122) (0.000375) (0.000826) (0.000136) (0.000246) (0.000675) (0.000672) (0.000509)
Husws * Wifews 0.004394** -0.002976*** -0.001602** -0.001688*** 0.000128 0.000271 -0.002162 0.000436 -0.001749*** -0.000093 -0.000972 -0.001414 15541.3800
(0.002234) (0.000499) (0.000813) (0.000382) (0.000246) (0.000754) (0.001663) (0.000274) (0.000495) (0.001358) (0.001352) (0.001023)
Central -3.184762 -0.207101 1.80237** 0.034839 -0.002288 -0.186018 -0.119464 0.056899 0.525967 1.851735 -0.974362 0.510734 0.5135
(2.021973) (0.45194) (0.735611) (0.345878) (0.222923) (0.682196) (1.505344) (0.248199) (0.448246) (1.229183) (1.223843) (0.92638)
North -2.964756 -1.981679*** 2.520144** -0.081597 0.077772 0.119965 -4.368114** 0.010833 0.625273 -1.849128 -6.783083*** 0.055843 0.1119
(2.813279) (0.628809) (1.023495) (0.481239) (0.310164) (0.949176) (2.094465) (0.345332) (0.623668) (1.710227) (1.702798) (1.288922)
Northeast -11.11628*** -1.976974*** 0.479287 -0.718239 -0.218553 -2.134999** -2.885923 0.425987 -0.658347 -1.425639 -10.39079*** 0.746323 0.1092
(2.894822) (0.647035) (1.053161) (0.495188) (0.319154) (0.976687) (2.155173) (0.355341) (0.641745) (1.759798) (1.752153) (1.326281)
South -6.160014** -1.927251*** 0.206349 -0.2706 -0.010133 -0.942858 -5.803028*** -0.040809 -0.299242 1.503657 -1.449722 -0.099398 0.0930
(2.880711) (0.643881) (1.048027) (0.492774) (0.317599) (0.971927) (2.144667) (0.353609) (0.638617) (1.75122) (1.743612) (1.319816)
Rural 0.660931 -0.378032 0.553346 -0.133006 -0.006646 -0.677087 0.393143 -0.1454 -0.58247 -0.736201 -2.295132** 0.408466 0.2527
(1.616781) (0.361374) (0.588199) (0.276566) (0.17825) (0.545488) (1.203681) (0.198461) (0.35842) (0.982861) (0.978591) (0.740738)
R-squared 0.2859 0.3237 0.3116 0.2356 0.1554 0.1391 0.5569 0.0162 0.2212 0.1889 0.1631 0.0559
Number of households 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix A 2. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with kids, no others 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Health Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 7.691888** -4.626713* -8.703235*** 7.32846*** -2.143228** 1.187164 -7.39408 -7.307036*** -2.39929 8.815167* 7.301019** 2.654427
(3.586904) (2.748746) (2.520889) (2.594281) (0.98068) (1.76549) (4.922307) (1.809558) (1.467492) (4.841619) (3.406892) (3.071063)
Household size 0.080032 1.484869*** 0.984512** 0.016145 0.310981* 0.393227 0.320696 1.60073*** -0.396108 4.363924*** 0.822891 -0.01304 3.4874
(0.645139) (0.494388) (0.453406) (0.466606) (0.176385) (0.317541) (0.885324) (0.325467) (0.263943) (0.870812) (0.612762) (0.55236)
Home owner 7.499744*** 0.617768 0.482058 -0.703994 0.035961 -0.038494 2.074347* 0.829848* 0.299218 -0.579721 1.112403 -1.111496 0.5549
(0.848888) (0.650527) (0.596602) (0.613971) (0.232091) (0.417827) (1.164929) (0.428256) (0.347302) (1.145833) (0.806286) (0.726808)
Vehicle owner -0.400681 0.477627 0.455171 -0.072206 0.269659 -0.758246 5.515184*** 1.326755* 0.652318 1.28244 -0.321366 1.110315 0.8948
(1.419808) (1.088039) (0.997846) (1.026897) (0.388183) (0.698836) (1.948401) (0.716279) (0.580879) (1.916462) (1.348553) (1.215622)
Husband age 0.000151 0.045246 -0.017793 0.001992 -0.01497 -0.006949 -0.097746 -0.047299 0.012501 -0.08981 -0.028042 -0.074583 38.2932
(0.092334) (0.070758) (0.064892) (0.066782) (0.025245) (0.045447) (0.126709) (0.046581) (0.037776) (0.124632) (0.0877) (0.079055)
Wife age 0.034356 0.042611 0.026722 -0.143858** 0.042794 -0.041842 0.239767* 0.121881** 0.035243 0.127429 0.037567 0.064413 35.7113
(0.096544) (0.073985) (0.067852) (0.069827) (0.026396) (0.04752) (0.132488) (0.048706) (0.039499) (0.130316) (0.091699) (0.08266)
Husband education (year) 0.484108*** 0.289727** 0.296528*** 0.179473 0.070764* -0.022573 0.786652*** 0.056432 0.109331* 0.366467* -0.007541 0.049295 10.6124
(0.153259) (0.117446) (0.107711) (0.110847) (0.041902) (0.075435) (0.210317) (0.077318) (0.062702) (0.206869) (0.145567) (0.131218)
Wife education (year) 0.456027*** 0.079908 0.147061 0.210725* 0.116475*** 0.06344 0.611136*** 0.065437 -0.065122 0.366049* 0.347446** -0.160789 10.6484
(0.152833) (0.11712) (0.107412) (0.110539) (0.041785) (0.075225) (0.209733) (0.077103) (0.062528) (0.206295) (0.145163) (0.130854)
Husband wage&salary -0.475442 -0.023415 -0.303279 -0.26659 0.688972*** -0.128178 2.644928** 0.328308 -0.444734 -0.184228 -0.09051 0.796149 120.7648
(0.766374) (0.587294) (0.538611) (0.554291) (0.209531) (0.377213) (1.051695) (0.386628) (0.313543) (1.034455) (0.727913) (0.65616)
Wife wage&salary -0.497451 -0.008496 -0.304678 -0.212811 0.718934*** -0.109096 2.801446*** 0.376691 -0.442125 -0.114889 -0.110296 0.762359 94.0006
(0.764718) (0.586025) (0.537446) (0.553093) (0.209078) (0.376398) (1.049422) (0.385793) (0.312865) (1.032219) (0.72634) (0.654742)
HH total income 0.515666 0.032184 0.327365 0.250126 -0.709467*** 0.133655 -2.624931** -0.327535 0.463103 0.215058 0.131345 -0.764777 215.1794
(0.767021) (0.58779) (0.539065) (0.554759) (0.209708) (0.377531) (1.052582) (0.386955) (0.313807) (1.035328) (0.728527) (0.656714)
Husband w&s square -0.000347 -0.000098 0.000376 0.000721 -0.00179*** 0.000147 -0.006115*** -0.000852 0.0005 -0.000425 0.000313 -0.001985* 27315.6700
(0.001267) (0.000971) (0.000891) (0.000916) (0.000346) (0.000624) (0.001739) (0.000639) (0.000518) (0.00171) (0.001204) (0.001085)
Wife w&s square -0.000364 -0.000172 0.00032 0.000616 -0.001844*** 0.000133 -0.006457*** -0.000965 0.000477 -0.000553 0.000311 -0.001914* 15772.2400
(0.001265) (0.000969) (0.000889) (0.000915) (0.000346) (0.000622) (0.001735) (0.000638) (0.000517) (0.001707) (0.001201) (0.001083)
HH total income square 0.000374 0.000144 -0.000323 -0.000588 0.001838*** -0.000151 0.006365*** 0.000935 -0.000495 0.000458 -0.000357 0.001957* 80401.1900
(0.001267) (0.000971) (0.00089) (0.000916) (0.000346) (0.000624) (0.001738) (0.000639) (0.000518) (0.00171) (0.001203) (0.001085)
Husws * Wifews -0.000782 -0.000315 0.000549 0.001042 -0.003684*** 0.000304 -0.012975*** -0.001996 0.000985 -0.000982 0.000814 -0.003906* 18561.0400
(0.002533) (0.001941) (0.00178) (0.001832) (0.000693) (0.001247) (0.003476) (0.001278) (0.001036) (0.003419) (0.002406) (0.002169)
Central -6.183872*** -0.502631 3.156497*** -1.436743 -0.109652 -0.47322 -5.864779*** -2.794723*** 1.023269* -0.86342 -3.2225** 2.048446 0.3786
(1.467896) (1.12489) (1.031642) (1.061677) (0.401331) (0.722505) (2.014392) (0.740539) (0.600553) (1.981372) (1.394228) (1.256794)
North -11.54594*** -1.426455 3.795213*** -2.851792** 0.119571 -0.76614 -13.13101*** -3.163742*** -0.288008 -5.205621** -7.201807*** 1.011391 0.1871
(1.600255) (1.22632) (1.124665) (1.157408) (0.437519) (0.787653) (2.196029) (0.807313) (0.654704) (2.160031) (1.519945) (1.370118)
Northeast -11.95611*** -3.037681** 0.323659 -1.601839 -0.417711 -0.902461 -13.34559*** -5.756561*** -0.350994 -1.916061 -7.547603*** 1.138169 0.1691
(1.642136) (1.258415) (1.154099) (1.187699) (0.448969) (0.808267) (2.253503) (0.828442) (0.671839) (2.216563) (1.559724) (1.405977)
South -7.172112*** -2.075567 3.281955*** -2.14349* -0.328647 -0.719748 -9.184138*** -3.641218*** -0.55694 -0.713927 -5.052498*** 0.402985 0.1538
(1.675848) (1.28425) (1.177792) (1.212082) (0.458186) (0.82486) (2.299765) (0.845449) (0.685631) (2.262067) (1.591744) (1.43484)
Rural -2.450314** -0.583092 -1.555412** 0.300532 -0.199507 -0.044887 1.394296 -0.681064 -0.226868 -0.499155 -0.791305 0.568796 0.2590
(1.006615) (0.771398) (0.707453) (0.728049) (0.275214) (0.495461) (1.381378) (0.507828) (0.411832) (1.358734) (0.956097) (0.861851)
R-squared 0.4573 0.3096 0.2944 0.5491 0.6105 0.0705 0.7334 0.4019 0.3016 0.2842 0.2526 0.0626
Number of households 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix A 3. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with others, no kids 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Health Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 33.36615* 1.715238 -6.277159 -8.968699 1.854225 -0.39126 1.36197 2.197409 -3.904654 3.633912 5.941415 5.196893
(19.00924) (6.371599) (6.722842) (8.236811) (2.109771) (13.50095) (16.14645) (11.02351) (5.568071) (11.41343) (10.29174) (6.3392)
Household size 6.059839** 2.502931*** 0.688474 3.407483*** -0.317755 0.208508 4.453686* 2.78513* 1.087083 5.69608*** 3.662724** 0.816366 3.4076
(2.768981) (0.928119) (0.979283) (1.199815) (0.30732) (1.966615) (2.351972) (1.605739) (0.811073) (1.662537) (1.499146) (0.923399)
Home owner 10.61327** 0.49266 -0.348317 0.963357 0.906732* -0.454034 1.676493 1.994892 0.022927 2.886268 3.5134 2.141459 0.7994
(4.911224) (1.646165) (1.736912) (2.128061) (0.54508) (3.488102) (4.171593) (2.848031) (1.438566) (2.948772) (2.658972) (1.637794)
Vehicle owner 13.18326* 2.694344 -1.423792 1.695636 -1.546157** -8.360764* 16.10571*** 0.629188 2.862677 -0.596022 -3.071252 -2.482115 0.9204
(7.022037) (2.353676) (2.483426) (3.042688) (0.779352) (4.987266) (5.964517) (4.072097) (2.056852) (4.216137) (3.801781) (2.341708)
Husband age -0.360524 0.043045 -0.010746 0.047172 -0.032255 -0.214487 0.173711 -0.191448 -0.043204 -0.157686 0.063293 -0.21111 47.3567
(0.420478) (0.140938) (0.148707) (0.182196) (0.046667) (0.298636) (0.357154) (0.243836) (0.123164) (0.252461) (0.22765) (0.140221)
Wife age 0.098073 0.00408 0.025864 0.009058 0.034147 0.363357 -0.55448 0.120803 0.111073 0.35043 0.095527 0.128293 45.2580
(0.45895) (0.153833) (0.162313) (0.198866) (0.050937) (0.32596) (0.389832) (0.266146) (0.134433) (0.27556) (0.248479) (0.153051)
Husband education (year) 0.864348 0.075319 -0.008755 0.171701 -0.110083 -0.267755 1.337227** 0.48258 0.112312 -0.001353 0.306063 -0.567663** 11.9841
(0.782817) (0.262388) (0.276853) (0.339199) (0.086882) (0.555981) (0.664925) (0.453958) (0.229298) (0.470015) (0.423823) (0.261054)
Wife education (year) -0.369397 0.46823* 0.25621 0.376496 0.211575** 0.570724 -0.442647 -1.007999** -0.037196 0.691844 0.785382* 0.135337 11.9172
(0.777567) (0.260628) (0.274996) (0.336924) (0.0863) (0.552252) (0.660465) (0.450913) (0.22776) (0.466863) (0.42098) (0.259303)
Husband wage&salary 0.575624 0.676005 -0.014904 0.438789 0.241276 1.683641 -1.933038 -1.3482 0.710242 -0.46249 1.840081 -0.644816 191.8114
(2.260407) (0.757653) (0.79942) (0.979447) (0.250875) (1.60541) (1.919989) (1.310816) (0.662105) (1.357182) (1.223801) (0.7538)
Wife wage&salary 0.64198 0.651544 -0.027093 0.388424 0.228709 1.635491 -1.852569 -1.328079 0.765342 -0.540946 1.826565 -0.713706 163.1361
(2.260559) (0.757704) (0.799473) (0.979513) (0.250892) (1.605518) (1.920119) (1.310904) (0.662149) (1.357274) (1.223883) (0.753851)
HH total income -0.543983 -0.660312 0.029476 -0.428294 -0.235837 -1.638658 2.009745 1.383006 -0.716977 0.536874 -1.858671 0.702034 355.5988
(2.268872) (0.76049) (0.802413) (0.983115) (0.251814) (1.611422) (1.927179) (1.315724) (0.664584) (1.362265) (1.228384) (0.756623)
Husband w&s square -0.001368 -0.0009 -0.00018 -0.000885 -0.000243 -0.001754 0.001822 0.002214 -0.001162 0.000496 -0.002509* 0.000501 55216.0200
(0.002557) (0.000857) (0.000904) (0.001108) (0.000284) (0.001816) (0.002172) (0.001483) (0.000749) (0.001535) (0.001384) (0.000853)
Wife w&s square -0.001343 -0.000879 -0.000163 -0.000852 -0.000232 -0.001736 0.001746 0.002171 -0.001209 0.000569 -0.002535* 0.000554 44616.7100
(0.002562) (0.000859) (0.000906) (0.00111) (0.000284) (0.00182) (0.002177) (0.001486) (0.000751) (0.001539) (0.001387) (0.000855)
HH total income square 0.001462 0.000876 0.000132 0.000834 0.00023 0.001758 -0.001703 -0.002103 0.001177 -0.000576 0.00254* -0.000528 187229.3000
(0.002563) (0.000859) (0.000907) (0.001111) (0.000285) (0.001821) (0.002177) (0.001486) (0.000751) (0.001539) (0.001388) (0.000855)
Husws * Wifews -0.003274 -0.001654 -0.000099 -0.001493 -0.000424 -0.003571 0.003188 0.003975 -0.002369 0.001215 -0.004996* 0.000988 43458.9400
(0.005116) (0.001715) (0.001809) (0.002217) (0.000568) (0.003634) (0.004346) (0.002967) (0.001499) (0.003072) (0.00277) (0.001706)
Central -49.31369*** -8.406606*** 5.939495** -4.608381 -0.046428 -1.9271 -7.049457 -8.246009** -4.469431** -5.298473 -7.103836*** 2.519388 0.3854
(7.05226) (2.363806) (2.494114) (3.055783) (0.782706) (5.008731) (5.990188) (4.089623) (2.065705) (4.234282) (3.818144) (2.351787)
North -58.57742*** -9.835184*** 3.961612 -7.147047** -0.275825 0.86922 -21.3503*** -6.878152 -6.382251*** -5.281836 -14.07595*** 0.302582 0.2038
(7.704572) (2.582451) (2.724812) (3.338434) (0.855104) (5.472023) (6.544262) (4.4679) (2.256776) (4.625941) (4.171311) (2.56932)
Northeast -62.81195*** -14.33616*** 5.204489* -8.571843*** 0.502297 -5.61215 -22.86777*** -13.30127*** -7.852556*** -9.973121** -20.80429*** 2.835588 0.2420
(7.595056) (2.545743) (2.686081) (3.29098) (0.842949) (5.394241) (6.451239) (4.404392) (2.224697) (4.560185) (4.112018) (2.532798)
South -52.05416*** -10.824*** 8.838409*** -6.699421* 0.415143 1.337717 -16.60449** -3.206557 -5.766239** -5.157351 -11.95407** 4.708121 0.0828
(9.211614) (3.087588) (3.257796) (3.991444) (1.022366) (6.542371) (7.824344) (5.341838) (2.69821) (5.530791) (4.987234) (3.071888)
Rural -1.977252 -2.248043 0.064967 -0.470691 0.008338 -0.974896 -5.413884 0.939791 -0.106269 -2.130401 -5.150929** -0.351514 0.2293
(4.632842) (1.552856) (1.638459) (2.007436) (0.514183) (3.290387) (3.935135) (2.686597) (1.357024) (2.781628) (2.508254) (1.54496)
R-squared 0.3900 0.4326 0.3184 0.1751 0.1910 0.0914 0.6055 0.2794 0.2301 0.2926 0.2637 0.0772
Number of households 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix A 4. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with kids and others 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Health Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 8.048147 -0.95667 2.458862 4.751777 -0.157569 12.75868 3.407915 -6.378675 1.552706 15.00858 13.21995 4.468619
(12.38509) (6.59724) (7.382409) (3.767399) (1.498428) (10.74838) (12.13728) (5.462524) (3.02792) (10.56571) (8.65971) (5.182062)
Household size 0.757195 3.328155*** -1.245442 0.029404 0.092017 -0.257538 2.109321 0.792769 -0.302243 1.167153 -1.473088 0.09652 4.5639
(2.311547) (1.231305) (1.377849) (0.703145) (0.279666) (2.006072) (2.265296) (1.019523) (0.565129) (1.971979) (1.616244) (0.967177)
Young children 3.37613 -1.942357 0.898784 0.831362 -0.392649 2.302906 -2.64439 -1.238937 0.282609 6.599321** 1.659504 0.068178 0.3333
(3.559932) (1.89629) (2.121976) (1.082889) (0.430703) (3.08948) (3.488702) (1.570131) (0.870336) (3.036976) (2.48912) (1.489515)
Older children -2.762861 -2.548151 3.072073* -0.560838 -0.394971 2.128335 -1.125871 1.352081 0.407608 1.065931 4.009764** -0.274582 1.0251
(3.045576) (1.622305) (1.815383) (0.926428) (0.368473) (2.643097) (2.984637) (1.343271) (0.744585) (2.598179) (2.12948) (1.274303)
Home owner 5.097523* 0.764297 0.131241 0.547 0.226032 1.090195 4.097644 -0.570151 0.221677 -2.058077 2.180688 -1.361095 0.7820
(2.661121) (1.417515) (1.58622) (0.809482) (0.321959) (2.309449) (2.607875) (1.173704) (0.650594) (2.2702) (1.860667) (1.113443)
Vehicle owner 4.20332 -0.975975 0.322009 0.757426 0.178889 4.361693 11.95592*** 2.701529 1.336814 -1.736565 1.24858 0.652797 0.9223
(4.255732) (2.266926) (2.536723) (1.294543) (0.514886) (3.693329) (4.17058) (1.877018) (1.040446) (3.630562) (2.975626) (1.780646)
Husband age 0.221082 -0.21439 -0.050035 -0.097698 0.002829 -0.210549 -0.338199 -0.008679 0.027576 -0.191183 -0.054246 -0.135452 42.3008
(0.272977) (0.145408) (0.162714) (0.083036) (0.033027) (0.236902) (0.267515) (0.120398) (0.066738) (0.232876) (0.190867) (0.114217)
Wife age -0.032494 0.12955 -0.028055 0.073116 -0.00589 -0.011623 0.058548 0.171518 -0.03667 0.372883 0.107752 0.147406 39.3158
(0.275119) (0.14655) (0.163991) (0.083688) (0.033286) (0.238762) (0.269615) (0.121343) (0.067262) (0.234704) (0.192365) (0.115113)
Husband education (year) 0.58257 -0.016799 -0.05805 -0.05551 0.018881 0.178672 0.156794 0.087285 0.017274 0.195401 0.077881 -0.151997 11.1404
(0.407488) (0.217059) (0.242892) (0.123953) (0.049301) (0.353638) (0.399335) (0.179725) (0.099623) (0.347628) (0.284917) (0.170498)
Wife education (year) 0.68194 0.081605 0.233532 0.123279 0.048611 0.126234 -0.057424 0.173628 -0.069326 0.531409 0.286661 0.054476 11.2682
(0.415474) (0.221313) (0.247652) (0.126382) (0.050267) (0.360568) (0.40716) (0.183247) (0.101575) (0.35444) (0.290501) (0.173839)
Husband wage&salary 0.445058 -0.214153 -0.01742 0.228937 -0.059037 -0.723858 -3.686507*** 0.36813 -0.745525** -0.699431 1.182678 -0.075655 150.4377
(1.331165) (0.709079) (0.79347) (0.404925) (0.161053) (1.155249) (1.30453) (0.587119) (0.325445) (1.135616) (0.930756) (0.556974)
Wife wage&salary 0.283716 -0.255091 -0.060157 0.18673 -0.08414 -0.691298 -3.765175*** 0.347529 -0.744521** -0.763958 1.106492 -0.103676 112.6142
(1.334331) (0.710766) (0.795358) (0.405888) (0.161436) (1.157997) (1.307633) (0.588515) (0.326219) (1.138317) (0.93297) (0.558299)
HH total income -0.349166 0.264144 0.065699 -0.196765 0.074823 0.73095 3.859327*** -0.350758 0.753095** 0.78608 -1.103856 0.095154 263.8561
(1.329196) (0.708031) (0.792297) (0.404326) (0.160815) (1.15354) (1.3026) (0.58625) (0.324963) (1.133936) (0.929379) (0.55615)
Husband w&s square -0.000227 0.000156 -0.000027 -0.00117*** 0.000047 0.000301 0.001792* -0.000453 0.000455* 0.000121 -0.000723 0.000073 35073.6800
(0.001035) (0.000551) (0.000617) (0.000315) (0.000125) (0.000898) (0.001014) (0.000457) (0.000253) (0.000883) (0.000724) (0.000433)
Wife w&s square 0.000188 0.000185 0.000095 -0.001027*** 0.00011 0.000344 0.001734* -0.000395 0.000458* 0.000226 -0.0006 0.00002 20749.1300
(0.001037) (0.000553) (0.000618) (0.000316) (0.000126) (0.0009) (0.001016) (0.000457) (0.000254) (0.000885) (0.000725) (0.000434)
HH total income square 0.000089 -0.000194 -0.000078 0.001136*** -0.000066 -0.000303 -0.001872* 0.000464 -0.000468* -0.0002 0.00064 -0.000054 103858.2000
(0.001033) (0.00055) (0.000616) (0.000314) (0.000125) (0.000897) (0.001012) (0.000456) (0.000253) (0.000881) (0.000722) (0.000432)
Husws * Wifews -0.000072 0.000465 0.000282 -0.002338*** 0.000115 0.00046 0.003929* -0.000928 0.001012** 0.000391 -0.001257 0.0001 23679.7800
(0.002093) (0.001115) (0.001248) (0.000637) (0.000253) (0.001817) (0.002052) (0.000923) (0.000512) (0.001786) (0.001464) (0.000876)
Central -22.29841*** -2.087883 1.668737 -2.346411* -0.656475 -11.83513*** -9.724456** -5.398981*** 0.228805 0.943944 -6.715775** -0.018903 0.3784
(4.383741) (2.335113) (2.613026) (1.333482) (0.530373) (3.804421) (4.296027) (1.933477) (1.071741) (3.739766) (3.06513) (1.834206)
North -24.71957*** -0.669343 1.891174 -1.509163 -0.376887 -14.55538*** -16.13729*** -5.737996*** -1.224165 0.419934 -12.50724*** 0.181933 0.1779
(4.681985) (2.49398) (2.790801) (1.424205) (0.566457) (4.063252) (4.588304) (2.065019) (1.144656) (3.994198) (3.273664) (1.958995)
Northeast -26.67108*** -3.081789 2.366071 -2.766031** -0.604137 -14.79651*** -16.11599*** -6.710648*** -1.471883 -3.818348 -11.55479*** 1.735082 0.2506
(4.601581) (2.451151) (2.742874) (1.399747) (0.556729) (3.993474) (4.509509) (2.029557) (1.124999) (3.925606) (3.217445) (1.925353)
South -23.8679*** -4.16841 3.920834 -1.418435 -0.896342 -11.41522** -14.55423*** -7.383451*** -1.809201 6.628814 -8.136769** 1.651182 0.1078
(5.173085) (2.755578) (3.083532) (1.573592) (0.625873) (4.489453) (5.069578) (2.281622) (1.264721) (4.413156) (3.617044) (2.164477)
Rural 1.759068 -0.567531 -0.612946 -1.122123 -0.087907 -2.420183 -0.446346 0.197236 -1.254808* -2.635728 -0.878603 -0.9622 0.2431
(2.772831) (1.47702) (1.652807) (0.843463) (0.335475) (2.406397) (2.71735) (1.222975) (0.677905) (2.365501) (1.938776) (1.160184)
R-squared 0.4051 0.2984 0.2128 0.4778 0.1740 0.0858 0.6420 0.3633 0.3286 0.3037 0.2884 0.0816
Number of households 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix A 5. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with one dependent 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Health Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 12.79448*** 5.476991*** -4.612895* 0.180664 -0.595774 -2.70354 6.3203 6.760887** -3.62796** 14.61518*** 10.0828*** 2.771065
(4.332992) (1.895925) (2.671023) (2.670517) (0.800929) (3.252394) (5.636794) (3.04188) (1.756414) (4.923672) (3.807634) (2.968186)
Young children -0.851288 -1.152348 0.207451 6.420221*** -0.029564 -0.711388 -6.055188*** -5.043804*** -0.126989 9.724024*** -2.797857* 0.378251 0.3191
(1.752927) (0.767003) (1.080572) (1.080367) (0.324019) (1.315768) (2.280385) (1.230603) (0.710564) (1.991889) (1.540392) (1.20079)
Older children -2.316924* -2.016196*** 0.377677 0.988459 0.027894 -2.255134** -1.934853 -1.796851* 0.450343 2.191912 -0.741229 1.797746* 0.4350
(1.400101) (0.612622) (0.863076) (0.862913) (0.258801) (1.050932) (1.821393) (0.98291) (0.567542) (1.590965) (1.230344) (0.959097)
Home owner 8.013226*** 0.868914* 0.469393 0.455175 0.310397 -0.077843 1.528403 0.668418 -0.011623 1.664642 0.976525 -1.170772 0.5875
(1.158808) (0.507043) (0.714334) (0.714199) (0.214199) (0.869815) (1.507495) (0.813516) (0.469733) (1.316779) (1.018307) (0.793807)
Vehicle owner -0.010067 0.075167 0.66263 0.573281 0.022354 -0.035291 7.243138*** 0.879619 0.977761 1.135247 0.649136 1.683064 0.8913
(1.821296) (0.796918) (1.122717) (1.122505) (0.336656) (1.367086) (2.369327) (1.2786) (0.738278) (2.069578) (1.600471) (1.247624)
Husband age -0.06519 -0.006395 -0.035935 0.065446 -0.010473 0.020196 -0.004779 -0.111084 0.012182 -0.152688 0.011538 -0.104053 40.2884
(0.1185) (0.05185) (0.073048) (0.073034) (0.021904) (0.088947) (0.154156) (0.08319) (0.048035) (0.134654) (0.104132) (0.081175)
Wife age 0.098891 0.01585 0.006449 -0.018967 0.006189 0.140121 -0.175779 0.040034 0.028264 0.391026*** 0.063746 0.096924 37.8712
(0.123943) (0.054232) (0.076403) (0.076389) (0.02291) (0.093033) (0.161237) (0.087011) (0.050241) (0.140839) (0.108915) (0.084903)
Husband education (year) 0.593547*** 0.075063 0.163388 0.255041** -0.036193 -0.020526 0.506525** 0.036229 0.191756** -0.003573 0.161746 0.058793 10.7742
(0.197332) (0.086344) (0.121643) (0.12162) (0.036476) (0.148119) (0.256709) (0.138532) (0.07999) (0.224232) (0.173406) (0.135176)
Wife education (year) 0.435222** 0.07498 0.080594 0.269689** 0.086663** 0.340974** 0.143702 -0.053185 -0.09426 0.363304 0.591672*** -0.052489 10.8416
(0.199867) (0.087453) (0.123206) (0.123182) (0.036944) (0.150022) (0.260007) (0.140312) (0.081018) (0.227113) (0.175634) (0.136913)
Husband wage&salary -0.551644 0.059427 -0.497515 0.380871 0.129054 0.803305 -1.241789 -0.534991 -0.633581** -0.332678 0.044365 0.381616 130.1483
(0.750791) (0.328513) (0.462816) (0.462729) (0.13878) (0.563552) (0.976705) (0.527076) (0.304339) (0.85314) (0.65976) (0.514307)
Wife wage&salary -0.575648 0.041686 -0.514236 0.444859 0.128818 0.789134 -1.205399 -0.609739 -0.588867* -0.276517 0.003351 0.382079 106.9741
(0.749851) (0.328102) (0.462237) (0.46215) (0.138606) (0.562847) (0.975482) (0.526416) (0.303958) (0.852072) (0.658935) (0.513663)
HH total income 0.592926 -0.02107 0.541448 -0.432231 -0.120185 -0.798383 1.379719 0.593148 0.63471** 0.374672 -0.01575 -0.375688 237.5311
(0.752121) (0.329095) (0.463636) (0.463548) (0.139025) (0.564551) (0.978435) (0.52801) (0.304878) (0.854651) (0.660929) (0.515218)
Husband w&s square 0.001149 -0.000181 0.00074 -0.000553 -0.000175 -0.001245 0.002189 0.001184 0.000996** 0.000771 0.000043 -0.001583** 28431.7100
(0.00108) (0.000473) (0.000666) (0.000666) (0.0002) (0.000811) (0.001405) (0.000758) (0.000438) (0.001227) (0.000949) (0.00074)
Wife w&s square 0.001148 -0.000199 0.000763 -0.000684 -0.000178 -0.001216 0.002108 0.001321* 0.000919** 0.000671 0.000075 -0.001594** 20141.5100
(0.00108) (0.000472) (0.000666) (0.000665) (0.0002) (0.00081) (0.001404) (0.000758) (0.000438) (0.001227) (0.000949) (0.00074)
HH total income square -0.001117 0.000176 -0.000785 0.000706 0.000169 0.001209 -0.002165 -0.001271* -0.00095** -0.000758 -0.00007 0.001661** 91898.2000
(0.001081) (0.000473) (0.000667) (0.000666) (0.0002) (0.000812) (0.001407) (0.000759) (0.000438) (0.001229) (0.00095) (0.000741)
Husws * Wifews 0.002164 -0.000374 0.001571 -0.001448 -0.000343 -0.00232 0.004137 0.002606* 0.001838** 0.001417 0.000196 -0.003494** 21556.7100
(0.002163) (0.000946) (0.001333) (0.001333) (0.0004) (0.001624) (0.002814) (0.001518) (0.000877) (0.002458) (0.001901) (0.001482)
Central -10.19712*** -1.097586 2.906194** -2.023302* -0.083334 -2.685098* -5.545112** -3.15031** 0.298651 -2.584781 -5.437917*** 1.12183 0.3865
(1.899545) (0.831157) (1.170953) (1.170731) (0.35112) (1.425821) (2.47112) (1.333533) (0.769996) (2.158494) (1.669233) (1.301226)
North -15.72496*** -2.744142*** 2.952715** -3.660848*** -0.145347 -2.363084 -14.23893*** -3.025281** -1.422878* -6.092405*** -9.791634*** -1.651092 0.2092
(2.058372) (0.900652) (1.26886) (1.26862) (0.380479) (1.545038) (2.677739) (1.445034) (0.834378) (2.338973) (1.808803) (1.410026)
Northeast -19.13615*** -3.904535*** 1.3714 -3.466197*** -0.410413 -5.11378*** -17.54489*** -7.520353*** -1.306094 -7.732446*** -14.02867*** 0.343628 0.1631
(2.152244) (0.941727) (1.326726) (1.326475) (0.39783) (1.6155) (2.799857) (1.510935) (0.87243) (2.445641) (1.891293) (1.47433)
South -11.27008*** -2.765308*** 4.260886*** -4.056797*** -0.170738 -2.059059 -9.238881*** -2.212189 -0.797563 -1.72065 -7.331278*** -0.111605 0.1312
(2.26239) (0.989921) (1.394624) (1.39436) (0.41819) (1.698176) (2.943146) (1.58826) (0.917078) (2.570802) (1.988084) (1.549782)
Rural -2.425054* -0.550168 -1.427075* 0.229882 -0.269514 -0.52934 -0.253972 0.332371 0.030025 -2.351198 0.407481 0.868508 0.2541
(1.304719) (0.570887) (0.804279) (0.804127) (0.24117) (0.979338) (1.697311) (0.915949) (0.528879) (1.482581) (1.146528) (0.893759)
R-squared 0.4049 0.3869 0.2409 0.3478 0.1787 0.1052 0.6201 0.1995 0.2727 0.2669 0.2191 0.0705
Number of households 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix A 6. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with two dependents 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Health Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 26.57127*** 0.422331 -4.147706 -1.933589 0.10764 20.60135*** -1.206732 -0.566583 -2.334763 21.42694*** 16.51493*** -0.663045
(9.241426) (4.706405) (4.352953) (2.91438) (1.065795) (6.009491) (7.423138) (3.652088) (2.405733) (6.773559) (5.482202) (4.462277)
Young children -4.316347** 0.026191 0.712987 3.664838*** -0.029105 -1.254356 -2.693841 -2.217451*** -0.137657 3.532913** -3.347035*** 1.156379 0.3709
(2.12391) (1.081649) (1.000417) (0.669797) (0.244946) (1.381131) (1.706022) (0.839341) (0.552898) (1.556733) (1.259947) (1.025543)
Older children -5.762177*** -0.250938 1.380295** 0.098409 0.180738 -2.040776** -0.288459 -1.560161*** -0.257989 0.900365 -1.946465** 1.454237** 1.0742
(1.462999) (0.745065) (0.689111) (0.461372) (0.168725) (0.951355) (1.175148) (0.578158) (0.380849) (1.072314) (0.867881) (0.706418)
Home owner 8.959116*** 0.908507 0.631952 -0.014738 -0.004347 0.249625 3.154413* 0.265819 0.418736 -2.226798 2.18026* -0.751238 0.6731
(2.032995) (1.035348) (0.957594) (0.641126) (0.234461) (1.322011) (1.632995) (0.803412) (0.52923) (1.490096) (1.206014) (0.981644)
Vehicle owner 7.199706** 0.992653 0.173631 0.623676 0.056327 -3.845061* 7.137393** 1.819573 1.408481 2.293726 -1.346735 -0.162378 0.9203
(3.534078) (1.799809) (1.664643) (1.114508) (0.407578) (2.298132) (2.838734) (1.39662) (0.919993) (2.590324) (2.096487) (1.706451)
Husband age -0.183863 0.038478 -0.057404 -0.007812 -0.008369 -0.216112 -0.26613 -0.08935 0.004078 -0.037324 -0.05117 0.007255 40.9560
(0.221552) (0.11283) (0.104357) (0.069869) (0.025551) (0.14407) (0.17796) (0.087554) (0.057674) (0.162388) (0.131429) (0.106978)
Wife age 0.022098 0.062306 -0.001829 0.070091 -0.00888 -0.148327 0.199006 0.279782*** 0.028581 0.044839 0.018552 0.043566 38.2967
(0.241157) (0.122815) (0.113591) (0.076051) (0.027812) (0.156819) (0.193708) (0.095302) (0.062778) (0.176757) (0.143059) (0.116444)
Husband education (year) 0.377213 0.273932 0.103442 -0.021146 0.025407 -0.033492 0.811286*** 0.191074 0.029546 0.029085 -0.248967 -0.014238 11.0783
(0.362185) (0.184451) (0.170599) (0.114219) (0.04177) (0.235521) (0.290924) (0.143131) (0.094284) (0.265466) (0.214856) (0.174883)
Wife education (year) -0.106001 0.100877 0.173102 0.225154** 0.036444 -0.140429 0.642523** 0.015631 -0.004041 0.172539 0.437796** -0.15841 11.1635
(0.351893) (0.179209) (0.165751) (0.110973) (0.040583) (0.228828) (0.282657) (0.139063) (0.091605) (0.257922) (0.20875) (0.169914)
Husband wage&salary -0.537879 0.170747 -0.273897 1.27587*** 0.103746 0.29322 0.380426 0.080291 -0.050005 0.397966 0.267274 0.050983 145.2872
(1.136455) (0.578766) (0.5353) (0.358393) (0.131065) (0.739011) (0.912853) (0.449112) (0.295843) (0.832972) (0.674169) (0.548744)
Wife wage&salary -0.571666 0.154227 -0.339795 1.28442*** 0.091446 0.34892 0.310824 0.108725 -0.042167 0.293732 0.219799 0.036736 110.7878
(1.137003) (0.579045) (0.535558) (0.358566) (0.131128) (0.739368) (0.913293) (0.449329) (0.295985) (0.833374) (0.674494) (0.549009)
HH total income 0.65008 -0.144902 0.331296 -1.277474*** -0.092622 -0.283581 -0.246294 -0.084403 0.065334 -0.254102 -0.191373 -0.030884 256.6934
(1.137597) (0.579347) (0.535838) (0.358753) (0.131197) (0.739754) (0.91377) (0.449563) (0.29614) (0.833809) (0.674846) (0.549296)
Husband w&s square 0.000315 -0.000185 0.000108 -0.00198*** -0.000064 -0.000431 -0.001642** -0.000007 -0.000196 -0.000681 -0.000004 0.000039 34634.3300
(0.000938) (0.000478) (0.000442) (0.000296) (0.000108) (0.00061) (0.000753) (0.000371) (0.000244) (0.000687) (0.000556) (0.000453)
Wife w&s square 0.00046 -0.000148 0.000188 -0.001993*** -0.000048 -0.000471 -0.001588** -0.00009 -0.000202 -0.000548 0.000043 0.000019 22356.4000
(0.000938) (0.000478) (0.000442) (0.000296) (0.000108) (0.00061) (0.000754) (0.000371) (0.000244) (0.000688) (0.000557) (0.000453)
HH total income square -0.00036 0.000153 -0.000199 0.001984*** 0.000046 0.000482 0.001659** 0.000137 0.000178 0.000524 -0.000052 -0.000052 104740.5000
(0.000939) (0.000478) (0.000442) (0.000296) (0.000108) (0.00061) (0.000754) (0.000371) (0.000244) (0.000688) (0.000557) (0.000453)
Husws * Wifews 0.0005 -0.000243 0.000528 -0.003903*** -0.000061 -0.001112 -0.003432** -0.000425 -0.000325 -0.001028 0.000095 0.000162 23657.0200
(0.00188) (0.000958) (0.000886) (0.000593) (0.000217) (0.001223) (0.00151) (0.000743) (0.00049) (0.001378) (0.001116) (0.000908)
Central -20.28266*** -0.687787 3.797908** 0.514333 -0.226804 -1.666941 -4.402607 -3.028019** 0.197695 1.896207 -3.27331 1.897815 0.3819
(3.512949) (1.789049) (1.654691) (1.107845) (0.405141) (2.284392) (2.821762) (1.38827) (0.914493) (2.574838) (2.083953) (1.696248)
North -26.86319*** -1.292619 3.662071** -0.269008 -0.292961 -2.309609 -14.3821*** -4.991682*** -0.884474 -1.99019 -8.785373*** 2.56529 0.1676
(3.870522) (1.971151) (1.823117) (1.220609) (0.446379) (2.516913) (3.108981) (1.529578) (1.007576) (2.836923) (2.296072) (1.868905)
Northeast -26.86223*** -4.358642** 1.608866** 1.364279 -0.294077 -1.891628 -12.66395*** -7.036793*** -1.975325** 0.699259 -8.656334*** 2.845479 0.2294
(3.791379) (1.930845) (1.785838) (1.195651) (0.437252) (2.465449) (3.04541) (1.498302) (0.986974) (2.778914) (2.249123) (1.83069)
South -22.71168*** -3.528906* 3.193109* 1.175814 -0.585758 -2.150421 -10.86817*** -5.951149*** -1.816837* 1.91614 -5.830346** 1.520172 0.1277
(4.078576) (2.077107) (1.921116) (1.286221) (0.470374) (2.652206) (3.2761) (1.611799) (1.061737) (2.989417) (2.419494) (1.969365)
Rural -1.255351 -1.166706 -1.497731 -0.739067 -0.17851 0.256392 0.30967 -1.444751 -0.71541 -1.295683 -3.315538** -0.271386 0.2473
(2.320089) (1.181558) (1.092823) (0.731664) (0.267571) (1.508702) (1.863602) (0.916868) (0.603967) (1.700523) (1.376324) (1.120269)
R-squared 0.3607 0.2260 0.2388 0.3794 0.2153 0.0679 0.6660 0.4248 0.2500 0.3129 0.2904 0.0545
Number of households 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
104 
 
Appendix A 7. Quasi-quadratic Engel curve (1.16) for spouses with three or more dependents 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Health Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 8.547077 16.46707* -2.333299 3.389664 -0.193932 2.421535 28.20125** -2.975294 0.194233 13.762 32.27221*** 14.78565**
(12.09144) (8.78621) (7.286625) (9.608259) (3.465135) (9.254264) (14.36026) (6.19526) (3.938471) (13.3214) (9.462197) (5.975101)
Young children 2.798074 -0.254189 -1.072673 2.133234 -0.37233 -0.232608 -3.150529 -1.377744 0.021748 4.974664** -3.707135** -1.463399 0.5657
(2.109196) (1.532641) (1.271058) (1.676037) (0.604448) (1.614287) (2.504963) (1.080683) (0.687015) (2.323746) (1.650558) (1.042279)
Older children -1.450992 -1.395916 1.033549 -0.711589 0.181134 0.554589 -3.367946* 0.930408 -0.073975 1.985453 -0.244731 -1.196805 1.4502
(1.485844) (1.079684) (0.895409) (1.180701) (0.425809) (1.1372) (1.764646) (0.761298) (0.483975) (1.636986) (1.162752) (0.734244)
Home owner 2.462563 0.013665 -1.541948 -1.021355 0.52568 0.741642 2.73049 0.161404 0.83654 1.657095 0.751924 -0.581556 0.7689
(3.101323) (2.253567) (1.86894) (2.464414) (0.888769) (2.373618) (3.683251) (1.589016) (1.010175) (3.416793) (2.42695) (1.532548)
Vehicle owner 4.186755 -0.249462 -1.970591 2.31472 -0.831367 2.281807 7.365098 2.155396 0.890417 -4.761421 -2.10659 -2.719771 0.9084
(4.574312) (3.32391) (2.756602) (3.634899) (1.310895) (3.500979) (5.432629) (2.343728) (1.489962) (5.039616) (3.579642) (2.26044)
Husband age 0.314517 -0.107451 0.041086 -0.063284 -0.065259 -0.104293 -0.468164 -0.011425 0.024011 -0.217645 -0.230743 -0.280232* 41.5538
(0.292656) (0.212658) (0.176362) (0.232554) (0.083869) (0.223986) (0.34757) (0.149947) (0.095325) (0.322425) (0.229019) (0.144619)
Wife age 0.085908 0.016402 -0.057137 0.243163 0.055351 0.100997 0.089245 0.153366 0.009129 0.52711 -0.052263 0.109627 38.6056
(0.305946) (0.222314) (0.184371) (0.243114) (0.087677) (0.234157) (0.363353) (0.156756) (0.099654) (0.337067) (0.239419) (0.151186)
Husband education (year) 0.639956 0.007552 -0.108642 0.399614 -0.035823 0.011047 -0.062146 0.159601 0.062001 0.770316 0.244706 -0.378768 11.2709
(0.502172) (0.364902) (0.302622) (0.399043) (0.143911) (0.384341) (0.596399) (0.257297) (0.163569) (0.553254) (0.392976) (0.248153)
Wife education (year) 0.79324 -0.17571 0.289989 0.031897 0.140581 0.328564 -0.852366 0.220052 -0.347528** 0.762081 -0.514792 0.152814 11.0757
(0.493762) (0.358791) (0.297554) (0.39236) (0.141501) (0.377904) (0.586411) (0.252988) (0.16083) (0.543988) (0.386395) (0.243997)
Husband wage&salary -1.100844 -0.885352 0.353733 -1.410041 -1.637057*** -1.55066 -8.177338*** 0.062293 -1.028987** -3.25263** 0.651087 -0.255841 154.0608
(1.432171) (1.040682) (0.863064) (1.13805) (0.410428) (1.096121) (1.700901) (0.733797) (0.466492) (1.577853) (1.12075) (0.707721)
Wife wage&salary -1.394158 -0.935014 0.362778 -1.360113 -1.595861*** -1.510812 -8.121706*** 0.062203 -1.070528** -3.208319** 0.647094 -0.307668 117.6607
(1.439326) (1.045882) (0.867376) (1.143736) (0.412479) (1.101598) (1.7094) (0.737464) (0.468823) (1.585736) (1.126349) (0.711257)
HH total income 1.208933 0.972206 -0.321435 1.399244 1.618042*** 1.542579 8.346662*** -0.05513 1.069425** 3.272624** -0.601342 0.2969 272.4781
(1.436973) (1.044172) (0.865958) (1.141866) (0.411804) (1.099797) (1.706605) (0.736258) (0.468056) (1.583144) (1.124508) (0.710094)
Husband w&s square 0.002441* 0.001116 0.000612 0.001905* 0.00099*** 0.001064 0.00845*** -0.001545** 0.001591*** 0.002308* -0.000922 -0.000308 49562.6700
(0.001263) (0.000918) (0.000761) (0.001004) (0.000362) (0.000967) (0.0015) (0.000647) (0.000411) (0.001391) (0.000988) (0.000624)
Wife w&s square 0.003185** 0.000992 0.000563 0.001781* 0.00091** 0.000999 0.008083*** -0.001389** 0.001654*** 0.002288 -0.00092 -0.000302 25944.6500
(0.00128) (0.00093) (0.000771) (0.001017) (0.000367) (0.00098) (0.00152) (0.000656) (0.000417) (0.00141) (0.001002) (0.000632)
HH total income square -0.002579** -0.001095 -0.000635 -0.00177* -0.000907** -0.001051 -0.008342*** 0.001645** -0.001663*** -0.002278 0.00086 0.000355 141986.4000
(0.001279) (0.00093) (0.000771) (0.001016) (0.000367) (0.000979) (0.001519) (0.000655) (0.000417) (0.001409) (0.001001) (0.000632)
Husws * Wifews 0.005187** 0.002179 0.001356 0.00339 0.001727** 0.002087 0.016678*** -0.003577*** 0.003463*** 0.004476 -0.001589 -0.000863 32967.8400
(0.002604) (0.001892) (0.001569) (0.002069) (0.000746) (0.001993) (0.003093) (0.001334) (0.000848) (0.002869) (0.002038) (0.001287)
Central -20.67589*** -8.856211*** 2.911524 -14.04081*** 0.067781 -4.534201 -13.63497** -6.331628*** -2.09632 -5.301891 -1.881363 1.339905 0.3506
(4.712235) (3.424131) (2.839718) (3.744497) (1.35042) (3.606539) (5.596432) (2.414395) (1.534887) (5.191568) (3.687574) (2.328596)
North -24.18938*** -4.95902 3.768054 -13.17022*** 1.230315 -6.272654 -17.10762*** -3.334177 -2.330186 -3.013276 -7.816831** 2.119136 0.1753
(5.007096) (3.638391) (3.017409) (3.978803) (1.434921) (3.832213) (5.94662) (2.565472) (1.63093) (5.516423) (3.918319) (2.474304)
Northeast -26.2663*** -9.631693*** 2.984265 -15.78655*** 0.045373 -8.765829** -18.08777*** -6.651532*** -2.901391* -9.476299* -5.307282 3.594312 0.2351
(4.910194) (3.567978) (2.959013) (3.901802) (1.407151) (3.758049) (5.831536) (2.515823) (1.599367) (5.409664) (3.842488) (2.426419)
South -23.16509*** -7.522788* 5.269604 -14.18999*** -0.08498 -5.223202 -14.34795** -4.940149* -3.561882** -3.468333 -6.215716 4.447199* 0.1434
(5.371892) (3.903469) (3.237245) (4.268683) (1.539463) (4.111412) (6.379867) (2.752382) (1.749753) (5.918327) (4.203791) (2.654571)
Rural 1.091531 -1.585689 1.006908 1.132775 -0.057194 -3.529524 -0.507353 0.326494 0.075942 2.156722 -1.934741 -1.045555 0.2470
(3.038941) (2.208237) (1.831347) (2.414843) (0.870892) (2.325873) (3.609164) (1.557054) (0.989855) (3.348065) (2.378133) (1.501721)
R-squared 0.5786 0.5390 0.4158 0.6408 0.7703 0.0767 0.8555 0.5750 0.4873 0.3275 0.4003 0.0998
Number of households 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix B 1. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with spouses only (3SLS) 
 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 84.28641** -0.051388 27.63119 8.00849 -8.05075 -110.6886*** 6.193183 9.625024 133.5254*** -15.03815 -51.47541*
(37.15709) (13.83926) (18.0156) (8.635747) (5.826972) (33.84887) (5.342912) (10.03086) (37.21412) (36.97279) (26.41305)
Home owner 0.999859 0.830132** -0.602949 -0.037944 0.235059 0.192939 0.247614* 0.027153 -0.219574 -0.710806 -1.394423** 0.3096
(0.932178) (0.347192) (0.451966) (0.216649) (0.146184) (0.849183) (0.13404) (0.251649) (0.933609) (0.927554) (0.662637)
Vehicle owner -0.637037 -0.051404 -0.05946 -0.221524 0.023597 2.257201*** 0.036735 0.340923* -0.730146 -1.33044* 0.098934 0.7238
(0.728019) (0.271153) (0.35298) (0.1692) (0.114168) (0.663201) (0.104684) (0.196535) (0.729137) (0.724408) (0.517511)
Husband age 0.112346* 0.000068 0.019026 -0.019195 -0.006409 -0.018127 0.00434 0.004478 0.103379* -0.171905*** -0.059456 36.3231
(0.062017) (0.023098) (0.030069) (0.014413) (0.009726) (0.056495) (0.008918) (0.016742) (0.062112) (0.061709) (0.044085)
Wife age 0.045003 0.062225*** -0.01033 -0.006292 -0.010899 -0.00302 -0.011699 -0.00668 0.007924 -0.125764* 0.068283 34.0821
(0.065196) (0.024282) (0.03161) (0.015152) (0.010224) (0.059391) (0.009375) (0.0176) (0.065296) (0.064873) (0.046345)
Husband education (year) 0.02076 -0.059387 0.065013 0.028078 0.022271 0.234179** 0.01027 0.076882** -0.022137 -0.065965 -0.283465*** 10.1507
(0.111978) (0.041707) (0.054293) (0.026025) (0.01756) (0.102009) (0.016102) (0.03023) (0.11215) (0.111423) (0.0796)
Wife education (year) -0.185137 0.118296*** 0.017977 0.039078 0.018295 0.068508 0.015515 0.00204 -0.063183 -0.075485 -0.031111 10.1182
(0.122958) (0.045796) (0.059616) (0.028577) (0.019282) (0.11201) (0.01768) (0.033193) (0.123146) (0.122348) (0.087404)
Log (husband wages) -6.773888*** 0.108887 -0.338193 0.0641 0.083146 3.730491*** 0.230589 0.324616 -0.118251 1.421979 0.849948 4.4212
(1.325887) (0.49383) (0.642856) (0.308152) (0.207926) (1.207839) (0.190653) (0.357934) (1.327922) (1.319311) (0.942505)
Log (wife wages) -3.459142*** -1.117143** 0.010165 0.154933 0.215617 2.414731** 0.178787 0.311803 -2.06128* 4.322217*** -1.424448* 4.2504
(1.208454) (0.450092) (0.585918) (0.280859) (0.18951) (1.100861) (0.173767) (0.326232) (1.210308) (1.20246) (0.859027)
Log (household total consumption) -27.03742* 4.244475 -13.34883* -1.520138 3.232377 42.25734*** -2.575538 -4.792563 -32.02371** 14.88081 23.86739** 4.7121
(15.44469) (5.752418) (7.488351) (3.589529) (2.422035) (14.0696) (2.220831) (4.169422) (15.4684) (15.36809) (10.97883)
Log (hh total consumption) squared 4.533978*** -0.532813 1.699091** 0.104234 -0.33643 -4.45035*** 0.18289 0.490124 2.226291 -2.263978 -2.274028* 22.4408
(1.717505) (0.639689) (0.832731) (0.399169) (0.269339) (1.56459) (0.246964) (0.463655) (1.720141) (1.708986) (1.220885)
Central -2.551083*** -0.011322 1.291381*** -0.199486 -0.050964 -0.401731 0.052617 0.278501 1.723953** -0.673497 0.607026 0.5135
(0.834451) (0.310794) (0.404583) (0.193936) (0.130859) (0.760157) (0.119988) (0.225267) (0.835732) (0.830313) (0.593168)
North -1.335696 -0.251736 2.227773*** -0.084207 0.08386 -0.742662 0.013589 0.200673 1.320719 -2.961997** 1.475402 0.1119
(1.288967) (0.480079) (0.624955) (0.299571) (0.202136) (1.174206) (0.185344) (0.347967) (1.290945) (1.282573) (0.91626)
Northeast -0.737175 -0.112064 2.216806*** -0.228905 0.150778 0.419006 0.07906 -0.276344 2.180358 -5.185967*** 1.954531** 0.1092
(1.390963) (0.518068) (0.674408) (0.323276) (0.218131) (1.267121) (0.20001) (0.375502) (1.393098) (1.384064) (0.988764)
South 0.054324 -0.676493 1.493832** -0.198181 -0.065304 -2.697185** -0.05553 -0.021174 2.72264** -1.696956 1.099031 0.0930
(1.227817) (0.457304) (0.595307) (0.285359) (0.192546) (1.1185) (0.176551) (0.331459) (1.229702) (1.221727) (0.872792)
Rural 0.311812 0.090743 0.412402 -0.107876 0.015846 1.029419* -0.129629 -0.247541 0.446782 -1.783921*** 0.409761 0.2527
(0.687242) (0.255965) (0.333209) (0.159723) (0.107773) (0.626054) (0.09882) (0.185527) (0.688297) (0.683833) (0.488525)
R-squared -0.3671 0.0687 0.1171 0.0272 0.0700 0.2850 -0.0326 0.0809 0.3272 0.1459 0.0652
Number of households 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108 1108
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix B 2. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with kids, no others (3SLS) 
 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant -27.07517 46.70066*** -13.06479 38.16406*** 3.825765 -48.72525* -6.110155 8.864514 192.1982*** -80.93303*** -7.243901
(18.7014) (9.851053) (12.20895) (11.6437) (3.183122) (25.18992) (7.898942) (6.026867) (29.78319) (20.36396) (14.65968)
Household size -0.730986* 0.82168*** 0.385655 -0.3629 -0.020674 -2.381946*** 0.745909*** -0.164009 2.489822*** -0.430252 -0.386112 3.4874
(0.383406) (0.201961) (0.250301) (0.238713) (0.065259) (0.51643) (0.16194) (0.12356) (0.610599) (0.417491) (0.300545)
Home owner 3.272844*** 0.200861 0.08528 -0.725894** -0.073228 -0.849914 0.172063 0.00497 -0.460428 -0.371751 -1.017421*** 0.5549
(0.462644) (0.2437) (0.302031) (0.288047) (0.078746) (0.62316) (0.195408) (0.149096) (0.736791) (0.503773) (0.362658)
Vehicle owner -1.811373** 0.477367 0.217669 -0.209921 0.093963 1.72237 0.692103** 0.726058*** 1.694695 -2.963834*** 0.043822 0.8948
(0.790274) (0.416281) (0.515919) (0.492033) (0.134511) (1.064462) (0.333789) (0.25468) (1.258562) (0.86053) (0.619481)
Husband age 0.05554 -0.010764 -0.021783 -0.020235 0.000901 0.081714 -0.003931 0.024291 -0.094235 0.003674 -0.008215 38.2932
(0.048068) (0.02532) (0.031381) (0.029928) (0.008182) (0.064745) (0.020303) (0.015491) (0.076551) (0.052341) (0.03768)
Wife age -0.036293 0.024325 0.002598 -0.088932*** -0.005311 -0.053111 0.065179*** 0.022501 0.089348 -0.006282 0.012933 35.7113
(0.049871) (0.02627) (0.032558) (0.03105) (0.008488) (0.067174) (0.021064) (0.016072) (0.079423) (0.054305) (0.039093)
Husband education (year) 0.070495 0.121219*** 0.084918 0.021044 -0.009573 -0.057506 0.010461 0.071084** 0.035768 -0.259386*** -0.010415 10.6124
(0.089215) (0.046994) (0.058243) (0.055546) (0.015185) (0.120168) (0.037682) (0.028751) (0.14208) (0.097146) (0.069934)
Wife education (year) 0.011183 0.042395 0.051959 0.0526 0.022837 -0.082679 0.038484 0.013522 0.140702 -0.126655 -0.187247*** 10.6484
(0.090371) (0.047603) (0.058997) (0.056266) (0.015382) (0.121725) (0.03817) (0.029124) (0.143921) (0.098405) (0.07084)
Log (husband wages) -0.844596 1.878057*** 0.879979 -1.064711 0.005645 -3.002602** 0.787537* 0.609969* 4.509908** -2.439566** -0.480919 4.5320
(1.135116) (0.597928) (0.741045) (0.706736) (0.193205) (1.528948) (0.479441) (0.365812) (1.807745) (1.236028) (0.889796)
Log (wife wages) -1.80264** 0.456231 -0.489545 -0.039548 -0.006513 -0.866147 0.31788 0.154003 2.595327** -0.186072 0.175832 4.2619
(0.711058) (0.374553) (0.464204) (0.442712) (0.121028) (0.957762) (0.300331) (0.229151) (1.132405) (0.774271) (0.557385)
Log (household total consumption) 19.79739*** -16.01339*** 3.87378 -11.75277** -2.080678 19.12037* 0.163246 -4.563137* -55.30267*** 38.49522*** 4.925731 4.9004
(7.586763) (3.996363) (4.952912) (4.723601) (1.291325) (10.21901) (3.204433) (2.444972) (12.08241) (8.261229) (5.947123)
Log (hh total consumption) squared -1.736469** 0.986341*** -0.324995 1.41303*** 0.285225** -0.158811 -0.080013 0.376655* 2.846081*** -3.168636*** -0.389921 24.3101
(0.691695) (0.364354) (0.451564) (0.430657) (0.117732) (0.931681) (0.292152) (0.222911) (1.101569) (0.753187) (0.542207)
Central -1.190084 -0.628228 1.896695*** -0.817846 0.074493 -0.078204 -1.004509*** 0.300872 -0.960786 0.108061 2.216059*** 0.3786
(0.812016) (0.427733) (0.530113) (0.50557) (0.138211) (1.093747) (0.342973) (0.261687) (1.293188) (0.884204) (0.636524)
North -1.219607 -1.501333** 3.088974*** -0.602981 0.347936* 2.175121* -1.005702** -0.23559 -4.286141** 0.385756 2.06145** 0.1871
(1.199282) (0.631727) (0.782934) (0.746686) (0.204127) (1.615376) (0.506543) (0.38649) (1.909933) (1.305898) (0.940095)
Northeast -1.499981 -1.872099*** 1.376052* 0.147616 0.189557 2.293262 -2.236365*** -0.204434 -1.772685 0.772038 2.266103** 0.1691
(1.204216) (0.634326) (0.786155) (0.749758) (0.204967) (1.622022) (0.508627) (0.38808) (1.917791) (1.311271) (0.943962)
South -0.362646 -1.344831** 2.350018*** -0.878168 0.046207 0.801865 -1.158697*** -0.475059 -0.803184 0.093213 1.297021 0.1538
(1.012324) (0.533247) (0.660882) (0.630284) (0.172305) (1.363553) (0.427577) (0.32624) (1.612191) (1.10232) (0.793542)
Rural -1.397994*** -0.282359 -0.571926* 0.317683 -0.06309 2.156006*** -0.47253** -0.084468 -0.282372 0.001287 0.500987 0.2590
(0.523303) (0.275652) (0.341631) (0.325814) (0.08907) (0.704865) (0.221028) (0.168644) (0.833394) (0.569825) (0.410208)
R-squared 0.0433 -0.0026 0.1126 0.0593 0.1375 0.0449 0.1366 0.0658 0.2258 0.0502 0.0606
Number of households 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112 1112
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix B 3. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with others, no kids (3SLS) 
 
 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant -25.61885 27.31265 1.854806 26.06031* 0.337827 -102.6561* 2.80779 -28.20247 234.9178*** -34.78545 -23.81864
(56.82421) (21.66995) (28.1551) (14.6156) (9.015585) (52.61389) (34.25972) (17.70175) (58.21718) (47.18976) (35.84237)
Household size -0.879125 0.055263 -0.158361 0.376621 -0.176773 -1.268152 0.564737 -0.226353 1.983536** 0.7106 -1.004357* 3.4076
(0.898599) (0.342681) (0.445235) (0.231126) (0.142569) (0.832018) (0.541772) (0.279929) (0.920626) (0.746243) (0.566799)
Home owner 3.554106*** -0.13795 -0.620215 0.182236 0.410301* -1.895847 -0.191142 -0.394512 0.155219 -0.410918 0.366698 0.7994
(1.377573) (0.525339) (0.682556) (0.354322) (0.218562) (1.275504) (0.830549) (0.429139) (1.411343) (1.144008) (0.868917)
Vehicle owner -0.031124 -0.352592 0.018355 0.142497 -0.573504* 4.881945*** -2.031213* 0.744151 0.644433 -1.98897 -0.221118 0.9204
(1.959949) (0.747428) (0.97111) (0.504113) (0.310961) (1.814729) (1.181668) (0.610559) (2.007995) (1.627643) (1.236255)
Husband age -0.009907 0.04264 -0.040605 0.022828 -0.022877 0.126396 0.000089 0.001947 -0.01089 0.019513 -0.102483 47.3567
(0.112614) (0.042945) (0.055797) (0.028965) (0.017867) (0.10427) (0.067896) (0.035081) (0.115374) (0.09352) (0.071032)
Wife age -0.099643 -0.059018 0.020686 -0.058775* 0.009895 -0.225877** 0.045189 0.023392 0.179737 -0.02761 0.062514 45.2580
(0.123587) (0.04713) (0.061234) (0.031787) (0.019608) (0.11443) (0.074511) (0.038499) (0.126616) (0.102633) (0.077953)
Husband education (year) 0.231971 -0.046622 -0.154873 0.054145 -0.057776* 0.199243 0.102694 -0.040897 0.025793 0.008118 -0.315493** 11.9841
(0.216644) (0.082617) (0.107342) (0.055723) (0.034372) (0.200592) (0.130616) (0.067489) (0.221955) (0.179913) (0.13665)
Wife education (year) -0.295399 0.079593 0.108263 0.039726 0.058939* -0.167527 -0.351513*** 0.000085 0.210372 0.100814 -0.046089 11.9172
(0.222477) (0.084842) (0.110232) (0.057223) (0.035298) (0.205993) (0.134133) (0.069306) (0.227931) (0.184756) (0.140329)
Log (husband wages) -4.738013*** 0.206653 1.591681* -0.120773 0.187742 1.197689 1.007742 -0.514328 2.09115 -1.149982 -0.554111 4.9861
(1.751813) (0.668055) (0.867984) (0.450579) (0.277938) (1.622015) (1.056181) (0.545721) (1.794757) (1.454796) (1.104972)
Log (wife wages) -0.415576 0.836533 1.211682* 0.214957 0.220527 2.415432* -0.894615 0.837718* -0.35681 -1.590978 -2.001522** 4.7709
(1.430123) (0.545378) (0.708593) (0.367838) (0.2269) (1.32416) (0.862231) (0.445509) (1.465181) (1.187648) (0.902063)
Log (household total consumption) 21.58927 -6.894372 -2.777329 -8.376433 0.138361 36.72306* -3.22489 9.905021 -71.77256*** 21.61752 12.73711 5.3622
(21.57862) (8.229019) (10.69171) (5.550177) (3.423608) (19.97977) (13.0099) (6.72212) (22.10759) (17.92) (13.6109)
Log (hh total consumption) squared -1.278054 0.460972 0.127334 0.714234 -0.030262 -3.017101* 0.657454 -0.826341 5.048543*** -1.979624 -0.72757 29.1275
(1.917996) (0.731429) (0.950324) (0.493323) (0.304304) (1.775885) (1.156374) (0.59749) (1.965013) (1.592803) (1.209793)
Central -5.144769** -0.803852 1.601529 0.104703 -0.085461 3.561109 -0.479043 0.149204 -1.773634 0.980238 2.161044 0.3854
(2.386291) (0.910014) (1.182353) (0.613772) (0.378603) (2.209482) (1.438712) (0.743372) (2.444788) (1.981699) (1.505174)
North -6.279053** -0.635105 1.591262 -0.412086 -0.002109 2.632052 1.6958 0.064322 0.003903 -0.759049 1.380445 0.2038
(2.919854) (1.113488) (1.446721) (0.751008) (0.463257) (2.703511) (1.760401) (0.909586) (2.99143) (2.424797) (1.841723)
Northeast -4.827132 -1.275695 2.765194* -0.365332 0.411625 4.40822 -0.400069 -0.265728 -1.706248 -2.419498 4.57288** 0.2420
(3.39181) (1.293469) (1.680565) (0.872398) (0.538136) (3.140498) (2.044947) (1.056609) (3.474956) (2.816734) (2.139414)
South -5.636813* -1.426474 2.534088* -0.765105 0.078881 2.282409 1.429972 -0.534617 0.005731 -0.656034 2.328051 0.0828
(2.906495) (1.108394) (1.440102) (0.747572) (0.461137) (2.691142) (1.752347) (0.905425) (2.977744) (2.413703) (1.833297)
Rural -0.435998 -0.780954 0.461764 -0.103289 -0.070692 1.125143 0.437793 0.459218 -0.954762 -0.744665 0.562215 0.2293
(1.315775) (0.501772) (0.651937) (0.338427) (0.208758) (1.218285) (0.793291) (0.409887) (1.34803) (1.092688) (0.829937)
R-squared -0.0051 0.0757 0.0953 0.0721 0.0904 0.3138 0.1446 0.0993 0.3112 0.1049 0.0627
Number of households 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314 314
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix B 4. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with kids and others (3SLS) 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 6.154422 52.37576** 42.58459 8.230505 -1.679992 -117.9231*** 17.79944 -12.07322 155.8969*** -15.44152 29.24307
(45.0715) (22.608) (29.01921) (13.97275) (5.321528) (39.73806) (22.03483) (10.14506) (47.49944) (39.8893) (28.1744)
Household size -0.302238 1.173707*** -0.628418 -0.168187 0.019659 0.561311 -0.048437 -0.23134 0.581497 -0.901002 -0.238985 4.5639
(0.847523) (0.42512) (0.545676) (0.262743) (0.100066) (0.747233) (0.414342) (0.190767) (0.893178) (0.750077) (0.52979)
Young children 0.096747 -0.686081 0.193675 0.091406 -0.207596 -2.121443* -0.739852 -0.003654 3.126523** -0.064005 0.223617 0.3333
(1.289449) (0.646792) (0.83021) (0.399746) (0.152244) (1.136865) (0.630394) (0.29024) (1.35891) (1.141192) (0.806041)
Older children -1.542526 -1.118562** 1.419133** -0.22354 -0.189808 -1.529427 0.762584 0.138498 0.597157 1.369963 0.13622 1.0251
(1.098359) (0.55094) (0.707176) (0.340506) (0.129682) (0.968387) (0.536972) (0.247228) (1.157526) (0.972073) (0.686589)
Home owner 2.119038** -0.361523 -0.083377 0.006043 -0.013365 1.55324* -0.746568 0.071009 -1.968085* 0.52613 -0.767593 0.7820
(0.985143) (0.494151) (0.634283) (0.305407) (0.116314) (0.868568) (0.481623) (0.221744) (1.038211) (0.871874) (0.615817)
Vehicle owner -0.585685 -2.517305*** -0.289907 -0.145054 0.027266 5.32202*** 0.307071 0.005513 -2.59831 -0.537942 0.044418 0.9223
(1.633865) (0.819552) (1.051961) (0.50652) (0.192908) (1.440525) (0.798774) (0.367764) (1.721879) (1.446008) (1.021337)
Husband age 0.22776** -0.033635 0.04533 0.025057 0.013872 -0.095664 -0.011706 0.017866 -0.036805 -0.053534 -0.125662** 42.3008
(0.102027) (0.051177) (0.06569) (0.03163) (0.012046) (0.089954) (0.049879) (0.022965) (0.107523) (0.090296) (0.063777)
Wife age -0.196358* -0.015125 -0.041338 -0.009825 -0.017337 0.032956 0.09491* -0.02557 0.069082 0.031501 0.110437* 39.3158
(0.103133) (0.051732) (0.066402) (0.031973) (0.012177) (0.090929) (0.05042) (0.023214) (0.108689) (0.091275) (0.064469)
Husband education (year) 0.260119* -0.004203 0.005595 -0.019722 0.013822 0.006629 -0.029764 -0.03423 -0.050316 -0.082893 -0.105425 11.1404
(0.149186) (0.074832) (0.096053) (0.04625) (0.017614) (0.131533) (0.072935) (0.03358) (0.157223) (0.132033) (0.093257)
Wife education (year) -0.085892 0.004557 0.182914* 0.053392 0.011812 -0.062077 0.029294 -0.041624 -0.096115 0.009652 -0.030831 11.2682
(0.157097) (0.0788) (0.101147) (0.048702) (0.018548) (0.138507) (0.076803) (0.035361) (0.16556) (0.139035) (0.098202)
Log (husband wages) -3.178818* 0.366119 -0.556715 -0.68275 -0.053828 4.963152*** -0.485016 0.220262 1.058018 -0.424701 1.370773 4.7618
(1.751434) (0.878525) (1.127658) (0.542968) (0.206789) (1.544182) (0.856252) (0.394227) (1.845782) (1.550059) (1.09483)
Log (wife wages) -0.879336 0.344246 -0.244973 0.038585 -0.005282 2.071111* -0.385821 0.382875 1.224267 -0.864015 -1.182051 4.4401
(1.231024) (0.617485) (0.792593) (0.381634) (0.145345) (1.085353) (0.601831) (0.277089) (1.297338) (1.089484) (0.769519)
Log (household total consumption) 4.435848 -17.79263** -15.85204 -0.926077 0.600567 40.49643*** -7.934113 3.883188 -39.38447** 13.74927 -8.142981 5.1068
(17.68147) (8.869077) (11.38418) (5.481486) (2.087625) (15.58917) (8.644225) (3.979889) (18.63394) (15.6485) (11.05277)
Log (hh total consumption) squared 0.187568 1.615196* 1.646126 0.123951 -0.024055 -3.968796*** 1.044202 -0.279865 2.317923 -1.176304 0.670519 26.3557
(1.666983) (0.836164) (1.073284) (0.516786) (0.196818) (1.469724) (0.814965) (0.375218) (1.756781) (1.475318) (1.042039)
Central -2.00979 1.00081 1.330134 -0.329577 0.013426 -1.254699 -0.344413 0.833894** 2.620172 -1.247703 0.580655 0.3784
(1.892014) (0.94904) (1.21817) (0.586549) (0.223387) (1.668126) (0.92498) (0.42587) (1.993934) (1.674475) (1.182707)
North -2.339502 1.558448 2.329148 0.154644 0.11663 -2.094627 0.433544 0.706575 3.848144 -3.416103* 0.154179 0.1779
(2.254637) (1.130933) (1.451644) (0.698967) (0.266202) (1.987839) (1.102261) (0.507492) (2.376091) (1.995405) (1.409384)
Northeast -2.1175 1.062708 2.897623* -0.050167 0.226563 -2.482786 -0.244444 0.540927 2.606285 -2.165421 1.172265 0.2506
(2.31045) (1.158928) (1.487579) (0.71627) (0.272792) (2.037047) (1.129547) (0.520055) (2.43491) (2.0448) (1.444273)
South -2.839759 0.099553 2.985717** -0.01329 -0.095353 -2.72452 -0.90589 0.153266 5.862242*** -2.217059 1.067441 0.1078
(2.158616) (1.082769) (1.389821) (0.669199) (0.254865) (1.903181) (1.055318) (0.485879) (2.274898) (1.910425) (1.349361)
Rural 0.262274 -0.278426 0.176892 -0.303672 0.000143 1.677691* 0.254999 -0.368004 -1.504496 0.587879 -0.575139 0.2431
(1.054227) (0.528804) (0.678762) (0.326824) (0.124471) (0.929478) (0.515397) (0.237294) (1.111017) (0.933015) (0.659002)
R-squared -0.0222 0.1008 0.1071 0.0444 0.1001 0.3970 0.1127 0.1384 0.4394 0.0705 0.0714
Number of households 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399 399
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix B 5. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with one dependent (3SLS) 
 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 9.607692 42.48559*** -24.63638 26.89102** -4.215899 -27.42558 -5.041132 6.376922 194.4819*** -93.11088*** -26.61102
(26.65131) (11.31006) (15.39001) (13.60178) (4.059494) (26.77895) (11.80278) (7.700325) (33.41395) (25.62627) (18.76658)
Young children -0.650086 -0.668379* -0.031233 2.905046*** -0.098003 -3.275267*** -2.126959*** -0.342395 5.996606*** -1.782388** 0.149236 0.3191
(0.913061) (0.387477) (0.527255) (0.465991) (0.139076) (0.917434) (0.404358) (0.26381) (1.144746) (0.877944) (0.642934)
Older children -0.275904 -1.116219*** 0.07506 -0.035088 -0.087111 -0.424395 -0.210814 0.056562 1.198084 0.768925 0.662742 0.4350
(0.74374) (0.315622) (0.429479) (0.379576) (0.113286) (0.747302) (0.329372) (0.214888) (0.932461) (0.715135) (0.523706)
Home owner 2.686896*** 0.093966 0.309029 -0.196694 0.116882 -0.760717 -0.077993 -0.316441* 0.324629 -0.659689 -1.208039*** 0.5875
(0.63678) (0.270231) (0.367714) (0.324987) (0.096994) (0.639829) (0.282004) (0.183984) (0.798359) (0.612288) (0.44839)
Vehicle owner -2.983845*** -0.17903 0.516733 0.233245 0.031362 4.097538*** 0.156601 0.57099** 0.902666 -2.613578*** -0.444755 0.8913
(1.010479) (0.428819) (0.583509) (0.515709) (0.153915) (1.015319) (0.4475) (0.291956) (1.266883) (0.971615) (0.711531)
Husband age 0.05366 0.012515 -0.032657 0.013883 -0.002088 0.088324 -0.013996 0.014854 -0.10058 0.014975 -0.063126 40.2884
(0.061877) (0.026259) (0.035732) (0.03158) (0.009425) (0.062174) (0.027403) (0.017878) (0.077578) (0.059497) (0.043571)
Wife age -0.073779 -0.013807 0.02437 -0.049091 -0.002155 -0.143486** 0.005945 0.015746 0.222764*** -0.042313 0.032864 37.8712
(0.064889) (0.027537) (0.037471) (0.033117) (0.009884) (0.0652) (0.028737) (0.018748) (0.081354) (0.062393) (0.045692)
Husband education (year) 0.070368 0.037633 0.10798* 0.029022 -0.01487 0.14611 0.016457 0.056547* -0.198238 -0.129934 -0.095191 10.7742
(0.108222) (0.045927) (0.062494) (0.055233) (0.016484) (0.108741) (0.047927) (0.031269) (0.135683) (0.10406) (0.076205)
Wife education (year) 0.003556 0.002206 0.091314 0.066063 0.046268*** -0.007107 -0.092477* -0.005442 0.065373 -0.053659 -0.227754*** 10.8416
(0.113857) (0.048318) (0.065748) (0.058108) (0.017343) (0.114402) (0.050423) (0.032897) (0.142747) (0.109478) (0.080173)
Log (husband wages) -3.090336*** 1.416274*** 1.502389*** -0.356497 0.240997 3.06232*** 0.493707 -0.345091 1.12858 -2.412884** -1.349154* 4.5944
(1.090599) (0.46282) (0.629775) (0.556599) (0.166119) (1.095823) (0.482982) (0.315105) (1.367334) (1.048654) (0.767948)
Log (wife wages) -3.038903*** 0.147012 0.352069 0.160246 0.164039 2.23176*** 0.232867 0.011217 1.761983* -0.808774 -0.921466 4.3593
(0.844523) (0.358392) (0.487676) (0.431011) (0.128637) (0.848567) (0.374005) (0.244007) (1.058816) (0.812041) (0.594673)
Log (household total consumption) 5.199436 -13.30208*** 9.052442 -8.885799 1.327467 7.16444 1.43849 -3.561425 -55.05468*** 44.33611*** 12.98756* 4.9202
(10.65526) (4.521792) (6.152967) (5.438027) (1.622996) (10.70629) (4.718783) (3.07861) (13.35898) (10.24545) (7.502928)
Log (hh total consumption) squared 0.351113 0.967795** -1.152427* 0.905914 -0.151051 -0.547099 -0.021741 0.506044 3.602141*** -3.838641*** -0.827672 24.5081
(1.085655) (0.460721) (0.62692) (0.554076) (0.165366) (1.090855) (0.480793) (0.313677) (1.361135) (1.0439) (0.764467)
Central -0.582077 -0.092479 1.43887** -0.791977 0.050652 -1.1552 -0.744492 0.418911 -0.969 -0.101907 3.053339*** 0.3865
(1.078839) (0.457829) (0.622984) (0.550597) (0.164327) (1.084006) (0.477774) (0.311708) (1.352589) (1.037346) (0.759667)
North 0.19376 -0.515386 1.93606** -1.04116 0.198178 -1.657388 0.081922 0.103423 -2.108153 0.026372 2.671003*** 0.2092
(1.436459) (0.609593) (0.829495) (0.733112) (0.2188) (1.443338) (0.636149) (0.415034) (1.800953) (1.381211) (1.011486)
Northeast 0.394799 -0.690179 1.44015 -0.664091 0.060925 -1.115607 -1.624949** 0.562846 -1.721088 -0.345787 4.243144*** 0.1631
(1.620599) (0.687736) (0.935828) (0.82709) (0.246848) (1.62836) (0.717698) (0.468237) (2.031818) (1.558269) (1.141149)
South 0.08295 -0.866827 2.071783*** -2.147145*** -0.00415 -1.444293 -0.055527 -0.160096 0.646891 0.234282 1.83598** 0.1312
(1.31566) (0.558329) (0.759739) (0.671461) (0.2004) (1.321961) (0.582653) (0.380132) (1.649502) (1.265058) (0.926425)
Rural -1.313874* -0.173014 -0.7284* 0.20093 -0.112757 1.409834** 0.04108 0.072367 -0.954475 1.010658 0.626047 0.2541
(0.684084) (0.290306) (0.39503) (0.34913) (0.104199) (0.68736) (0.302953) (0.197651) (0.857667) (0.657773) (0.481699)
R-squared -0.0973 0.0723 0.0443 0.1556 0.0951 0.3401 0.1659 0.1589 0.3977 0.0870 0.0716
Number of households 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846 846
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix B 6. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with two dependents (3SLS) 
 
 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant -25.94597 49.71399*** 15.2075 5.842335 0.148954 -135.043*** 11.21353 -0.034415 213.2955*** -62.0318** 19.11897
(31.14947) (14.29068) (18.82204) (13.0403) (4.172485) (33.16421) (14.17913) (8.504395) (41.75173) (26.87952) (20.35923)
Young children -0.213211 -0.062337 0.439968 1.550279*** -0.080883 -0.38795 -1.114623*** 0.056878 1.669201* -2.317174*** 0.255049 0.3709
(0.706221) (0.323998) (0.426734) (0.29565) (0.094599) (0.7519) (0.32147) (0.192812) (0.946596) (0.609413) (0.461585)
Older children -0.794166 -0.30794 0.720806** 0.179793 0.036415 0.750998 -0.486703** -0.010308 0.283052 -0.747008* 0.567646* 1.0742
(0.504697) (0.231544) (0.304963) (0.211285) (0.067604) (0.537341) (0.229737) (0.137792) (0.67648) (0.435514) (0.329869)
Home owner 3.348566*** 0.025581 -0.228717 -0.41986 -0.082249 0.258031 -0.379648 0.086162 -1.711844* 0.257495 -0.585396 0.6731
(0.706059) (0.323924) (0.426636) (0.295582) (0.094577) (0.751727) (0.321396) (0.192768) (0.946378) (0.609273) (0.461479)
Vehicle owner 0.031207 -0.377858 -0.226687 -0.49439 -0.011207 1.089079 -0.35629 0.666445** 2.847611* -2.476033** 0.466059 0.9203
(1.246085) (0.571676) (0.752946) (0.521657) (0.166914) (1.326682) (0.567214) (0.340205) (1.670212) (1.075273) (0.814439)
Husband age 0.064447 -0.022606 0.008764 0.009031 0.001189 -0.015922 -0.025621 0.029907 -0.005541 -0.022428 0.004433 40.9560
(0.072918) (0.033453) (0.044061) (0.030526) (0.009767) (0.077634) (0.033192) (0.019908) (0.097737) (0.062922) (0.047659)
Wife age -0.085666 0.034745 -0.029967 -0.007361 -0.012654 -0.016783 0.12452*** -0.001184 0.051942 -0.037143 0.014681 38.2967
(0.079126) (0.036301) (0.047812) (0.033125) (0.010599) (0.084244) (0.036018) (0.021603) (0.106058) (0.06828) (0.051717)
Husband education (year) 0.108976 0.048025 0.014582 -0.10668** 0.015411 0.12397 0.011195 -0.007249 0.021591 -0.140033 -0.024609 11.0783
(0.122796) (0.056336) (0.074199) (0.051407) (0.016449) (0.130738) (0.055896) (0.033526) (0.164592) (0.105963) (0.080259)
Wife education (year) -0.229022* 0.074249 0.081762 0.017556 0.005584 0.051034 0.004308 0.027523 0.042435 0.091117 -0.149014* 11.1635
(0.128698) (0.059044) (0.077766) (0.053878) (0.017239) (0.137022) (0.058583) (0.035137) (0.172503) (0.111056) (0.084117)
Log (husband wages) -3.683913** 0.172662 -0.254161 -1.459282** 0.049629 -1.540365 -0.04397 0.640743 6.97923*** 0.080463 0.56298 4.7127
(1.71899) (0.788634) (1.038698) (0.719632) (0.230259) (1.830174) (0.782478) (0.469317) (2.304077) (1.483352) (1.123528)
Log (wife wages) -1.205059 0.528851 -0.678645 -0.244235 0.090925 -1.037598 -0.862611* 0.321761 2.933841** 0.333003 -0.104787 4.4034
(1.04392) (0.478927) (0.630788) (0.437023) (0.139834) (1.111441) (0.475189) (0.28501) (1.399236) (0.90082) (0.682304)
Log (household total consumption) 17.54364 -14.95976*** -6.457366 -1.320407 -0.241456 51.16108*** -4.540637 -1.305593 -63.26694*** 32.09322*** -6.294794 5.0507
(12.15356) (5.575778) (7.343777) (5.087921) (1.627974) (12.93965) (5.532258) (3.318151) (16.29023) (10.48755) (7.943538)
Log (hh total consumption) squared -0.889276 1.146844** 0.883368 0.492247 0.051401 -3.751024*** 0.697244 0.070604 3.343394** -3.213066*** 0.529381 25.8142
(1.15417) (0.529507) (0.697406) (0.483177) (0.154602) (1.228821) (0.525374) (0.31511) (1.547011) (0.995957) (0.754363)
Central -2.524624** -0.341107 1.810907** 0.268513 -0.02521 0.370177 -0.980737* 0.446319 -0.003882 -0.310451 0.762328 0.3819
(1.260757) (0.578407) (0.761812) (0.527799) (0.168879) (1.342303) (0.573892) (0.344211) (1.689878) (1.087933) (0.824028)
North -2.198517 -0.583303 2.972044*** 1.007097 0.026419 1.502531 -0.664532 0.393025 -2.605829 -2.095037 0.963203 0.1676
(1.855929) (0.851458) (1.121443) (0.776959) (0.248602) (1.97597) (0.844813) (0.506704) (2.487626) (1.601519) (1.213031)
Northeast -1.904761 -1.18679 2.159979** 1.665501** 0.202605 1.303717 -1.642774** -0.328103 -0.991387 -2.044136 1.481256 0.2294
(1.777856) (0.81564) (1.074268) (0.744275) (0.238145) (1.892848) (0.809274) (0.485388) (2.38298) (1.534149) (1.162003)
South -1.346234 -1.017177 2.491754** 1.275628* -0.045127 0.437815 -1.319636* -0.127008 -0.493286 -1.58082 0.688144 0.1277
(1.614045) (0.740488) (0.975286) (0.675698) (0.216202) (1.718442) (0.734708) (0.440665) (2.163413) (1.392793) (1.054937)
Rural -0.113413 -0.254093 0.131249 0.02186 -0.065041 2.481049*** -0.343108 -0.179432 -1.059636 -1.456804** 0.076254 0.2473
(0.787828) (0.361438) (0.476044) (0.329813) (0.10553) (0.838784) (0.358617) (0.215092) (1.055979) (0.679833) (0.514923)
R-squared -0.0765 0.0908 0.0857 0.0051 0.1033 0.1879 0.1484 0.0680 0.1792 0.0817 0.0322
Number of households 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728 728
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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Appendix B 7. QUAIDS Engel curve (1.17) for households with three or more dependents (3SLS) 
 
Variable Housing Household Clothing& Personal& Cosmetic Transportation& Education Recreation& Food in Food out Alcohol& Mean of X
operations Footwear Services Communication Religion Tobacco
Constant 15.77136 81.18375*** 8.541248 27.17966* 13.23764 -138.5017*** -6.047831 -5.162412 133.8621*** -12.03124 25.07067
(38.30264) (25.21963) (28.22445) (15.38049) (8.116318) (48.1543) (21.84644) (11.00513) (49.81215) (41.55579) (29.31194)
Young children 0.400745 -0.244075 -0.432096 1.095245*** -0.122134 -0.524346 -0.647989 -0.167854 2.66877*** -1.691292** -0.534337 0.5657
(0.764659) (0.503475) (0.563462) (0.30705) (0.162031) (0.961334) (0.436134) (0.219702) (0.994431) (0.829604) (0.585172)
Older children -0.81359 -0.43458 0.559276 0.167172 0.103497 -1.387835** 0.539723* -0.023013 1.290989** -0.085951 -0.239318 1.4502
(0.50029) (0.329406) (0.368654) (0.200892) (0.106011) (0.628968) (0.285348) (0.143744) (0.650622) (0.542781) (0.382858)
Home owner 1.424702 -0.099615 -0.641984 -0.322673 0.039175 -0.517948 -0.392559 0.244262 1.117606 -0.247919 -0.555687 0.7689
(1.064019) (0.700583) (0.784055) (0.427259) (0.225465) (1.337691) (0.606878) (0.305715) (1.383745) (1.154389) (0.814264)
Vehicle owner 0.78019 -0.36346 -0.001734 -0.025579 -0.015086 5.077748*** 0.885314 -0.011693 -4.539312** -1.831275 -0.77943 0.9084
(1.562153) (1.028569) (1.151119) (0.627285) (0.33102) (1.963948) (0.890996) (0.448839) (2.031563) (1.694831) (1.195472)
Husband age 0.186726* 0.025066 -0.001481 0.027991 -0.002121 0.118289 0.055489 0.016806 -0.054954 -0.240907** -0.130097 41.5538
(0.106681) (0.070242) (0.078611) (0.042838) (0.022606) (0.13412) (0.060847) (0.030652) (0.138737) (0.115742) (0.08164)
Wife age -0.116002 -0.028767 0.012862 -0.001871 -0.001064 -0.087166 0.006489 0.017053 0.1245 0.002865 0.065872 38.6056
(0.106153) (0.069894) (0.078222) (0.042626) (0.022494) (0.133456) (0.060546) (0.0305) (0.13805) (0.115169) (0.081236)
Husband education (year) 0.279775 0.200276* -0.108136 0.198217*** -0.018589 -0.230572 -0.015136 0.002345 0.160709 -0.198827 -0.216991 11.2709
(0.183628) (0.120906) (0.135312) (0.073736) (0.038911) (0.230858) (0.104735) (0.05276) (0.238806) (0.199224) (0.140525)
Wife education (year) 0.008724 0.072251 0.211039 -0.071231 0.053748 -0.169032 0.081032 -0.067921 0.05682 -0.401596** 0.129607 11.0757
(0.174754) (0.115063) (0.128773) (0.070173) (0.03703) (0.219702) (0.099673) (0.05021) (0.227266) (0.189596) (0.133734)
Log (husband wages) 1.515908 2.678484** 0.63914 -0.802076 0.061384 -2.84259 -0.577179 -0.122318 -1.308198 0.686964 1.788219 4.7307
(1.883489) (1.240147) (1.387906) (0.756318) (0.399111) (2.367934) (1.074274) (0.541165) (2.449456) (2.043459) (1.441381)
Log (wife wages) -0.87907 0.396308 0.613029 -0.559713 -0.072017 -0.413933 0.544776 0.234969 1.19069 1.171174 -1.456643 4.4432
(1.336922) (0.88027) (0.985151) (0.536843) (0.283293) (1.680786) (0.762532) (0.384125) (1.738652) (1.45047) (1.023109)
Log (household total consumption) 1.352251 -26.6478*** -4.802379 -9.249888 -5.507976* 47.2751*** 1.017305 0.906227 -28.50187 12.58707 -5.980221 5.1458
(14.12661) (9.301389) (10.40962) (5.672563) (2.993424) (17.76005) (8.057307) (4.058864) (18.37149) (15.32642) (10.8107)
Log (hh total consumption) squared -0.517995 1.846468** 0.405958 1.054898** 0.569407** -2.784879** 0.034127 0.023992 1.371464 -1.135999 0.439075 26.8081
(1.106385) (0.728478) (0.815273) (0.444271) (0.234443) (1.390954) (0.631042) (0.317887) (1.438842) (1.200354) (0.846686)
Central -3.904303** -1.595942 1.351703 -1.169132 0.027269 3.696976 -0.66748 0.376145 0.565551 0.943597 0.596051 0.3506
(1.925625) (1.26789) (1.418954) (0.773238) (0.408039) (2.420907) (1.098307) (0.553272) (2.504253) (2.089173) (1.473627)
North -6.576808*** -0.554597 2.524154* -0.897474 0.289907 3.652183 0.81471 0.450233 2.089998 -1.572364 0.296778 0.1753
(2.054854) (1.352978) (1.51418) (0.82513) (0.435423) (2.583374) (1.172014) (0.590402) (2.672314) (2.229378) (1.572522)
Northeast -6.073314*** -2.208436 1.958462 -1.438814 0.241443 4.790483* -0.253686 0.372811 1.173693 1.249037 1.316281 0.2351
(2.291469) (1.508773) (1.688538) (0.920143) (0.485562) (2.880848) (1.306971) (0.658386) (2.980029) (2.486089) (1.753597)
South -5.140622** -1.379728 3.416182** -1.65932* -0.051889 3.105499 -0.296188 -0.410637 2.896793 -1.748459 1.65897 0.1434
(2.138454) (1.408024) (1.575784) (0.8587) (0.453138) (2.688477) (1.219697) (0.614422) (2.781036) (2.320079) (1.636499)
Rural -0.969292 -1.839902*** 0.599857 0.217152 0.038627 2.242472* 0.064928 0.102582 0.226156 0.659704 -0.575612 0.2470
(1.085604) (0.714795) (0.79996) (0.435926) (0.230039) (1.364828) (0.61919) (0.311916) (1.411816) (1.177808) (0.830783)
R-squared 0.1121 -0.0914 0.0906 0.2152 0.1437 0.1795 0.1713 0.1801 0.4743 0.1284 0.0565
Number of households 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251
1
 Standard error in parentheses
2
 *** Significant at 1%
   **   Significant at 5%
   *     Significant at 10%
3
 Incomes and total consumption in 100 baht
4
 Dummy variables - Bangkok dummy equals zero; Urban dummy equals zero
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